Cosmark v. Struthers Wells Corp.

• Decision Date: 17 October 1963
• Citation: 412 Pa. 211,194 A.2d 325
• Parties: F. J. COSMARK, John C. Martin and Melvin D. Patterson, Individually, and as Representatives of a Class, Appellants, v. STRUTHERS WELLS CORPORATION, International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers of America (A.F.L.-C.I.O.), Local Lodge 636 thereof, Russell A. Graham, Individually, Lee A. Reisinger, Donald E. Chapel and Harry A. Wiles, Individually, and as Representatives of a Class.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

194 A.2d 325

412 Pa. 211

F. J. COSMARK, John C. Martin and Melvin D. Patterson, Individually, and as Representatives of a Class, Appellants, v. STRUTHERS WELLS CORPORATION, International Brotherhood of

Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers of America (A.F.L.-C.I.O.), Local Lodge 636 thereof, Russell A. Graham, Individually, Lee A. Reisinger, Donald E. Chapel and Harry A. Wiles, Individually, and as Representatives of a Class.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 17, 1963.

George J. Barco, Yolanda G. Barco, Barco & Barco Meadville, for appellant.

John C. Bane, Jr., John G. Wayman, J. S. McLaughlin, Reed, Smith Shaw & McClay, Pittsburgh, V. H. Elderkin, Jr., Elderkin &amp Martin, Erie, for Struthers Wells Corp.

F Joseph Thomas, Meadville, for International Brotherhood, etc.

Before BELL, C. J., and MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN and KEIM, JJ.

JONES, Justice.

Three employees [Employees] of the Struther Wells Corporation [Employer], members in good standing of the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers (A.F.L.-C.I.O.) [International] and Local 636 thereof [Local], on their own behalf and as representatives of the employee-class known as 'Forge Employees,' instituted an equity action in the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County against the Employer, the International, the Local and certain International and Local officials.

The complaint averred, inter alia, that: under a collective bargaining agreement between the Employer, the International and the Local, effective from June 15, 1957 to May 31, 1959, the Employees were divided into two separate seniority rosters, namely, Forge Weldment Division and Iron Works Division; at a meeting held on May 2, 1959, a majority of the membership of the Local in attendance ratified a new seniority provision, known as Article II, of a proposed new supplemental collective bargaining agreement which agreement, effective June 1, 1959, executed on September 23, 1959 was adopted by the Employer, the International and the Local: Article II of this new agreement eliminated the system of separate seniority rosters theretofore existing between Forge Employees and Iron Works Employees and provided that employees of the Forge Weldment Division seniority list would, as of May 1, 1959, be placed at the bottom of a consolidated seniority list, while still retaining overall length of service for vacation purposes: the Employer, engaged in the construction and manufacture of boilers and high-pressure vessels in various plants, operated a Forge Division at its Forge shop in Titusville, Crawford County, and an Iron Works Division at its Iron Works Shop, located close by in Titusville; the Employees were employed in Employer's Forge Division at the Forge shop in Titusville; in August, 1957, the Employer began to move its machinery and work, which had been performed prior thereto in the Forge shop of the Forge Division, to the Perry Forge shop and the Iron Works shop; in these latter shops, Forge employees were furloughed and additional Iron Works employees were engaged; by April 1959, all operations at the Forge shop had ceased and the machines and orders on which the Forge employees had customarily worked were being serviced at the Iron Works shop and the Perry Forge shop by Iron Works employees, many of whom had less seniority than the Forge Employees under the collective bargaining agreement of 1957; the furloughed Forge employees, who were thus out of work from April, 1959 to the date of filing the complaint in August, 1960, would have been employed during that entire period and many of the other Forge employees would have been employed for a larger period of time but for the action taken by the Employer, the Unions and the named Union officials.

The complaint further alleged that: the Employer's actions in transferring the work and machinery from the Forge Division Shop, culminating in a termination of the work of the operators thereon or about April, 1959, with the consequent laying off of the Forge employees who would otherwise have been employed there, constituted a permanent discontinuance of the department, entitling the furloughed employees to severance pay; the Employer's actions in establishing a consolidated seniority list was arbitrary and discriminatory against the Forge employees and wrongfully deprived them of their rights under the 1957 agreement and, by increasing the representation of the Iron Works employees and weakening the representative strength of the Forge employees, the latter were deprived of their rights as members of a bargaining unit; the International and the Local acted improperly and wrongfully in adopting the consolidated seniority list which was arbitrary and discriminatory as to the Employees and caused them to lose their seniority status; the Unions breached their duty to fairly represent all members of the bargaining unit, including Employees; the Local's actions, approved by International, were directed by certain named executive officers of the Local who, by reason of hostility, failed to press the Employees' grievances and treated the Forge employees' seniority and other rights in bad faith, fraud and discrimination so as to deprive them of their rights; these officers of the Local acted in concert with the Employer to the Employees' detriment, the Local's action being approved by the International.

The relief requested was several-fold: (1) reinstatement to positions, classifications, seniorities and related rights, including rights under the 1957 and 1959 collective bargaining agreements; (2) payment of back wages and vacation pay and/or severance pay; (3) payment of costs and counsel fees; (4) injunctive relief restraining all the defendants from (a) retaliation against the Employees and (b) doing any acts in derogation of the Employees' rights.

Preliminary objections to the complaint were filed which averred inter alia, that: (1) the matters complained of were exclusively within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board; (2) that the complaint (a) failed to set forth a cause of action and (b) combined causes of action ex contractu and ex delicto.

The court below sustained the preliminary objections and concluded, inter alia, that the matters complained of were exclusively within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board and not within the jurisdiction of the state court and that the complaint did not set forth a justiciable cause of action. From the order dismissing the complaint this appeal was taken.

In Smith et al. v. Pittsburgh Gage and Supply Company et al., Pa., 194 A.2d 181, we reviewed recent rulings of the United States Supreme Court on the scope of the jurisdiction of state courts in cases where the activity complained of is arguably subject to the protections of Section 7 or the prohibitions of Section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act. ^[1] In Smith, we said (p. 182 of 194 A.2d):

'The basic rule delineating jurisdiction in this area of the law was recently reiterated by the United States Supreme Court in Local 100, etc. v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 693, 83 S.Ct. 1423, 1425, 10 L.Ed.2d 638: 'This Court held in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775, that in the absence of an overriding state interest such as that involved in the maintenance of domestic peace, state courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board in cases in which the activity that is the subject matter of the litigation is arguably subject to the protections of § 7 or the prohibitions of § 8 of the National Labor Relations Act.' The rationale of that rule is clear: in its promulgation of rules governing the relations of labor and management as such affect interstate commerce, 'Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law to be enforced by any tribunal competent to apply law generally to the parties. It went on to confide primary interpretation and application of its rules to a specific and specially constituted tribunal [the National Labor Relations Board] * * *. Congress evidently considered that centralized administration of specially designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of its substantive rules and to avoid those diversities and conflicts likely to result from a variety of local procedures and attitudes toward labor controversies. * * * A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures are quite as apt to produce incompatible or conflicting adjudications as are different rules of substantive law.' (Emphasis supplied): Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers, etc., 346 U.S. 485, 490, 491, 74 S.Ct. 161, 165, 166, 98 L.Ed. 228. In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, supra, Mr. Justice Frankfurter (79 S.Ct. 778) stated: 'In determining the extent to which state regulation must yield to subordinating federal authority, [the Court has] been concerned with delimiting areas of potential conflict; potential conflict of rules of law, of remedy, and of administration' and that '[w]hen the exercise of state power over a particular area of activity threatened interference with the clearly indicated policy of industrial relations, it has been judicially necessary to preclude the States from acting. [citing cases].'

'The U S. Supreme Court has established a yardstick for determining when 'due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield', i. e., '[w]hen an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board.': (emphasis supplied). Garmon, supra, 79 S.Ct. 780. See...