Coslett v. State
Decision Date | 18 April 1997 |
Docket Number | CR-96-611 |
Parties | Clint COSLETT v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Clint Coslett, pro se.
Ellen Leonard, Asst. General Counsel, Department of Corrections, for appellee.
During a prison disciplinary proceeding, the appellant, Clint Coslett, was found guilty of making a false statement to a Department of Corrections employee in violation of Department of Corrections Admin.Reg. No. 403, Annex B, Rule Violation 41, "Making False Statements or Charges." As a result, he was removed from work release, placed in a Class IV classification for three months, and referred for custody and classification review. The appellant filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, alleging that he was denied due process of law because the charge against him was improper and because he was not allowed to call two witnesses at the disciplinary hearing. The State filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that, because his punishment did not include a loss of accrued "good time," the appellant was not entitled to the procedural protections of Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). The trial court denied the petition, noting that the appellant had not lost any accrued "good time" and finding that the appellant had failed to state a cause of action concerning the disciplinary proceeding. Subsequently, the appellant filed a Traverse to the State's Motion to Dismiss, a Motion for the Appointment of Counsel, a Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing, and a Motion for Reconsideration. The trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration on December 20, 1996, and the appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on January 3, 1997.
The appellant argues that the trial court erred in finding that no liberty interest was involved and in dismissing his petition. Although he did not lose any accrued "good time," the appellant argues that, in essence, he lost "good time" because he lost the ability to earn "good time" for several months. Therefore, he argues that he was entitled to the Wolff procedural protections because he had a protected liberty interest in remaining in the highest classification and continuing to earn "good time" at the highest rate.
Alabama gives inmates an opportunity to reduce their prison sentences through incentive time or "good time" deductions. § 14-9-41, Ala.Code 1975. That statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
§ 14-9-41, Ala.Code 1975. This statute is couched in discretionary terms. For example, the statute provides that an inmate who has "faithfully observed the rules for a period of time ... may be entitled to earn a deduction." § 14-9-41(a), Ala.Code 1975. Therefore, inmates in Alabama are not entitled to receive, and thus do not have a liberty interest in receiving, "good time" deductions from their sentences. State v. Malone, 654 So.2d 92 (Ala.Cr.App.1995); Parker v. State, 648 So.2d 653 (Ala.Cr.App.1994); Gullett v. State, 613 So.2d 400 (Ala.Cr.App.1992). However, once an inmate does actually earn "good time," it may not be taken away without due process. Ex parte Hawkins, 475 So.2d 489 (Ala.1985); Ex parte Bland, 441 So.2d 122 (Ala.1983); Williams v. Davis, 386 So.2d 415 (Ala.1980); Keenan v. Bennett, 613 F.2d 127 (5th Cir.1980); Diamond v. Thompson, 364 F.Supp. 659 (M.D.Ala.1973), aff'd, 523 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir.1975).
The opportunity to earn "good time" is a privilege, not a right, in Alabama. Prisoners may earn higher classifications, and thus more "good time," through good behavior. A higher classification is based on a prisoner's trustworthiness, willingness and ability to work, and behavior while in prison. Accordingly, a favorable evaluation of a prisoner's conduct may result in a move to a higher classification so that he can earn more "good time" for each day served. Because Alabama's system is an incentive system, prison officials must have the authority to place prisoners who do not follow the rules or who fail to meet the requirements of a higher classification in lower classifications.
In Sandin v. Conner, the United States Supreme Court set forth the standard by which to evaluate whether alleged liberty interests are indeed protected by the Due Process Clause and thus entitled to the Wolff procedural protections. 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995). In so doing, the Court stated as follows:
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Ex parte Boykins
...Accordingly, inmates are not entitled to receive, and thus do not have a liberty interest in receiving, IGT. See Coslett v. State, 697 So.2d 61 (Ala.Crim. App.1997); Parker v. State, 648 So.2d 653 (Ala.Crim.App.1994); Gullett v. State, 613 So.2d 400 (Ala.Crim.App. 1992).2 As we explained in......
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Collins v. Alabama Dept. of Corrections, CR-03-0285.
...request for IGT. We agree with the determination of the Court of Criminal Appeals, relying on Ala.Code 1975, § 14-9-41, Coslett v. State, 697 So.2d 61 (Ala.Crim.App.1997), Parker v. State, 648 So.2d 653 (Ala.Crim.App.1994), and Gullett v. State, 613 So.2d 400 (Ala.Crim.App.1992), that Boyki......
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Bostwick v. ALA. BD. OF PARDONS AND PAROLES
...opportunity to be released on parole is a privilege, or a matter of grace, rather than a right in Alabama. Compare Coslett v. State, 697 So.2d 61, 64 (Ala.Crim. App.1997) (holding that "[t]he opportunity to earn `good time' is a privilege, not a right, in Alabama"). Alabama courts have prev......
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Block v. Alabama Dept. of Corrections, CR-04-1417.
...request for IGT. We agree with the determination of the Court of Criminal Appeals, relying on Ala.Code 1975, § 14-9-41, Coslett v. State, 697 So.2d 61 (Ala.Crim.App.1997), Parker v. State, 648 So.2d 653 (Ala.Crim.App.1994), and Gullett v. State, 613 So.2d 400 (Ala.Crim. App.1992), that Boyk......