Cosby v. S.C. Prob. Parole & Pardon Servs.
| Decision Date | 24 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No.6:20-cv-00655-HMH-JDA |
| Parties | Kristin Cosby, Plaintiff, v. South Carolina Probation Parole and Pardon Services, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's motion to dismiss. [Doc. 6.] Plaintiff alleges discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended ("Title VII"), as well as state law claims. [Doc. 1-1.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(g), D.S.C., all pretrial matters in employment discrimination cases are referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for consideration.
Plaintiff brought suit in the Greenville County Court of Common Pleas on December 27, 2019. [Doc. 1.] Defendant removed the case to this Court on February 6, 2020, and, on February 10, 2020, filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. [Docs. 1; 6.] Plaintiff filed a response opposing the motion to dismiss on February 24, 2020, and on March 2, 2020, Defendant filed a reply. [Docs. 9; 11.] Accordingly, the motion is ripe for review.
Defendant originally hired Plaintiff in 2006. [Doc. 1-1 ¶ 8.] Plaintiff left her employment with Defendant in 2010 and then applied to return to work for Defendant in 2012 but was told that Defendant wanted to hire a male for the position Plaintiff sought. [Id.] Plaintiff subsequently filed a charge of discrimination with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), asserting that Defendant's refusal to hire her because of her gender violated Title VII. [Id.] As a result of that charge, Defendant was required to rehire Plaintiff in 2012. [Id.]
During approximately the fall of 2018, Plaintiff had applied for a promotion, and Plaintiff's agent in charge ("AIC") and assistant agent in charge ("AAIC") began investigating a purported inappropriate relationship between Plaintiff and another employee and other related matters. [Id. ¶ 10.] Plaintiff objected to the investigation, which she maintained was baseless and for the purpose of preventing her from receiving the promotion she was seeking. [Id.] Her objections were validated when a regional director subsequently advised the AIC and AAIC that there was no evidence of wrongdoing by Plaintiff and that they were not to take any further action against her regarding the allegations. [Id.] The AIC and AAIC nonetheless continued to harass Plaintiff. [Id.]
On approximately October 19, 2018, Plaintiff made another complaint to Defendant concerning the conduct of her AIC and AAIC, asserting that they were subjecting her to ahostile work environment and discriminatory conduct based on gender and retaliatory animus. [Id. ¶ 11.] Defendant took no action to investigate or stop the conduct Plaintiff had alleged. [Id.] Rather, on November 7, 2019, Plaintiff's AIC and AAIC were informed of her complaint and they instituted yet another investigation into Plaintiff's conduct for the purpose of retaliating against Plaintiff and preventing her from being promoted. [Id.] This latest investigation concerned sexual conduct that had allegedly occurred between Plaintiff and one of her subordinates during an off-duty party in May 2015. [Id. at 11-12.] Plaintiff disclosed that the subordinate in question had attempted to engage in sexual activity with her at the party—a fact that she had disclosed to her AIC around the time the incident had occurred. [Id. at 12.] Although the activity or relationship would not have violated any policy or rules even had the subordinate's attempt been successful, Defendant required Plaintiff to take a polygraph regarding the issue. [Id.]
Following the test, the agent who had administered it informed Plaintiff that he believed she had not been honest, and he encouraged her to write a statement acknowledging that sexual activity had occurred. [Id. ¶ 13.] Upon the agent's repeated urging that it would be in Plaintiff's interest to admit the sexual activity, Plaintiff wrote a statement confirming again events that she had previously acknowledged. [Id.] Defendant subsequently advised Plaintiff that she could either resign or be subjected to whatever adverse action Defendant deemed appropriate. [Id. ¶ 14.] Believing that Defendant would continue its pattern of retaliation against her if she did not resign, she submitted her resignation on December 19, 2018. [Id.]
On January 3, 2019, even though Plaintiff had resigned, "Defendant falsely reported to the [Law Enforcement Training Council ("LETC")] that Plaintiff's employment had beenterminated by Defendant and further reported said 'termination' as resulting from 'MISCONDUCT.'" [Id. ¶ 15.] The purpose of this communication was to retaliate against Plaintiff for her prior complaints and charge and bring about the revocation of Plaintiff's law enforcement certification. [Id.]
On September 25, 2019, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC "complaining of the same discrimination and retaliation outlined in [her Complaint in this Court], including claims under Title VII." [Id. ¶ 19.] The EEOC issued Plaintiff a Notice of Right to Sue on September 30, 2019, stating that "[t]he facts alleged in the charge fail to state a claim under any of the statutes enforced by the EEOC." [Id.; id. at 16.]
Plaintiff then filed this action on December 27, 2019, alleging claims under Title VII for gender discrimination and retaliation, as well as state-law claims of fraud and defamation based on Defendant's communication to the LETC regarding Plaintiff's separation from her employment. [Id. ¶¶ 20-39.] As her relief, Plaintiff requests compensatory and punitive damages, as well as attorneys' fees and costs. [Id. at 14.]
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) examines whether the complaint fails to state facts upon which jurisdiction can be founded. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). It is the plaintiff's burden to prove jurisdiction, and the court is to "regard the pleadings' allegations as mere evidence on the issue, and may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment." Richmond, Fredericksburg &Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991). To resolve a jurisdictional challenge under Rule 12(b)(1), the court may consider undisputed facts and any jurisdictional facts that it determines. See id. The court may dismiss a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on any of the following bases: "'(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.'" Johnson v. United States, 534 F.3d 958, 962 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981)).
Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a claim should be dismissed if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When considering a motion to dismiss, the court should "accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). However, the court "need not accept the legal conclusions drawn from the facts" nor "accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments." E. Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000). Further, for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may rely on only the complaint's allegations and those documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference. See Simons v. Montgomery Cty. Police Officers, 762 F.2d 30, 31 (4th Cir. 1985). If matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion is treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
With respect to well-pleaded allegations, the United States Supreme Court explained the interplay between Rule 8(a) and Rule 12(b)(6) in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," in order to "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the "grounds" of his "entitle[ment] to relief" requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (footnote and citations omitted); see also 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, at 235-36 (3d ed. 2004) ().
"A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The plausibility standard reflects the threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2)—the pleader...
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