Costa v. Parr
| Decision Date | 13 June 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:19-cv-00318-LJO-JDP (HC) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | MICHAEL SCOTT COSTA, Petitioner, v. M. PARR, Respondent. |
Petitioner Michael Scott Costa, a federal prisoner represented by the Federal Public Defender, seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner seeks recalculation of his release date under the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (Dec. 21, 2018). Petitioner contends that Section 102(b) of the Act entitles him to 54 days of good time credit—also known as "good conduct time credit" or, more simply, "good time"—for each year of his sentence. Petitioner cannot prevail because Section 102(b) of the Act has not yet become effective.
A federal inmate can hasten his release from prison by obtaining good time through "exemplary compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations." See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(a)-(b). The method of calculating an inmate's good time has been litigated in the past, see generally Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474 (2010), and it is now settled that, in practice, a prisoner can receive up to 47 days of good time for each year of the sentence imposed. The First Step Act introduces various amendments to the United States Code, including to the statutory provisions governing how the Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") calculates inmates' good time. Under Section 102(b)(1)(A) of the First Step Act, inmates can earn up to 54 days good time for each year of the sentence imposed. See Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 102(b)(1)(A), 132 Stat. at 5213.
Petitioner has almost finished serving his sentence. In November 2008, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California sentenced petitioner to a 204-month term of imprisonment for conspiracy to distribute marijuana, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and other, related offenses. In January 2019, the sentencing court granted a motion to reduce petitioner's sentence to 180 months (fifteen years). Petitioner is scheduled to be released on April 7, 2020. He is also scheduled to be transferred to a halfway house on October 1, 2019, and to be placed on home confinement on October 7, 2019. See ECF No. 13 at 1.
A federal district court may grant habeas relief to a federal prisoner if his custody violates federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241. While a federal prisoner challenging the validity of a conviction must bring a petition under Section 2255, a petitioner challenging the manner, location, or execution of that sentence must ordinarily rely on a petition under Section 2241. See Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 2000). The BOP, rather than the sentencing court, calculates a federal prisoner's entitlement to sentencing credit in the first instance. See United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 335 (1992). The BOP's calculation of sentencing credit is a sentence's execution that a habeas petitioner may challenge with a Section 2241 petition. See Zavala v. Ives, 785 F.3d 367, 370 n.3 (9th Cir. 2015); United States v. Giddings, 740 F.2d 770, 772 (9th Cir. 1984). A federal prisoner must file a Section 2241 petition in the district of his custodian, not the district that sentenced him. See Hernandez, 204 F.3d at 865.
Here, petitioner raises only one habeas claim: that under the First Step Act, the BOP must award him an additional 105 days of good time. Petitioner has calculated this additional claimed good time by multiplying seven—the additional days he believes he is owed per year—by fifteen—the years of his amended term of incarceration. According to petitioner, he should already be at a halfway house or transferred to home confinement.
We begin by considering our jurisdiction. Respondent argues that petitioner's claim is not ripe because Section 102(b) of the First Step Act has not become effective. ECF No. 11 at 2-3. The argument conflates the merits of the case with ripeness.
The Constitution limits federal courts' jurisdiction to deciding "cases" and "controversies." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. Ripeness, one component of the case or controversy requirement, is a "question of timing, designed to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements." Clark v. City of Seattle, 899 F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). "The ripeness inquiry contains both a constitutional and a prudential component." Oklevueha Native Am. Church of Hawaii, Inc. v. Holder, 676 F.3d 829, 835 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Portman v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1993)). The constitutional component of the ripeness inquiry overlaps with the injury-in-fact analysis, as it requires issues that are "definite and concrete, not hypothetical or abstract." Id.; accord Clark, 899 F.3d at 809.
The prudential component of ripeness is "discretionary." Bishop Paiute Tribe v. Inyo Cty., 863 F.3d 1144, 1154 (9th Cir. 2017). The court will consider the "fitness of the issues for judicial review" and the "hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration." Oklevueha Native Am. Church of Hawaii, 676 F.3d at 837; accord Bishop Paiute Tribe, 863 F.3d at 1154. A claim is "fit for decision if the issues raised are primarily legal, do not require further factual development, and the challenged action is final." Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045, 1060 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting US W. Commc'ns v. MFS Intelenet, Inc., 193 F.3d 1112, 1118 (9th Cir. 1999)). To show hardship, a party "must show that withholding review would result in direct and immediate hardship and would entail more than possible financial loss." Id.
Here, petitioner has shown both constitutional and prudential ripeness. Unnecessary incarceration presents a definite and concrete injury. Petitioner's claim is fit for this court's decision, since it does not require further factual development and the challenged actions here—the BOP's calculation of petitioner's good time credit and release date—are final. Declining to decide the petition could result in hardship for petitioner in the form of prison time. Indeed, in a case pending before the Ninth Circuit, the federal government has acknowledged that the issue in this case—whether Section 102(b) of the First Step Act has become effective—is ripe for adjudication. See Bottinelli v. Brown, No. 19-35201, ECF No. 26 at 6-7 (9th Cir. filed June 5, 2019); ECF No. 13-2 at 7-8.
Ordinarily, a party's failure to exhaust available remedies is an affirmative defense. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 832 (9th Cir. 2008). Petitioner has no obligation to raise the exhaustion issue before any response from the government, but he has chosen to do so. He contends that he need not exhaust administrative remedies because doing so would be futile. See ECF No. 6 at 13-14; Ward v. Chavez, 678 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012) (). According to petitioner, the BOP has already informed certain federal prisoners that in the BOP's view the pertinent statutory amendment has not become effective, making pursuit of administrative remedies futile.
Respondent contends in his answer that the court should dismiss the petition because petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. Respondent argues:
The BOP has established an administrative remedy procedure through which an inmate can seek formal review of any complaint regarding any aspect of imprisonment. To bring a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition, a prisoner is ordinarily required to exhaust his administrative remedies. "It is only when a prisoner has exhausted his administrative remedies that he becomes entitled to litigate the matter in district court." Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F. 2d 1308, 1313 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1031 (1985). The record in this matter reflects Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. See Vickers Declaration. Additionally, even if granted the relief Petitioner has requested, he asserts his release date would be December 24, 2019. Supp. Pet. at 2. Petitioner would have had nearly 9 months to utilize the remedy process, and as such, exhaustion should not be excused in this case.
ECF No. 11 at 10. Respondent's argument fails to address petitioner's argument that any attempt to exhaust would be futile because the BOP has already informed federal prisoners how it interprets Section 102(b). We decline to dismiss the petition based on petitioner's alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
We now turn to the central issue of this case: whether the amendments introduced by Section 102(b)(1)(A) of the First Step Act have become effective. Section 102(b)(1)(A) amends Section 3624(b)(1) of Title 18 of the United States Code, which allows a federal prisoner to earn up to 47 days of good time each year. The Section 102(b)(1)(A) amendments increase the maximum annual good time to 54 days.
Several courts have concluded that the amendments have not become effective, relying on the statutory text of Section 102(b)(2), a provision that follows Section 102(b)(1)(A), which states:
(2) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this subsection shall take effect beginning on the date that the Attorney General completes and releases the risk and needs assessment system under subchapter D of chapter 229 of title 18, United States Code, as added by section 101(a) of this Act.
Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 102(b)(2), 132 Stat. at 5213 (emphasis added). The parties agree that the Attorney General has not completed and released the assessment system referenced in Section 102(b)(2). Petitioner contends that the phrase "this subsection"...
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