Cosme-Montalvo v. Trafon Grp., Inc.
| Decision Date | 29 April 2013 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL NO.: 11-2197 (MEL) |
| Parties | SYLVIA Y. COSME-MONTALVO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. TRAFON GROUP, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
On December 14, 2011, plaintiffs Sylvia Y. Cosme Montalvo ("plaintiff"1 or "Cosme") and José Quiñones Mercado (collectively, "plaintiffs") filed a complaint against defendant Trafon Group, Inc. ("defendant" or "Trafon") alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and Puerto Rico law. (D.E. 1). Pending before the court is defendant's motion for summary judgment. (D.E. 21). Over the course of the last two months, plaintiffs and defendant have litigated four motions to strike (D.E. 33; 41; 56; 85) relating to the pending motion. Now that the controversies over the motions to strike have been adjudicated, the court is presented with memoranda supporting and opposing the motion for summary judgment (D.E. 21; 54; 74) and proposed statements of uncontested material facts and responses thereto (D.E. 51; 55; 65; 82; 85). For the reasons set forth below, defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiff began working for Trafon in June or July 2009. At all times during her employment with Trafon, plaintiff received a base annual salary of $91,000, an annual car allowance of $9,000, and the Christmas bonus required by local law. (D.E. 1, ¶ 6; 51, ¶¶ 2, 4; 55, ¶¶ 2, 4; 55-1, ¶¶ 2-3; 55-2, ¶ 2; 55-5, at 6 ll. 16-21; 60-1, ¶ 3(h), (j)).
Although the date of the actual initiation of plaintiff's health insurance coverage is contested,3 it is uncontested that plaintiff signed her payroll deduction authorization on August 3, 2009, for health and dental plans, specifying an effective date of August 1, 2009. It is also uncontested that, on August 10, 2009, defendant sent letters to MAPFRE Life Insurance and Delta Dental Plan of P.R. "certify[ing] that ... [plaintiff wa]s entitled to" a medical-hospital plan and a dental plan, respectively, also specifying an effective date of August 1, 2009. (D.E. 29-3, at 1; 29-5, at 1). On September 1, 2009, MAPFRE Life Insurance sent a letter "certify[ing]" plaintiff's insurance coverage. (D.E. 51-2, at 2). Aside from the issue of plaintiff's health insurance coverage, her salary and marginal benefits were never reduced or otherwise negatively affected while she was working for Trafon. (D.E. 22-3; 22-4; 22-6; 29-2; 29-3; 29-5; 51, ¶¶ 5, 7-10; 51-2; 55, ¶¶ 5, 7-10).
At least between October 2009 and her dismissal in February 2011, plaintiff had the position of Director of Strategic and Business Intelligence at Trafon, a position which, according to plaintiff, she was never formally informed she would occupy.4 Plaintiff was the only personwho ever occupied the position of Director of Strategic and Business Intelligence at Trafon. (D.E. 1, ¶ 10; 51, ¶ 3; 55, ¶¶ 3, 25-27; 65, ¶¶ 6-8).
In October 2009, Oscar Pérez ("Pérez") was hired for the position of Marketing Director. Pérez's compensation package was part of the consideration in an Asset Purchase Agreement which Trafon entered into with Importers and Distributors, Inc., a company wholly owned by Pérez. When Pérez was hired, he received an annual salary of $145,000, an annual performance bonus of $15,000, a company car, 100% health care benefit, and a Christmas bonus required by state law. Before working for Trafon, Pérez had marketing experience at Proctor and Gamble, Playtex, and his own business. (D.E. 51, ¶¶ 20-21; 51-4, at 2; 55, ¶¶ 20-21, 30-31; 60-1, ¶ 3(x)-(y); 65, ¶¶ 11-12).
Javier Pietrantoni ("Pietrantoni"), Senior Executive Vice President for Trafon, was the direct supervisor of plaintiff and Pérez. Pérez's job performance did not meet Pietrantoni's expectations. On the other hand, plaintiff's job performance was satisfactory and met Pietrantoni's expectations. (D.E. 55, ¶¶ 32-34; 65, ¶¶ 13-15).
At Trafon, plaintiff was "at the same level as" José Prado ("Prado"), Pérez, Héctor Galarza ("Galarza"), and Alejandro Sánchez ("Sánchez"). (D.E. 55-6, at 8). Pérez, Galarza, and Sánchez received higher levels of compensation than plaintiff. At least when Prado, an attorney who was hired as the Director of Human Resources, was recruited for his position on May 7, 2009, he received the same salary and benefits that plaintiff received throughout her time at Trafon.5 (D.E. 22-2; 29-1; 51, ¶ 6; 55, ¶¶ 6, 28-29; 60-1, ¶ 3(l); 65, ¶¶ 9-10).
On October 7, 2010, a meeting was held wherein a representative of London Consulting Group explained that minutes needed to be prepared for all meetings. David Valle ("Valle"), Trafon's Vice President of Procurement, and Pérez commented that, "That was easy it has to be Sylvia because she is a woman." (D.E. 55-1, ¶ 16). Although Pietrantoni heard the comment, he did not take any action. (D.E. 55, ¶ 39; 65, ¶ 20).
At the beginning of 2011, defendant, seeking to reduce expenses, decided to perform a corporate restructuring by eliminating positions, redistributing duties, and merging positions.6 Plaintiff's position of Director of Strategic and Business Intelligence was eliminated on February 2, 2011. On February 9, 2011, José Prado, Director of Human Resources, called plaintiff to inform her that she was terminated from her position at Trafon. At the time she was dismissed, plaintiff had been placed under rest pursuant to an order issued by the Puerto Rico State Insurance Fund. No person was assigned plaintiff's position after she was terminated. (D.E. 51, ¶¶ 12-13, 17; 55, ¶¶ 12-13, 17, 37-38; 60-1, ¶ 3(n), (p), (t)-(u); 65, ¶¶ 18-19).
As part of the restructuring process, in November 2011, the position of Marketing Director and the Marketing Department as a whole were eliminated, leading to Pérez's termination.7 Pérez's duties and responsibilities as Marketing Director were not performed by anyone in Trafon after his termination. In addition to plaintiff and Pérez, more than eighty employees were discharged in 2011. Over fifty employees were discharged in 2012. Aside from a list of terminated employees, Trafon does not have any document regarding its restructuring process. (D.E. 22-9; 29-6; 51, ¶¶ 14, 22, 23; 55, ¶ 14, 22, 23, 36; 60-1, ¶ 3(aa)-(bb); 65, ¶ 17).
The purpose of summary judgment "is to pierce the boilerplate of the pleadings and assay the parties' proof in order to determine whether trial is actually required." Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 794 (1st Cir. 1992). Summary judgment is granted when the record shows that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). " " Farmers Ins. Exch. v. RNK, Inc., 632 F.3d 777, 782 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Rodríguez-Rivera v. Federico Trilla Reg'l Hosp., 532 F.3d 28, 30 (1st Cir. 2008)).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant presents a properly focused motion "averring 'an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case[,]' [t]he burden then shifts to the nonmovant to establish the existence of at least one fact issue which is both 'genuine' and 'material.'" Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir. 1990) (quoting Garside v. Osco Drug., Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir. 1990)). For issues where the nonmoving party bears the ultimate burden of proof, that party cannot merely "rely on the absence of competent evidence, but must affirmatively point to specific facts" in the record "that demonstrate the existence of an authentic dispute." McCarthy v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 313, 315 (1st Cir. 1995). The plaintiff need not, however, Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original).
In assessing a motion for summary judgment, the court "must view the entire record in the light most hospitable to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Griggs-Ryan, 904 F.2d at 115 (citations omitted). There is "no room for credibility determinations, no room for the measured weighing of conflicting evidence such as the trial process entails, [and] no room for the judge to superimpose his own ideas of probability and likelihood ..." Greenburg v. P. R. Mar. Shipping Auth., 835 F.2d 932, 936 (1st Cir. 1987). The court may, however, safely ignore "conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation." Medina-Muñoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).
Under Title VII, an employer may not "discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's ... sex." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). "Absent the evidentiary equivalent of a 'smoking gun,' the plaintiff must attempt to prove her case by resort to a burden-shifting framework." Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., Inc., 76 F.3d 413, 421 (1st Cir. 1996). "First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination." Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981). "Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant 'to articulate some legitimate,...
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