Coston v. Plitt Theatres, Inc.

• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
• Writing for the Court: Before COFFEY and MANION, Circuit Judges, and ESCHBACH; ESCHBACH; MANION
• Citation: Coston v. Plitt Theatres, Inc., 831 F.2d 1321 (7th Cir. 1987)
• Decision Date: 28 October 1987
• Docket Number: Nos. 86-2109,86-2137 and 86-2144,s. 86-2109
• Parties: 44 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1722, 44 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 37,487, 56 USLW 2231 Sam T. COSTON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PLITT THEATRES, INC., Defendant-Appellant.

Page 1321

831 F.2d 1321

44 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1722,

44 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 37,487, 56 USLW 2231

Sam T. COSTON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PLITT THEATRES, INC., Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 86-2109, 86-2137 and 86-2144.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Argued Feb. 10, 1987.

Decided Sept. 23, 1987.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Oct. 28, 1987.

Sidney Z. Karasik, Chicago, Ill., for defendant-appellant.

Daniel S. Mathless, Baum, Glick & Wetherimer, P.C., Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before COFFEY and MANION, Circuit Judges, and ESCHBACH, Senior Circuit Judge.

ESCHBACH, Senior Circuit Judge.

Sam T. Coston was discharged from his position as Operations Manager of Plitt Theatres, Inc. ("Plitt"), and brought an action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). After a trial the jury found that Plitt had willfully violated the ADEA, and the district judge awarded liquidated damages, backpay, and attorney's fees. He denied reinstatement and front pay. Plitt appeals the sufficiency of the evidence for the verdict that it had violated the ADEA, the determination that its violation was willful, the method the district court used for calculating liquidated damages, and the award and amount of attorney's fees. Coston appeals the denials of reinstatement, front pay, and prejudgment interest. For the reasons stated below we affirm the district court's judgment in all respects except the method of calculating liquidated damages; on that issue alone we reverse and remand.

I

In 1978 at age 55 Sam T. Coston was hired by Plitt Theatres' Midwest Division as a district manager. Plitt is a national chain of movie theaters. Each district manager was responsible for the general operation of a set of movie theaters. In addition to the district managers there was for some period of time a position entitled Operations Manager. Coston became Operations Manager in 1979 but also continued to be a District Manager. The Operations Manager in this Midwest Division in fact reported to a Vice President, Irwin Cohen. Cohen in turn reported to an Executive Vice President, Harold Klein. Klein was Plitt's chief administrative official for the Midwest Division.

When Coston became Operations Manager he received an increase in his salary. The Operations Manager was generally to inspect the theaters, engage in some collective bargaining, help district managers with local problems, help set up budgets, handle customer complaints if necessary, and serve generally as an intermediary between the district managers and the higher management. The Operations Manager position required some travel to supervise the individual theaters, but the amount of travel required was the subject of some disagreement at trial, even between Executive Vice President Klein and Vice President Cohen.

Sometime in late 1981 Plitt determined that it needed to engage in a reduction-in-force ("RIF") of its staff in order to respond to reduced business. On January 4, 1982, Cohen informed Coston in a face-to-face, one-on-one meeting of the poor business conditions and of Plitt's decision to cut expenses by, inter alia, eliminating several positions within the company. Coston was at that time less than sixty years of age. Cohen told Coston that the Operations Manager position was one of the positions being phased out and Coston's position was being terminated as of January 8, 1982. Coston testified that he had no disagreement with the decision to phase out the Operations Manager position, and that he realized that business had been poor and was not surprised to learn that "certain things needed to be done." Coston testified that he asked Cohen why he couldn't stay on and continue as a District Manager rather than one of the younger district managers. According to Coston, Cohen responded that one of the younger district managers (Pat Burns) had seniority with the company, and the other (Kurt Noack) was "super." Coston testified that he then asked if there were any position with Plitt Coston could fill, and Cohen replied that there was none, hesitated, and then added, "Besides, Sam, we have to go along with youth." Coston testified that he then asked if Klein knew of Coston's discharge, and Cohen replied that Klein knew of the decision (Klein in fact had made the decision) and had informed him (Cohen) that there was no other position available for Coston.

Plitt did not appoint a successor Operations Manager, but it did appoint Pat Burns, who had previously been a District Manager for another district, to add Coston's old District Manager position for the Water Tower District to his own district.

Coston brought an action against Plitt in federal district court claiming that in discharging him Plitt violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. Secs. 621-634. Plitt claimed that it had discharged Coston in accordance with a RIF necessitated by poor business conditions and that Coston's discharge was appropriate under the ADEA. The case was tried to a jury, which found Plitt liable of a willful violation of the ADEA and assessed commission and bonus damages against Plitt of $9,600. Pursuant to section 626(b) Coston requested reinstatement or front pay, liquidated damages, actual damages, interest, costs, and attorney's fees. The district court denied both reinstatement and front pay, computed actual damages, and (to reach the liquidated damages figure) first doubled actual damages and then deducted amounts earned in mitigation. The court also granted costs to plaintiffs and awarded plaintiffs attorney's fees of $35,408.50.

Plitt moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, for a new trial. The trial court denied the motions. Plitt now appeals the judgment of liability and the judgment that the liability was willful. Plitt also appeals the award of attorney's fees and the method of calculating liquidated damages. Coston appeals the denials of reinstatement and front pay and the denial of prejudgment interest.

II

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

The plaintiff in an age discrimination suit under the ADEA has the ultimate burden of proving that age was a determining factor in his or her discharge. E.g., Mathewson v. National Automatic Tool Co., 807 F.2d 87, 89 (7th Cir.1986); La Montagne v. American Convenience Products, Inc., 750 F.2d 1405, 1409 (7th Cir.1984). The plaintiff may attempt to meet this burden either through the presentation of direct proof or by utilizing the shifting burden of production method set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). E.g., Mathewson, 807 F.2d at 89-90; La Montagne, 750 F.2d at 1409. Of course, the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff at all times. E.g., Mathewson, 807 F.2d at 89-90; La Montagne, 750 F.2d at 1409.

A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case in a reduction-in-force action under the ADEA by

(1) showing that the plaintiff was within the protected age group; (2) showing that the plaintiff was adversely affected, either by discharge or demotion; (3) showing that the plaintiff was qualified to assume another position at the time of discharge or demotion; and (4) producing circumstantial or direct evidence from which a factfinder might reasonably conclude that the employer intended to discriminate in making the employment decision at issue.

McNeil v. Economics Laboratory, Inc., 800 F.2d 111, 114 (7th Cir.1986), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 1983, 95 L.Ed.2d 823 (1987); see also Matthews v. Allis-Chalmers, 769 F.2d 1215, 1217 (7th Cir.1985); La Montagne, 750 F.2d at 1409.

In reviewing a jury's verdict we ascertain whether there is substantial evidence in support of the verdict. E.g., Mathewson, 807 F.2d at 90. In applying this standard we ascertain whether the verdict finds sufficient support from the evidence presented and all the reasonable inferences that may be drawn in favor of the party winning the verdict; conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in the winning party's favor. E.g., Mathewson, 807 F.2d at 90; La Montagne, 750 F.2d at 1410. Our role is not to weigh the evidence in search of a preponderance as would a jury, but it is instead the more restrictive function of determining if the evidence in support of the verdict is substantial; a mere scintilla of supporting evidence will not suffice. E.g., Mathewson, 807 F.2d at 90; La Montagne, 750 F.2d at 1410.

Coston was undoubtedly within the protected age group and was adversely affected by his discharge. In addition, Coston admits that business conditions were poor and that steps needed to be taken to reduce costs; there is no real disagreement over the justification for a reduction-in-force at the time of the discharge. Thus the evidence at trial centered on whether Coston was qualified to assume another position at the time his was eliminated, and whether a factfinder might have reasonably concluded that the employer intended to discriminate against Coston in making the discharge decision.

The evidence at trial of Coston's competence was conflicting. There was testimony that suggested that Coston was performing competently and within the range of ability expected. In addition, Klein himself admitted that his decision to discharge Coston was made without knowledge of Cohen's assertions that Coston had performed audits improperly and without exact knowledge of Coston's record of theater visits. With regard to theater visits even the requirements for determining competence are unclear; Klein testified that Coston should have been in the office more and Cohen testified that Coston should have been out more. It is also undisputed that Coston improved the situation at Water Tower from what it had been during Noack's tenure there as district manager. Therefore there was significant, if not...