Cosby v. Vicksburg Healthcare, LLC, CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:11cv159-KS-MTP

Decision Date16 May 2013
Docket NumberCIVIL ACTION NO. 5:11cv159-KS-MTP
PartiesSHIRLEY COSBY PLAINTIFF v. VICKSBURG HEALTHCARE, LLC D/B/A RIVER REGION MEDICAL CENTER AND DARLENE WHITE, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment [44] of the Defendants Vicksburg Healthcare, LLC d/b/a River Region Medical Center ("RRMC") and Darlene White. Having considered the parties' submissions, the record, and the applicable law, the Court finds that the motion should be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 26, 2010, Plaintiff Shirley Cosby, an African-American female, was terminated from her employment with RRMC for purportedly violating the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA") by accessing a co-worker's medical records. RRMC operates several medical facilities in Vicksburg, Mississippi, including a hospital and a separate medical clinic that is commonly referred to as the "Street Clinic". Plaintiff was fifty-one (51) years old and was working in the Street Clinic as a Lab Assistant/Phlebotomist at the time of her discharge. Further, Plaintiff had been employed by RRMC for approximately twenty-five (25) years when she was terminated. At all times relevant to the Complaint, Defendant Darlene White was employed by RRMC as the Administrative Laboratory Director and was responsible for managing both the hospital and Street Clinic laboratories.

On November 1, 2011, Plaintiff brought this lawsuit against RRMC and Darlene White asserting numerous federal and state law claims in connection with the termination of her employment. (See Compl. [1].) Plaintiff alleges employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. ("ADEA"), and the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 ("FMLA"). Plaintiff also asserts the following state law causes of action: tortious breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence. RRMC and Defendant White have moved for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims. (See Motion for SJ [44].) The motion has been fully briefed and the Court is ready to rule.

II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "Where the burden of production at trial ultimately rests on the nonmovant, the movant must merely demonstrate an absence of evidentiary support in the record for the nonmovant's case." Cuadra v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 808, 812 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The nonmovant must then "come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. "'An issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action.'" Sierra Club, Inc. v. Sandy Creek Energy Assocs., L.P., 627 F.3d 134, 138 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Danielsv. City of Arlington, Tex., 246 F.3d 500, 502 (5th Cir. 2001)). "An issue is 'genuine' if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Cuadra, 626 F.3d at 812.

The Court is not permitted to make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 164 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007)). When deciding whether a genuine fact issue exists, "the court must view the facts and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Sierra Club, Inc., 627 F.3d at 138. However, "[c]onclusional allegations and denials, speculation, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic argumentation do not adequately substitute for specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial." Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 744 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is mandatory "'against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.'" Brown v. Offshore Specialty Fabricators, Inc., 663 F.3d 759, 766 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986)), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2103 (2012).

B. Analysis
1. Federal Claims

The following circumstances are pertinent to Plaintiff's federal claims for relief. In July of 2010, one of RRMC's employees at the Street Clinic was diagnosed with aserious illness and became a patient at RRMC (the "Employee-Patient").1 On July 22, 2010, Defendant Darlene White was advised by Lisa Hasty, a RRMC employee, that another RRMC employee, Liz Conner, had used her log-in and password information to view certain test results of the Employee-Patient on the hospital's Co-Path computer system.2 Defendant White subsequently advised Joy Hite, RRMC's Privacy and Compliance Officer, of the matter and Ms. Hite conducted an investigation as to whether the Employee-Patient's medical information had been improperly accessed by other RRMC employees.

Ms. Hite initially attempted to obtain an audit of the Co-Path system with respect to the Employee-Patient's records, but was unable to get one. Ms. Hite subsequently obtained audits of the HBO system, which Ms. Hite used to determine that the following RRMC employees had accessed the Employee-Patient's medical information without any legitimate reason for doing so: Plaintiff Shirley Cosby, Maggie Fife, Shirley Brewer, Mary Elizabeth Conner,3 Sylvia McBeath and Jennifer Smith. Ms. Hite interviewed each of these employees. Brewer, Conner, McBeath and Smith all admitted to accessing the Employee-Patient's medical information without authorization. Each of theseemployees received a written warning and Ms. Smith was also suspended for three (3) days without pay. Plaintiff and Maggie Fife denied accessing the Employee-Patient's medical information. Plaintiff told Ms. Hite that she had no reason to access the Employee-Patient's information and that the Employee-Patient had previously called her and asked that she inform their supervisor, Cynthia Douglas,4 that she would have to miss work because of a medical issue.

On August 26, 2010, Plaintiff and Maggie Fife were terminated for violating HIPAA. Plaintiff was advised of her termination in a meeting with Joy Hite, Darlene White and Anita Oliphant (RRMC's Interim Human Resources Director). At the beginning of the meeting, Joy Hite folded a piece of paper in front of her and stated, "This is where we have you logging in to patient/coworker information." (Cosby Dep. [51-3] 47:17-23.) Plaintiff again denied accessing the Employee-Patient's protected information. Darlene White then allegedly took control of the meeting and told the Plaintiff that she "was going to be terminated for . . . a HIPAA violation." (Cosby Dep. [51-3] 144:2-9.) Plaintiff contends that Defendant White called her "Illiterate" and was loud and intimidating during the meeting. (Cosby Dep. [51-3] 156:1-14.) Plaintiff refused to sign a disciplinary notice indicating that she had violated HIPAA and walked out of the meeting after stating, "Well, other people came to me and told me things. . . .If it's not something done to them, I will seek an attorney." (Cosby Dep. [51-3] 47:17-48:6.)

Also during the summer of 2010 (specifically, on August 20), Defendant White met with the Plaintiff and Maggie Fife (a Medical Technologist) in regard to a reduction in force at the Street Clinic. Defendant White advised the Plaintiff and Ms. Fife that laboratory testing would be performed at the hospital, as opposed to the Street Clinic, and thus, Ms. Fife's services were no longer needed. Plaintiff's Phlebotomist position was not being eliminated because blood samples would still be taken at the Street Clinic. Defendant White further stated that another employee at the Street Clinic who was out on sick leave, the Employee-Patient, would be laid off and that the Employee-Patient would be advised of this decision through the mail. Plaintiff purportedly questioned whether the Employee-Patient could be terminated while he or she was out sick, and walked out of the meeting after Ms. White stated, "Yeah, we can do that." (Cosby Dep. [51-3] 39:25-40:12.) Subsequent to Plaintiff's termination for violating HIPAA, her Phlebotomist position at the Street Clinic was filled by Tina Broom, an African-American female approximately the same age as the Plaintiff. (Cosby Dep. [44-1] 90:16-91:8.)

Plaintiff alleges retaliation under the FMLA and disparate treatment and retaliation under both Title VII and the ADEA in connection with the preceding circumstances. As an initial matter, the Court finds that Plaintiff's Title VII and ADEA claims against Defendant Darlene White fail as a matter of law. Neither statute permits the maintenance of a claim against a managerial or supervisory employee. See Ackel v. Nat'l Commc'ns, Inc., 339 F.3d 376, 381 n.1 (5th Cir. 2003) ("Individuals are not liableunder Title VII in either their individual or official capacities.") (citation omitted); Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 655 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that there is no basis for individual liability against supervisory employees under the ADEA). Furthermore, Plaintiff's official capacity claims against Defendant White are redundant since her employer, RRMC, is a party to this lawsuit. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985) (Official capacity claims "generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.") (...

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