Cosme-Perez v. Municipality of Juana Diaz

• Decision Date: 26 June 2015
• Docket Number: Civil No. 07–1942 (DRD).
• Citation: 110 F.Supp.3d 357
• Parties: Higinia COSME–PEREZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MUNICIPALITY OF JUANA DIAZ, Ramon A. Hernandez–Torres, Mrs. Hernandez–Torres, and their Conjugal Partnership; Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; John Doe; Richard Doe; and Their Respective Insurance Companies, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

110 F.Supp.3d 357

Higinia COSME–PEREZ, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.MUNICIPALITY OF JUANA DIAZ, Ramon A. Hernandez–Torres, Mrs. Hernandez–Torres, and their Conjugal Partnership; Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; John Doe; Richard Doe; and Their Respective Insurance Companies, Defendants.

Civil No. 07–1942 (DRD).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Signed June 26, 2015.

Juan Ramon Rodriguez–Lopez, Rodriguez Lopez Law Office, Ponce, PR, for Plaintiff.

Carmen Edith Torres–Rodriguez, M.L. & R.E. Law Firm, San Juan, PR, Johanna M. Emmanuelli–Huertas, Pedro E. Ortiz Alvarez, Law Office, Ponce, PR, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

DANIEL R. DOMINGUEZ, District Judge.

Pending before the Court are: (a) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support, Docket No. 50, (b) Defendants' Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Docket No. 100, (c) Plaintiffs' Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support, Docket No. 73, and Plaintiffs' Opposition to the Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Docket No.101; (d) Plaintiffs' Reply to Statement of Uncontested Facts and Additional Uncontested Facts, Docket 74, and (e) Defendants' Position Regarding Additional Uncontested Facts, Docket 85. For the reasons set forth below, the defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff Higinia Cosme–Pérez ("Cosme") was sixty-nine years old at the time the instant complaint was filed on October 5, 2007. Complaint, Docket No. 1, page 3, ¶ 11. Cosme worked with the Municipality of Juan Diaz' ("Municipality") Head Start Program from September 12, 2003 through February 2007, as a full time kitchen assistant employee. Plaintiff Cosme was hired at the approximate age of 65. The contract was entered on a yearly basis from September 2003 through February 28, 2007, under the federal Head Start Program.

The Court further finds that: (a) plaintiff "Cosme began working for the Head Start Program managed by the Municipality of Juana Diaz in the year 2003;" Docket No. 50–2, ¶ 1; (b) "Cosme was a kitchen assistant;" Docket No. 50–2, ¶ 2; (c) Cosme's "last contract with the Municipality had the effective dates of March 1, 2006 to February 28, 2007," Docket No. 109–1, pages 1–9, as well as the Addendum at Docket No. 109–1, page 10, regarding the Head Start Contract executed by the Municipality and plaintiff Cosme for the year March 1, 2005 to February 28, 2006; (d) "on June or July 2006, Cosme underwent surgery for bone spurs" in her foot, Docket No. 50–2, ¶ 6; (e) Cosme requested sick leave in August 2006, as she was still unable to return to work, Docket No. 50–2, ¶ 7; (f) "after exhausting her medical leave, [Cosme] obtained the benefits of a disability insurance for workers, SINOT, for the period of August 16, 2006 to December 1, 2006," Docket No. 50–2, ¶ 8; (g) on December 18, 2006, Cosme signed a letter of resignation due to her husband's health condition, Docket No. 54–2; (h) on April 9, 2007, Cosme filed a claim with the EEOC, Docket No. 106–1; (i) Cosme received the EEOC's Notice of Suit Rights dated July 9, 2007, Docket No. 106–2; (j) the instant action followed on October 5, 2007; (k) as of November 19, 2009 when the defendants took Cosme's deposition, she testified that she was still unable to return to work, as she had then not been medically discharged, Docket No. 101–2, page 20; (l ) Cosme never requested a reasonable accommodation to the Municipality, except for one year of leave without pay, and without providing an estimated date to return to work, Docket No. 1, ¶¶ 15, 16, and Docket No. 50–2, ¶¶ 17–18. The Court notes that plaintiff did not oppose the fact that she never requested a reasonable accommodation except for the one year of leave without pay starting from January 2007.

In sum, during the year 2006, Cosme suffered a health condition of bone spurs in her foot that required medical treatment and surgery. Although Cosme had a foot surgery on or about late June or early July 2006, she was on medical leave from August 10, 2006 until December 2006 when she stopped receiving SINOT checks.¹ Plaintiff Cosme claims that she was constantly harassed and discriminated against because of her health condition by Mayor Hernández, and other personnel in front of third parties. Cosme further alleges that defendant Hernández told her she was too old and that he needed young people.

By December 18, 2006, Cosme alleges she felt forced to resign and tendered her letter of resignation.See Docket No. 50–3. Cosme allegedly met with Mayor Hernández sometime in December 2006 in his office and requested a leave of one-year without pay upon tendering the Mayor her resignation letter. The Mayor allegedly told Cosme not to worry that he already asked Carlos Colon, his special aid, about her sick leave and asked Cosme to meet with Carlos Colon. Complaint, Docket No. 1, page 4, ¶ 16. Cosme further alleges that at the meeting with Carlos Colon, he informed her that the one-year leave without pay would not be granted. Docket No. 1, page 4, ¶ 16. Subsequently, plaintiffs herein filed a complaint with the United States Equal Employment Commission ("EEOC") on April 9, 2007, and the Notice of Right to Sue was issued on July 9, 2007. Docket entries No. 106–1 and 106–2. The instant action was filed on October 5, 2007.

In the instant Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Higinia Cosme felt forced to resign due to constant harassment, discrimination and threat due to her health condition and age under Title VII and Title 42, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (" Section 1983"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., and the American with Disability Act ("ADA") 42 U.S.C. § 12112 et seq. Plaintiff also claims causes of action under local labor laws, as well as under the Puerto Rico Civil Code.²

On December 7, 2009, defendants, the Municipality and the Mayor Ramon A. Hernandez Torres ("Mayor Hernandez") filed a motion for summary judgment with the corresponding statement of uncontested facts and exhibits in support thereof. See Docket No. 50. Plaintiffs filed their response in opposition for summary judgment on May 23, 2010. See Docket entries No. 73 and 74. On May 28, 2010, the defendants moved the Court for sanctions against plaintiffs and for an order regarding additional uncontested facts. See Docket entries No. 75, 76. Plaintiffs opposed the defendants' requests on May 31, 2010. See Docket No. 77. A Status Conference was held on June 17, 2010, wherein the Court granted the defendants ten days to reply to plaintiffs' uncontested facts, and granted leave to supplement their motion for summary judgment after the discovery has been completed. See Minutes of June 17, 2010, Docket No. 78. Defendants' motion for sanctions was held in abeyance. Id. On July 6, 2010, the defendants filed their position regarding plaintiffs' additional uncontested facts. See Docket No. 85. After months of delay, for excusable reasons, including plaintiffs' counsel repeated legitimate service in the armed forces, a Status Conference was held on November 27, 2012. The parties informed the Court that settlement negotiations had been unsuccessful, and granted the defendants until December 11, 2012 to update their motion for summary judgment. See Minutes of November 27, 2013, Docket No. 99. Likewise, plaintiffs were granted until December 27, 2012 to supplement their response to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, as supplemented. Id. The record shows that the defendants filed their Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on December 11, 2012, Docket No. 100. On December 21, 2012, plaintiffs filed their Response in Opposition to Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Docket No. 101.

Applicable Law and Discussion

The Summary Judgment Standard

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Fed.R.Civ.P.") provides that a judgment may be entered when the "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) ; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; Johnson v. University of Puerto Rico, 714 F.3d 48, 52 (1st Cir.2013) ; Prescott v. Higgins, 538 F.3d 32, 40 (1st Cir.2008) (citing Thompson v. Coca–Cola Co., 522 F.3d 168, 175 (1st Cir.2008) ). "A dispute is 'genuine' if the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the non-moving party." Johnson, 714 F.3d at 52, quoting Sanchez v. Alvarado, 101 F.3d 223, 227 (1st Cir.1996). See also Prescott v. Higgins, 538 F.3d at 40 ; Mendez–Martinez v. Caribbean Alliance Ins. Co., 851 F.Supp.2d 336, 342 (D.P.R.2012). On the other hand, a fact is considered material if it has the potential to "affect the outcome of the suit under governing law." Sands v. Ridefilm Corp., 212 F.3d 657, 660–661 (1st Cir.2000) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ). See also Caribbean Alliance Ins. Co., 851 F.Supp.2d at 342. The moving party has the burden of proving both of these elements. Perez v. Saint John's School, 814 F.Supp.2d 102, 108 (D.P.R.2011) (citing Vega–Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico, 110 F.3d 174, 179 (1st Cir.1997) ).

Upon a showing by the moving party of an absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate that a trier of fact could reasonably be found in his or her favor. Caribbean Alliance Ins. Co., 851 F.Supp.2d at 342 (citing DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 306 (1st Cir.1997) ; Celotex Corp. 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986) ). See also Johnson v. University of Puerto Rico, 714 F.3d 48, 52 (1st Cir.2013). To prove...