Costa v. FCA U.S. LLC
| Decision Date | 27 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 20-cv-11810-ADB |
| Parties | MARIA COSTA, individually, and MARIO SOARES, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. FCA U.S. LLC f/k/a CHRYSLER GROUP LLC, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Mario Soares (“Soares”) and Maria Costa (“Costa,” together, “Plaintiffs”) allege they were injured by defective automatic headrests (“AHRs”) installed in vehicles sold by Defendant FCA U.S. LLC (“FCA”). Soares-seeking to represent two classes of Massachusetts residents who own FCA cars with these headrests-asserts a claim for economic losses allegedly caused by FCA's statements and actions concerning the headrests. Currently before the Court is Plaintiff Soares' motion to certify classes, [ECF No. 62] FCA's motion for summary judgment on all counts, [ECF No 82], and FCA's motions to exclude certain expert testimony, [ECF Nos. 84, 86].
For the reasons discussed below, FCA's motions to exclude expert testimony, [ECF Nos. 84, 86], are DENIED; FCA's motion for summary judgment, [ECF No. 82], is also DENIED; and Soares' motion to certify classes [ECF No. 62], is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Plaintiffs filed a seven-count complaint on October 2, 2020 asserting claims against FCA and the manufacturer of the headrests. [ECF No. 1]. The Court earlier dismissed the manufacturer for lack of personal jurisdiction and dismissed five of the counts asserted in the complaint, leaving only Soares' Chapter 93A claim and Costa's negligence claim. [ECF No. 41]. Soares then filed a motion to certify two classes on November 19, 2021, [ECF No. 62], which FCA opposed, [ECF No. 72], and Soares replied, [ECF No. 88]. On January 6, 2022, FCA filed a motion for summary judgment on both counts. [ECF No. 82]. Plaintiffs opposed summary judgment on February 3, 2022, [ECF No. 99], and FCA replied to their opposition on February 17, 2022, [ECF No. 102]. FCA has also filed two motions to exclude the opinions and testimony of Plaintiffs' expert witnesses, Dr. Francesco Biondi (“Dr. Biondi”) and Dr. Mariusz Ziejewski (“Dr. Ziejewski”). [ECF Nos. 84, 86]. Plaintiffs opposed both motions. [ECF Nos. 94, 95]. The parties have also filed supplemental materials. See [ECF Nos. 104-08].
Fed. R. Evid. 702. The district court has a gatekeeping role in which it must “ensur[e] that an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597. The court must also consider whether the expert is “qualified in the specific subject for which his [or her] testimony is offered.” Garfield v. Gorilla, Inc., No. 13-cv-12810, 2015 WL 3874826, at *2 (D. Mass. June 23, 2015) (quoting Whiting v. Bos. Edison Co., 891 F.Supp. 12, 24 (D. Mass. 1995)). The court's analysis, however, is “not limited to an appraisal of an expert's credentials and techniques but also entails an examination of his [or her] conclusions to determine whether they flow rationally from the methodology employed.” Samaan v. St. Joseph Hosp., 670 F.3d 21, 32 (1st Cir. 2012). In other words, if the analysis reveals “too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered,” the expert's testimony should be excluded. Id. (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997)).
In Daubert, the Supreme Court provided a non-exhaustive list of factors that a court may consider in determining whether expert testimony is reliable:
(1) whether the scientific theory or technique can be (and has been) tested; (2) whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) whether it has a known rate of error; (4) whether there are standards controlling its application or operation; and (5) whether it is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.
Carrozza v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 391 F.Supp.3d 136, 144 (D. Mass. 2019) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94).
Courts must be careful to focus on the principles or methodology involved in the expert's testimony, rather than solely on the conclusions ultimately drawn by the expert. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.
Daubert does not require that a party who proffers expert testimony carry the burden of proving to the judge that the expert's assessment of the situation is correct. As long as an expert's scientific testimony rests upon ‘good grounds, based on what is known,' . . . it should be tested by the adversary process-competing expert testimony and active cross-examination-rather than excluded from jurors' scrutiny for fear that they will not grasp its complexities or satisfactorily weigh its inadequacies.
Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola of P.R. Bottling Co., 161 F.3d 77, 85 (1st Cir. 1998) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590-96)); see also Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. Zoll Med. Corp., 256 F.Supp.3d 50, 52 (D. Mass. 2017) (“If an expert's testimony is within ‘the range where experts might reasonably differ' the jury, not the trial court, should be the one to decide among the conflicting views of different experts.”) (quoting Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 153 (1999)). The First Circuit has warned district courts against exercising their “gatekeeping role under Daubert with too much vigor.” Lawes v. CSA Architects & Eng'rs LLP, 963 F.3d 72, 99 (1st Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).
The Court finds that the opinions of Plaintiffs' proffered experts Dr. Biondi and Dr. Ziejewski satisfy this standard. FCA's objections concerning the methodologies of both experts go to the weight of their proffered testimony, not their admissibility.
Dr. Biondi seeks to testify regarding the distraction potential and safety risk associated with the unintentional deployment of AHR systems[2] in vehicles manufactured by FCA.
[ECF No. 95 at 5]. FCA moved to exclude Dr. Biondi's opinions and testimony because they are not useful and are based on insufficient facts and unreliable methodologies. [ECF No. 85 at 4, 7]. The Court will spend little time on Dr. Biondi's qualifications as they are undisputed. He is an expert in “human factors” and ergonomics, specifically as related to human-machine interfaces, including cars. [ECF No. 95 at 5, 7; ECF No. 85 at 6]. He has a lengthy academic career in this area and has published dozens of peer-reviewed articles. [ECF No. 95 at 7].
Dr. Biondi's report concludes that “the unexpected, unintended deployment of AHR may result in a source of internal distraction for drivers [and] . . . may pose a safety risk.” [ECF No. 95-11 at 6 (“Biondi Rpt.”)]. According to his report, the “loud sound and sudden impact [of AHR deployment]” may startle a driver and cause them to visually or manually inspect the vehicle, which could take their attention away from the primary task of driving. [Id. at 6-7].
As a preliminary matter, FCA's argument that Dr. Biondi's conclusions amount to nothing more than “theoretical possibilities” that are unhelpful to the trier of fact because of his inclusion of the word “may” is unavailing. [ECF No. 85 at 6]. Courts have acknowledged that there are often no reliable methodologies that allow experts to testify with certainty and, as such, a “lack of absolute certainty on the part of the expert does not render her opinion unreliable under Daubert.” United States v. Monteiro, 407 F.Supp.2d 351, 372 (D. Mass. 2006); Lawes, 963 F.3d at 109 (). Moreover, as Dr. Biondi explained in his deposition, risk analysis in the field of distracted driving is normally a question of possibility and probability. See [ECF No. 95 at 13-14]. This conditional language also is notably absent in Dr. Biondi's rebuttal report. See [ECF No. 95-8 (“Biondi Rebuttal”) at 6 (); 10 (certain customer behaviors in response to unexpected deployment “[are] to be considered a distraction.”)].
Additionally Dr. Biondi's opinion is based on sufficient data and reliable methodologies. In preparing his opinion, he relied on his “scientific experience evaluating driver-automobile interactions, relevant literature, and his review of hundreds of complaints from consumers who experienced unexpected AHR deployments[.]” [ECF No. 95 at 5]. He also reviewed materials about the AHR defect specific to this case, deposition testimony, and FCA's videos of AHR deployment, [id. at 17], which provided enough information upon which to base an opinion. FCA questions his reliance on the “subjective” facts recited in consumer complaints and on a Volkswagen study that FCA asserts is not sufficiently analogous to inform his opinion in this matter, [ECF No. 85 at 8-12], but these challenges to some of the facts and literature underlying Dr. Biondi's testimony are largely attacks on Dr. Biondi's credibility-which FCA can raise during cross examination at...
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