Costoras v. Noel
Decision Date | 04 January 1956 |
Citation | 100 N.H. 81,119 A.2d 705 |
Parties | Harry COSTORAS v. Harold B. NOEL. |
Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
McCabe & Fisher and Harold D. Moran, Dover, for plaintiff.
Burns, Calderwood & Bryant and Robert E. Hinchey, Dover, for defendant.
Actions of tort for physical injuries to the person and the causes of such actions survive only to the extent specified by the statute. RSA 556:9; Halle v. Cavanaugh, 79 N.H. 418, 111 A. 76. The statute relating to pending actions formerly read as follows: 'If such an action is pending at the time of the decease of one of the parties it shall abate and be forever barred, unless the administrator of the deceased party, if the deceased was plaintiff, shall appear and assume the prosecution of the action before the end of the second term after the decease of such party, or, if the deceased party was defendant, unless the plaintiff shall procure a scire facias to be issued to the administrator of the deceased party before the end of the second term after the original grant of administration upon his estate.' R.L. c. 355, § 10. This section was amended by Laws 1951, c. 88, which added the following:
The question presented in this case is whether the phrase 'any of the foregoing provisions' which appears in the last sentence refers only to that part of RSA 556:10 that was inserted by the 1951 amendment or to the whole section. It is the contention of the defendant that the quoted phrase in the proviso of the statute applies only to those cases where the defendant has deceased, and it is the contention of the plaintiff that it applies to the whole section, RSA 556:10, including cases involving the death of the plaintiff as well as the death of the defendant.
The legislative history of the 1951 amendment sheds little light on the legislative intent, although it is clear that Senate Bill 40 as passed by the Senate allowed the Superior Court no discretionary authority and provision for it was inserted by the House of Representatives and subsequently concurred in by the Senate on motion of the sponsor of the bill. House Journal 1951, pp. 424-425; Senate Journal 1951, pp. 186-187. In the absence of any discretionary authority in the Presiding Justice, failure to comply with RSA 556:10 will cause the action to abate. Dubois v. Pouliot, 97...
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Homewood v. Homewood
...301, 302 (1980). A phrase and a section of a statute may not be considered in isolation from the rest of the statute, Costoras v. Noel, 100 N.H. 81, 83, 119 A.2d 705 (1956), and words must be given their ordinary meaning unless the context suggests otherwise. Martin v. Gardner Mach. Works, ......
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Appalachian Mountain Club v. Meredith
...by amicus curiae. A determination of the legislative intent is to be made upon consideration of the act as a whole. Costoras v. Noel, 100 N.H. 81, 83, 119 A.2d 705. The conclusion that the word 'used' was intended to convey the same meaning in subsection V which was clearly given to it in s......
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State v. Stone
...The words 'sell' or 'sale' must be interpreted within the context of the whole statute of which they are a part. Costoras v. Noel, 100 N.H. 81, 83, 119 A.2d 705, 706 (1956). They need not have the same meaning in this criminal statute that they have in the statute governing commercial trans......
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Costoras v. Noel
...death did so solely by virtue of RSA Ch. 556 and predecessor statutes and only to the extent specified by them. Costoras v. Noel, 100 N.H. 81, 82, 119 A.2d 705. The statute which creates the right also limits its existence. Kostoras v. Hines, 80 N.H. 500, 119 A. When there is an action pend......