Per
Curiam
In
Docket No. 355947, appellant, William Joseph Costello
trustee of the Michael Eyde Trust (the Trust), appeals as of
right an order denying Costello's motion for summary
disposition, in which he had alleged a lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction over an objection raised by appellee Richland
Animal Rescue, Inc. (Richland), to a change of situs of the
Trust from Michigan to Illinois. In Docket No. 356500
Costello purports to appeal as of right[1] a later order
requiring him to provide immediately the Eyde estate's
tax form (form 706) to the beneficiaries listed in the Trust,
i.e., Julie Baker, Christopher Joseph Palinski (Christopher),
Carol Palinski Hildebrand, Elizabeth Daly Unis, and Richland.
We reverse in part and remand.[2]
In
Docket No. 355947, Costello, primarily relying on Trust
documents and statutory law, argues that the trial court
erred by concluding that it had subject-matter jurisdiction
over the proceedings. This Court reviews de novo whether a
court has subject-matter jurisdiction and also reviews de
novo issues of statutory construction and decisions regarding
motions for summary disposition. Elba Twp v. Gratiot Co
Drain Comm'r, 493 Mich. 265, 278; 831 N.W.2d 204
(2013); Piccione v. Gillette, 327 Mich.App. 16,
18-19; 932 N.W.2d 197 (2019). Also subject to de novo review
is "the proper interpretation of a trust." In
re Estate of Stan, 301 Mich.App. 435, 442; 839 N.W.2d
498 (2013).
In
general, "[s]ubject matter jurisdiction in particular is
defined as the court's ability to exercise judicial
authority over that class of cases; not the particular case
before it but rather the abstract power to try a case of the
kind or character of the one pending." Campbell v.
St John Hosp, 434 Mich. 608, 613-614; 455 N.W.2d 695
(1990) (quotation marks and citations omitted). "When a
court is without jurisdiction of the subject matter, any
action with respect to such a cause, other than to dismiss
it, is absolutely void." Fox v. Bd of Regents of
Univ of Mich, 375 Mich. 238, 242; 134 N.W.2d 146 (1965).
"Probate courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.
Const 1963, art 6, § 15. The jurisdiction of the probate
court is defined entirely by statute." In re
Wirsing, 456 Mich. 467, 472; 573 N.W.2d 51 (1998).
MCL
700.7203(1) states that the probate court "has exclusive
jurisdiction of proceedings in this state brought by a
trustee or beneficiary that concern the administration of a
trust as provided in section 1302(b) and (d)." MCL
700.1302 states, in part:
The court has exclusive legal and equitable jurisdiction of
all of the following:
(b) A proceeding that concerns the validity,
internal affairs, or settlement of a trust; the
administration, distribution, modification, reformation,
or termination of a trust; or the declaration of
rights that involve a trust, trustee, or trust beneficiary,
including, but not limited to, proceedings to do all of the
following:
(i) Appoint or remove a trustee.
(ii) Review the fees of a trustee.
(iii) Require, hear, and settle interim or final
accounts.
(iv) Ascertain beneficiaries.
(v) Determine a question that arises in the
administration or distribution of a trust, including a
question of construction of a will or trust.
(vi) Instruct a trustee and determine relative to a
trustee the existence or nonexistence of an immunity, power,
privilege, duty, or right.
(vii) Release registration of a trust.
(viii) Determine an action or proceeding that
involves settlement of an irrevocable trust.
(d) A proceeding to require, hear, or settle the accounts of
a fiduciary and to order, upon request of an interested
person, instructions or directions to a fiduciary that
concern an estate within the court's jurisdiction.
[Emphases added.]
However, MCL 700.7205(1) provides:
If a party objects, the court shall not entertain a
proceeding under section 7203 that involves a trust that is
registered or that has its principal place of
administration in another state, unless either of the
following applies:
(a) All appropriate parties could not be bound by litigation
in the courts of the state where the trust is registered or
has its principal place of administration.
(b) The interests of justice would otherwise be seriously
impaired. [Emphasis added; citation omitted.]
Given
the language of MCL 700.7205(1), an important question to be
answered is whether the Trust did, in fact, have its
principal place of administration in another state by virtue
of what Costello did before any proceedings were initiated.
MCL
700.7105(1) states, "Except as otherwise provided in
the terms of the trust, this article governs the duties
and powers of a trustee, relations among trustees, and the
rights and interests of a trust beneficiary." (Emphasis
added.) Costello argues that the terms of the Trust
(discussed
shortly, infra) allowed him to transfer the
principal place of administration of the trust to Illinois
without following the notice requirements set forth in MCL
700.7108. MCL 700.7108 states:
(1) Without precluding other means for establishing a
sufficient connection with the designated jurisdiction, terms
of a trust designating the principal place of administration
are valid and controlling if any of the following apply:
(a) A trustee's principal place of business is located in
or a trustee is a resident of the designated jurisdiction.
(b) A trust director's principal place of business is
located in, or a trust director is a resident of, the
designated jurisdiction.
(c) All or part of the administration occurs in the
designated jurisdiction.
(2) A trustee is under a continuing duty to administer the
trust at a place appropriate to its purposes, its
administration, and the interests of the qualified trust
beneficiaries.
(3) Without precluding the right of the court to order,
approve, or disapprove a transfer, the trustee, in
furtherance of the duty prescribed by subsection (2), may
transfer the trust's principal place of administration to
another state or to a jurisdiction outside of the United
States.
(4) The trustee shall notify the qualified trust
beneficiaries in writing of a proposed transfer of a
trust's principal place of administration not less than
63 days before initiating the transfer. The notice of
proposed transfer must include all of the following:
(a) The name of the jurisdiction to which the principal place
of administration is to be transferred.
(b) The address and telephone number at the new location at
which the trustee can be contacted.
(c) An explanation of the reasons for the proposed transfer.
(d) The date on which the proposed transfer is anticipated to
occur.
(e) In a conspicuous manner, the date, not less than 63 days
after the giving of the notice, by which a qualified trust
beneficiary must notify the trustee in writing of an
objection to the proposed transfer.
(5) The authority of a trustee under this section to transfer
a trust's principal place of administration without the
approval of the court terminates if a qualified trust
beneficiary notifies the trustee in writing of an objection
to the proposed transfer on or before the date specified in
the notice.
(6) In connection with a transfer of the trust's
principal place of administration, the trustee may transfer
some or all of the trust property to a successor trustee
designated in the terms of the trust or appointed under
section 7704.
(7) The view of an adult beneficiary must be given weight in
determining the suitability of the trustee and the place of
administration.
Appellees
contend that Costello needed to follow this statute and that
the lack of 63 days of notice, as required by MCL
700.7108(4), rendered his attempt to transfer the principal
place of administration from Michigan to Illinois
ineffective.[3] Costello relies, instead, on MCL
700.7105(1) and on the following language from the article of
the Trust labeled "administrative powers":
Trustee has the power to perform every act that a reasonable
and prudent investor would perform incident to the
collection, preservation, management, use, and distribution
of the trust assets to accomplish the desired result of
administering the trust legally and in the best interest of
the trust beneficiaries, without the approval of any court or
beneficiary. . . . Trustee possesses . . . the authority to:
7.31 Situs of Trust. Change the situs and
principal place of administration of any trust under this
Agreement by notice to each current beneficiary; if a trust
under this Agreement is registered, it may be registered in
Ingham County, Michigan, in the jurisdiction in which the
trust is being administered, or in a jurisdiction in which
any trustee resides . . . .
"When
construing a trust, a court's sole objective is to
ascertain and give effect to the intent of the settlor.
Absent ambiguity, the words of the trust document itself are
the most indicative of the meaning and operation of the
trust." In re Stillwell Trust, 299 Mich.App
289, 294; 829 N.W.2d 353 (2012) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). "[I]ntent [of the settlor] is gauged from the
trust document itself, unless there is ambiguity."
In re Kostin, 278 Mich.App. 47, 53; 748 N.W.2d 583
(2008). In In re Estate of Reisman, 266 Mich.App.
522, 527; ...
