Coss v. Magdziasz

Decision Date04 November 1965
Docket NumberNo. 49619,49619
Citation212 N.E.2d 717,65 Ill.App.2d 40
PartiesAnna M. COSS, as administratrix of the Estate of Jose Coss, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Stanley MAGDZIASZ, Kazimir Gurecki, Reuben V. Torres, Ernest Correa, Reuben Vilaros and Walter H. Colewell, Defendants. Appeal of Walter H. COLEWELL.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Mack Berg, Chicago, for appellant.

James A. Thompson, Chicago, for appellee.

SCHWARTZ, Justice.

In a dramshop case the jury returned a verdict for $20,000 and the court entered judgment thereon. Appeal was taken by the defendant Walter H. Colewell. Plaintiff is the widow of one Jose Coss, who was killed by Ernest Correa in a tavern fight while Correa was allegedly intoxicated.

The complaint charged that Colewell was the owner of the building, and the answer filed by Colewell specifically admitted that he owned the building. Suit was instituted on April 8, 1960 and was brought to trial on March 31, 1964. In his opening statement Colewell's counsel said for the first time, and contrary to his specific pleading, that his client Colewell was not then 'nor has he ever been, the owner wherein the building at 1200 something Chicago Avenue is located.' A discussion then followed in which the court said:

'Well, the pleadings are an admission but whether the admission will be overcome by evidence, I don't know. We'll get to that point when we get to it.'

A further discussion followed, and counsel for Colewell again said that Colewell was not then, at the time of the occurrence or at any time the owner of the property; 'that he had assisted the owner, a Mr. Gurecki, who had been the owner of this property for about ten years, that he had assisted him in the operation of the building located in a rough neighborhood, 1200 Chicago Avenue. * * *'

It should be noted that the statute of limitations applicable to dramshop cases had expired. Plaintiff, in an excess of caution when the trial court indicated that defendant might have the right to amend his answer and retract his admission of ownership, examined defendant under Section 60 of the Civil Practice Act, Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 110, § 60 (1963) and in that examination, defendant denied ownership. No steps, however, were taken to amend the answer.

The law is clear that an admission in an answer is binding on the party making it and as to such party, it is conclusive as to the admitted fact. Holsinger, Theis & Co. v. Holsinger, 329 Ill.App. 460, 69 N.E.2d 360. Indeed, upon the filing of the answer, owership ceased to be an issue in the case. It is now contended, however, that the admission was waived by the plaintiff's calling the admitting party as a witness under Section 60. The cases cited by the defendant do not support this contention. Pallasch for Use of McNamara v. United States Fidelity & G. Co., 329 Ill.App. 257, 67 N.E.2d 883, and Ancateau for Use of Trust Co. of Chicago v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 318 Ill.App. 553, 48 N.E.2d 440, are garnishment cases in which the plaintiffs' failure to traverse new matters in the garnishees' answers would ordinarily have established the truth of these new assertions. The garnishees, however, introduced evidence on those issues and the court held that the defendants waived the effect of the plaintiffs' failure to reply where the parties treated the issues as properly made. Meyer v. Hendrix, 311 Ill.App. 605, 37 N.E.2d 445, also holds that the defendant's introduction of evidence following the plaintiff's failure to traverse an affirmative defense made the defense an issue. None of these decisions is authority for the proposition that an admission in the pleadings is waived by calling the admitting party under Section 60.

The defendant cannot negate the evidentiary effect of the admission of ownership in the answer, even...

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10 cases
  • Leszinske v. Grebner
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 12 Diciembre 1967
    ...would normally be considered a judicial admission and conclusive upon the plaintiff as to the admitted facts. Coss v. Magdziasz, 65 Ill.App.2d 40, 42, 43, 212 N.E.2d 717 (1965); Precision Extrusions, Inc. v. Stewart, 36 Ill.App.2d 30, 50, 51, 183 N.E.2d 547 (1962); 30 I.L.R. Pleading, § 20.......
  • Gowdy v. Richter
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 20 Junio 1974
    ...conclusive as to the admitted fact on the person making it. Thus, Richter's specific admission is binding upon him. Coss v. Magdziasz (1965), 65 Ill.App.2d 40, 212 N.E.2d 717. In evaluating the recitals in the answers of the other three defendants, we must determine if the answers fairly re......
  • Conley v. Echoles
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 2 Febrero 1970
    ...'believable and the truth of which was not improbable,' stood unimpeached and uncontradicted. Authorities include Coss v. Magdziasz, 65 Ill.App.2d 40, 212 N.E.2d 717 (1965), where it is said (p. 43, 212 N.E.2d p. 'Section 60, supra, itself provides: 'The party calling for the examination is......
  • State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Larsen
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 13 Junio 1978
    ...conclusive as to the admitted fact. Consequently, the facts so admitted cease to be an issue in the case. Coss v. Magdziasz (1st Dist.1965), 65 Ill.App.2d 40, 42, 212 N.E.2d 717, 718. Regarding defendants' argument, we must conclude even when we take into consideration Illinois' adherence t......
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