Costello v. State

• Decision Date: 09 February 1965
• Docket Number: No. 159,159
• Citation: 206 A.2d 812,237 Md. 464
• Parties: Charles W. CONSTELLO v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 464

237 Md. 464

206 A.2d 812

Charles W. CONSTELLO v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 159.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Feb. 9, 1965.

Charles W. Bell, Rockville (Bell & Bell, Rockville, on the brief), for appellant.

Stuart H. Rome, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Thomas B. Finan, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, and Leonard T. Kardy and Charles Foster, State's Atty. and Asst. State's Atty., respectively, for Montgomery County, Rockville, on the brief), for appellee.

Before HAMMOND, HORNEY, MARBURY, SYBERT and OPPENHEIMER, JJ.

OPPENHEIMER, Judge.

The appellant contends that his sentence upon a conviction for assault was imposed in violation of constitutional and legal mandates. No question is raised as to the conduct of the trial or of his guilt or innocence.

The appellant was convicted of assault by a jury in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County on March 9, 1964. Judge Shure presided at the trial. After the verdict, sentence was deferred pending a pre-sentence investigation. On April 27, 1964, the appellant was called before Judge Shure in open court for sentencing. His wife and mother testified on his behalf, but no transcript of the record, or record extract, has been filed in this appeal. The appellant was represented by counsel at all stages of the proceedings. At the conclusion of the testimony, Judge Shure again postponed sentencing. After the completion of the presentence investigation, which the Judge had requested, the appellant was again brought to court for sentencing on May 13. There was an unreported conference between the judge and appellant's counsel at the bench. After the conclusion of the conference, the appellant was sentenced to the House of Correction for 360 days. On May 14, the appellant filed a motion for modification or reduction of sentence, with two affidavits, and a motion to release him on bond pending the hearing. On May 20, he filed a motion that Judge Shure disqualify himself from any further participation in the matter. A hearing on these motions was had in open court on May 22, at which the appellant and his wife testified. Judge Shure overruled both motions, but ordered the sentence to begin April 27, 1964, instead of May 13, the date of imposition of sentence. Thereafter, notice of appeal was filed and the appeal bond set at $3,000.

During the May 22 hearing, Judge Shure made a statement in respect of a controversy which had developed between appellant's counsel and the judge, which was referred to in the affidavits filed with the appellant's motions. The judge said, inter alia, that at the sentencing hearing on April 27, the appellant's wife in her testimony had given the court the impression that the appellant was a good husband, a law-abiding citizen, whereas the judge had received information to the contrary from a part-time Assistant State's Attorney who had represented the wife in his private professional capacity. Judge Shure referred to the offense of which the appellant had been convicted as 'an extremely aggravated assault', and stated that the pre-sentence investigation made by the Department of Parole and Probation disclosed five convictions involving theft, disorderly conduct, drunkenness, and operating a motor vehicle while the license was revoked. The judge said further that the report revealed the appellant was charged with assault on his wife in February, 1964, although the warrant was later withdrawn. Judge Shure told the appellant that the conduct of his attorney had no effect whatsoever upon the court's judgment in respect of sentencing him. The appellant, after a prior conviction, had been given three years' probation, the judge noted, and said 'the Court is convinced that the only way that you are ever going to be straightened out is to serve these 360 days in jail.' The court then ordered the sentence to begin from the earlier date.

The appellant contends that neither he nor his counsel was ever informed, prior to the court's decision, of the content and nature of the allegations made by counsel for the appellant's wife; that his requests to submit his wife for questioning and for a one day continuance made at the bench conference on May 13 were improperly denied; and that his request to inspect the pre-sentence investigation report was also improperly denied. He contends, further, that at the hearing on his motions for modification or reduction of sentence and for disqualification of Judge Shure, the trial court improperly denied the proffer of appellant's counsel to call Mrs. Costello's former attorney as a witness and the further request of his counsel to take the stand himself and to argue the motions. He claims reversible error in the denial of the motion for disqualification. The State contests each of these allegations, and argues further that the appellant can not argue the validity of his sentence upon this appeal.

In support of its contention that the sentence here involved is not reviewable on appeal, the State cites Gleaton v. State, 235 Md. 271, 277, 201 A.2d 353 (1964), in which we reiterated the principle that, if the sentence is within the limits prescribed by law, it ordinarily may not be reviewed on appeal. There is no question here that the sentence is within the legal limitation. The appellant does not and could not claim that his 360 day sentence for assault constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Gleaton v. State, supra; Adair v. State, 231 Md. 255, 256, 189 A.2d 618 (1963). The appellant's contention, however, is that the procedure in the determination of the sentence, in the light of the circumstances involved, violated his constitutional right to due process of law. That allegation, if supported, is reviewable on appeal as an exception to the general principal. See Williams v. People of State of New York, 337 U.S 241, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949) and Ann. 'Imposing sentence and procedural due process', 93 L.Ed. 1345. The State contends further that, in any event, the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act, Code (1957) Article 27, Section 645A(b) (1963 Supplement), provides thtat no direct appeal lies from the denial of a motion by the trial court for modification or reduction of the sentence. We agree. Wilson v. State, 227 Md. 99, 100-101, 175 A.2d 775 (1961) and cases therein cited. However, because in this case the proceedings on the motion were closely related to those in the imposition of the sentence, and, as in Wilson, to avoid the delay and expense of a remand to permit the bringing up of the question on a petition for post-conviction relief, we shall indicate our views on the merits.

In our consideration of the merits, we are confined to what the record shows transpired. Maryland Rule 826 b, Yamin v. State, 204 Md. 407, 104 A.2d 588 (1954). As has been noted, we do not have the benefit of the transcript of the sentencing hearing on April 27. We can not consider the nature of content of any informal, off-the-record conversations between the trial judge and the appellant's counsel. Whether the conduct of his counsel was or was not proper is not an issue here involved. Similarly, the question of whether or not the former counsel for the appellant's wife violated any professional privilege in communicating information to the trial judge without his client's consent is not before us, except to the extent, if any, that the attorney's disclosure infringed any of the rights of the appellant.

The appellant contends that he and his counsel were improperly denied the opportunity to inspect the pre-sentence report prepared by the Department of Parole and Probation. The record does not show that a request for inspection was made, or, if it was made, that it was denied, or that the judge did not tell the appellant's counsel of the contents of the report. The appellant's contention in respect of the non-disclosure of his report can not now, for the first time, be considered. Maryland Rule 885. Bicknell v. State, 222 Md. 416, 417, 160 A.2d 608 (1960). In any event, as we said in Driver v. State, 201 Md. 25, 32, 92 A.2d 570 (1952), '[T]he procedure in the sentencing process is not the same as that in the trial process. It is a fundamental principle that a person accused of crime shall not be convicted unless he is given reasonable notice of the charge and an opportunity to be heard in his defense and to examine adverse witnesses. But the sentencing judge may consider information, even though obtained outside the courtroom, from persons whom the defendant has not been permitted to confront or cross-examine. Murphy v. State, 184 Md. 70, 40 A.2d 239.' 201 Md. at 32, 92 A.2d at 573. See also Williams v. People of State of New York, supra.

The appellant relies upon the statement in Driver, 201 Md. at 32, 92 A.2d 570, that any information which might influence the court's judgment in imposing sentence which has not been received from the defendant or given in his presence, should be called to his attention or that of his counsel, so that he may be afforded an opportunity to refute or discredit it. However, the information here involved is contained in a pre-sentence report, and Maryland Rule 761 d specifically provides that such a report shall be subject to inspection by counsel 'unless the court directs otherwise.' The court, therefore, can refuse inspection in the sound exercise of its discretion. The presumption, here unrebutted, is that the court made proper use of the report. Driver v. State, supra, at 34, 92 A.2d 570. That presumption is fortified by the summary of the report given by Judge Shure at the May 22 hearing.

The appellant's grievances as to the sentencing procedure are largely based upon the use of the information volunteered by his wife's former attorney. Sparse as is the record, it is evident that at the sentencing hearing on April 27, the appellant's wife testified on his behalf to the effect that he was a good husband and father and that thereafter, before the imposition of sentence on May 13, the wife's former...