Cothron v. White Castle Sys., Inc.
Citation | 477 F.Supp.3d 723 |
Decision Date | 07 August 2020 |
Docket Number | No. 19 CV 00382,19 CV 00382 |
Parties | Latrina COTHRON, Individually and on behalf of similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. WHITE CASTLE SYSTEM, INC. d/b/a White Castle, Defendant. |
Court | United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Court (Northern District of Illinois) |
Andrew C. Ficzko, James B. Zouras, Ryan F. Stephan, Stephan Zouras, LLP, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.
Alexander M. Misakian, Kenneth Daniel Walsh, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Benjamin Sedrish, Kathleen Mary Ryan, Erin Bolan Hines, Melissa Anne Siebert, William Francis Northrip, Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P., Mary A. Smigielski, Lewis Brisbois, Chicago, IL, Melissa Dunlap Palmisciano, White Castle System, Inc., Columbus, OH, for Defendant.
Despite numerous recent suits concerning Illinois’ Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA), important questions of statutory interpretation remain unresolved. This case presents two such questions: what acts violate BIPA Section 15(b) and Section 15(d) and when do claims premised on such violations accrue? Plaintiff Latrina Cothron alleges that, in 2007, her employer, White Castle System, Inc. ("White Castle"), implemented a system that involved capturing her fingerprint data and disclosing it to third parties. After BIPA's enactment in mid-2008, White Castle continued to operate its system but did not obtain the newly required consent of its employees, thereby violating BIPA Section 15(b) and Section 15(d).1 White Castle has moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), arguing that Ms. Cothron's claims accrued in 2008 and are therefore barred by the statute of limitations. Because the Court finds that Ms. Cothron's claims under both Section 15(b) and Section 15(d) are timely, White Castle's motion is denied.
The facts set forth below are largely the same as those described in the Court's prior opinion in this case. See Mem. Op. Order 2-3, ECF No. 117. Latrina Cothron began working for White Castle in 2004 and is still employed by the restaurant-chain as a manager. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 39, ECF No. 44. Roughly three years after Ms. Cothron was hired, White Castle introduced a fingerprint-based computer system that required Ms. Cothron, as a condition of continued employment, to scan and register her fingerprint in order "to access the computer as a manager and access her paystubs as an hourly employee." Id. ¶ 40. According to Ms. Cothron, White Castle's system involved transferring the fingerprints to two third-party vendors—Cross Match and Digital Persona—as well as storing the fingerprints at other separately owned and operated data-storage facilities. Id. ¶¶ 28-31. Perhaps unsurprisingly—given that the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act ("BIPA") did not exist yet—White Castle did not receive a written release from Ms. Cothron to collect her fingerprints or to transfer them to third parties before implementing the system. Id. ¶ 41.
When the Illinois legislature enacted BIPA in mid-2008, the legal landscape changed but White Castle's practices did not—at least not for roughly ten years. Id. ¶¶ 27-28. White Castle continued to use its fingerprint system in the years following BIPA's passage and continued to disseminate that data to the same third parties. Id. ¶¶ 28-31. It was not until October 2018 that White Castle provided Ms. Cothron with the required disclosures or a consent form. Id. ¶¶ 45, 48-49. On December 6, 2018, Ms. Cothron filed her class action complaint in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois and the case was subsequently removed to this Court by Cross Match Technologies, Inc. (since dismissed from the case). Mot. J. Pleadings 2, ECF No. 120. After the Court denied White Castle's motion to dismiss Ms. Cothron's second amended complaint, White Castle filed an answer. Id. In the answer, White Castle raised a statute of limitations defense and subsequently moved for judgment on the pleadings on that basis. Id.
A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is evaluated using the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) : to survive the motion, "a complaint must state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bishop v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l , 900 F.3d 388, 397 (7th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted). A claim has "facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Wagner v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. , 840 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ). In assessing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court draws "all reasonable inferences and facts in favor of the nonmovant, but need not accept as true any legal assertions." Id. Ms. Cothron provides two arguments for rejecting White Castle's statute of limitations defense: first, that White Castle waived its statute of limitations defense by not asserting it in its previously filed motion to dismiss; second, that her claims are timely.
In making her waiver argument, Ms. Cothron ignores the basic framework provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as well as the language of Rule 12(g)(2), on which she relies. The Rules provide that a defendant may respond to a complaint by filing a responsive pleading or, alternatively, by filing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a). A Rule 12(b) motion, which must be made before a responsive pleading, is the proper vehicle for challenging the sufficiency of the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). And White Castle, in its previously filed motion to dismiss, properly raised arguments under Rule 12(b)(6) that targeted the sufficiency of the complaint. Affirmative defenses (such as the defense of statute of limitations), on the other hand, are "external" to the complaint. Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners , 682 F.3d 687, 690 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012). Per Rule 8(c), the proper time to identify affirmative defenses is in a defendant's responsive pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c). Then, "[a]fter pleadings are closed," a party may subsequently file a motion for judgment on the pleadings and seek judgment based on the previously raised affirmative defense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). In keeping with these rules, the Seventh Circuit has "repeatedly cautioned that the proper heading for such motions is Rule 12(c)." Brownmark Films LLC , 682 F.3d at 690 n.1 ; see also Burton v. Ghosh , 961 F.3d 960, 964-965 (7th Cir. 2020) ( . Contrary to Ms. Cothron's argument, White Castle did not waive its right to assert a statute of limitations defense in a motion for judgment on the pleadings; Rule 12(g)(2) expressly states that its limitation on further motions is applicable "except as provided in Rule 12(h)(2) ." And Rule 12(h)(2)(B), in turn, expressly provides that failure to state a claim may be raised "by a motion under Rule 12(c)"—a motion which, again, may only be made "after the pleadings are closed."3 Far from having waived its statute of limitations defense, White Castle has raised the affirmative defense at precisely the procedural posture envisioned by the Rules. Ms. Cothron's argument to the contrary is entirely off-base.
Ms. Cothron's second argument for denying the motion—that, considered on the merits, White Castle's statute of limitations defense fails—is substantially stronger; indeed, the Court concludes that it is correct. A statute of limitations defense is an argument about the timeliness of a claim, and timeliness is a function of both the accrual date of a cause of action and the applicable statute of limitations. Nonetheless, in asserting its defense, White Castle limits itself to the issue of accrual and the Court does the same. See Reply Br. 5 n.2, ECF No. 124 () .4
As a general matter, under Illinois law, a cause of action accrues and the "limitations period begins to run when facts exist that authorize one party to maintain an action against another." Feltmeier v. Feltmeier , 207 Ill. 2d 263, 278, 278 Ill.Dec. 228, 798 N.E.2d 75, 85 (2003). On the same facts, however, the parties put forth accrual dates that differ by roughly 10 years: White Castle argues that the claims accrued in mid-2008, while Ms. Cothron contends that at least a portion of her claims accrued in 2018. How so far apart? The ten-year delay stems from accepting either of Ms. Cothron's two theories of accrual. First, Ms. Cothron contends that the alleged BIPA violations can be understood as falling under an exception to the general rule governing accrual, the continuing violation exception. "[U]nder the ‘continuing tort’ or ‘continuing violation’ rule, ‘where a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury, the limitations period does not begin to run until the date of the last injury or the date the tortious acts cease.’ " Id. (quoting Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. , 199 Ill.2d 325, 345, 264 Ill.Dec. 283, 770 N.E.2d 177 (2002) ).
Applying this doctrine, Ms. Cothron argues that the statute of limitations did not begin to run on any portion of her claim until the final violation (the last time White Castle collected and disseminated her fingerprint before she received BIPA notice and provided her consent). In the alternative, Ms. Cothron contends that each post-BIPA scan of...
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Illinois Supreme Court Rules That BIPA Violations Accrue With Each Scan
...information to the original scan (stored in an off-site database by one of the third parties with which White Castle contracted). 477 F. Supp. 3d 723, 732 (N.D. Ill. 2020). In essence, according to the Court, every time an employee scans his or her fingerprint in order to compare it with th......
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