Cotta v. Cnty. of Kings, 1:13–cv–359–LJO–SMS.

• Decision Date: 07 January 2015
• Docket Number: No. 1:13–cv–359–LJO–SMS.,1:13–cv–359–LJO–SMS.
• Parties: Yvonne COTTA, individually and as a representative of the Estate of John Cotta, and Madison Cotta, a minor represented by guardian ad litem Yvonne Cotta, Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF KINGS and Sgt. Shari Henderson, Does 1 through 30, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

79 F.Supp.3d 1148

Yvonne COTTA, individually and as a representative of the Estate of John Cotta, and Madison Cotta, a minor represented by guardian ad litem Yvonne Cotta, Plaintiffs

v.COUNTY OF KINGS and Sgt. Shari Henderson, Does 1 through 30, Defendants.

No. 1:13–cv–359–LJO–SMS.

United States District Court, E.D. California.

Signed Jan. 7, 2015.

Kevin Gerard Little, Law Office of Kevin G. Little, Fresno, CA, for Plaintiffs.

James J. Arendt, Roy C. Santos, Weakley & Arendt, LLP, Fresno, CA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. 60)

LAWRENCE J. O'NEILL, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This case concerns the death of John Cotta (“Decedent”), who was allegedly killed by his cellmate on April 23, 2012, while incarcerated at Kings County Jail (“the jail”). See Doc. 47, Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), at ¶ 4. Yvonne Cotta (“Mrs. Cotta”), individually and as the representative of the Estate of John Cotta, the Estate of John Cotta (“the Estate”), Madison Cotta, and Kaylianna Cotta (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) bring this suit against the County of Kings (“the County”) Sergeant Shari Henderson (“Sgt. Henderson”) (collectively, “Defendants”), and Does 1–50 on the ground Defendants violated Decedent's constitutional rights while he was incarcerated and those violations ultimately caused his death. See id. at 9–15.

Currently pending before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Doc. 60. The Court did not set a hearing for the motion and the parties did not request one. Doc. 70. The Court finds it appropriate to rule on the motion without oral argument. See Local Rule 230(g); id. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND¹

On June 29, 2010, Decedent and Heath Parnell (“Parnell”) were arrested after a car chase with the police. Doc. 68, Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Statement of Disputed Facts (“UMF”), 19. Parnell was the driver. SAC at ¶ 9. “Many shots were fired during the chase, with police officers barely escaping serious injury or death.” Id. Decedent was charged multiple felony charges, including auto theft and attempted murder of a peace officer. UMF 19. Decedent was then taken to the jail.

When booking inmates, the jail employs an objective classification system to classify inmates to determine their “securing level” and where they should be housed. UMF 16. The parties do not dispute that the jail's housing and classification policy (“the policy”) “was in compliance with California Code of Regulations Title 15 [“Title 15² ”] and accepted standards in the State of California.” UMF 14.³ Jail authorities use information the inmate provides, as well as information, including but not limited to the inmate's current charges, prior convictions, escape history, disciplinary history, and gang affiliation. See UMF 18.

When booked at the jail, Decedent stated that he would not have “problems on the streets with anyone,” that he had not “provided information about criminal activity/testified against other person[s],” and that he was not an informant. UMF 21. Decedent did not “anticipate any problems with inmates while in custody.” UMF 22.

Henderson was assigned as the Classification Sergeant in 2009, id., and has been properly trained with respect to all of her duties in that position. UMF 12. In that capacity, she has the sole and unreviewable authority to make housing decisions at the jail. UMF 27. Accordingly, she made all housing-related decisions concerning Decedent. Id. None was approved by other jail staff, nor was any required to be approved. Id.

Henderson testified that, although co-defendants generally are not housed together, it is not mandatory under applicable law or the jail's classification and housing policy, but rather is determined on a case-by-case basis. See Henderson Depo. at 22:20–24. One exception, however, is for “snitches” (i.e., law enforcement informants), who are indefinitely placed in protective custody. Id. at 53:2–3. Henderson has granted and denied requests for co-defendants to be housed together.See id. at 67. Henderson explained that a perceived adversity between co-defendants, such as one “telling on” the other or one taking a plea deal that the other opposes, can lead to their being housed separately. See id. at 28:1–4, 68:2–18.

Due to the high-profile nature of his case, Henderson initially decided to house Decedent alone. See Doc. 65–5 at 5. On July 6, 2010, Decedent was moved to the jail's general population housing, but he was not housed with Parnell. Id. On February 8, 2011, February 17, 2011, and May 8, 2011, Decedent submitted three written requests to be housed with Parnell as his cellmate. UMF 24. He also made multiple oral requests to Henderson to be housed with Parnell as his cellmate. UMF 25. Henderson eventually authorized Decedent's request, and he was housed with Parnell as his cellmate from May 17, 2011 until his death on April 23, 2012. UMF 27. In January 2012, Decedent and Parnell jointly requested to be moved to another location in the jail. UMF 32.

Henderson was unaware that Decedent “had given a statement to any law enforcement official that was against the interests of Parnell.” UMF 28. Henderson had no knowledge that Decedent and Parnell ever had any altercations, that Parnell ever threatened Decedent, or that Parnell had attempted to intimidate Decedent. UMF 29. Henderson had no knowledge that Parnell pressured Decedent to request that they be housed together. UMF 30. Henderson was unaware that Parnell had ever been violent toward any inmate at the jail, including Decedent. UMF 31. Decedent spoke with Henderson on a number of occasions and never expressed to her that he believed that Parnell was a threat to his safety. UMF 35. Henderson never received any information from anyone that Parnell threatened Decedent's safety. UMF 36.⁴

At all relevant times, the jail had a written policy concerning cell check searches. UMF 37. The policy required “a cell check at the beginning of every shift and at least hourly thereafter.” UMF 39. Jail deputies received ongoing training on conducting cell checks and searches that comply “with the minimum guidelines set forth by the State of California Standards and Training for Corrections (‘STC’).” UMF 42; see also UMF 78. Jail staff also receives training on monitoring the safety of inmates and classification and housing of inmates. UMF 78. At all relevant times, the jail's staff “met or exceeded the minimum standards for training set forth by STC.” UMF 78; see also UMF 73–77.

In March 2012, a jury convicted Parnell and Decedent for crimes they committed during the course of the car chase. SAC at ¶ 15. Decedent did not testify at the trial, but his defense—that Parnell was the primary actor and he was an unwilling participant—was adverse to Parnell. See Doc. 65–4, Deposition of Christopher Caine (“Caine Depo.”), at 20. Their sentencing was set for April 24, 2012. Doc. 65–4, Deposition of Carlos Navarette (“Navarette Depo.”), at 11:8–11.

Around 11:21 P.M. on April 22, 2012, Deputy Justin Davis checked Decedent's and Parnell's cell. UMF 49. Around 12:37 A.M. on April 23, 2012, Deputy Rosalie Garcia–Gonzalez checked their cell. Id. Around 1:33 A.M. on April 23, 2012, Deputy Eric Hobbs checked their cell. Id. The deputies could see parts of both Decedent's and Parnell's bodies and did not note any signs of disturbance or anything otherwise out of the ordinary. UMF 50.⁵ Henderson was not on duty between 4:00 P.M. on April 22, 2010, and 7:45 A.M. on April 22, 2010, and had no supervisorial responsibility over the deputies. UMF 55–56.

The cells are monitored by video camera and are equipped with an intercom system that permits jail staff to hear inside a cell when its intercom is activated. UMF 57–58. On the night of April 22–23, 2010, Detentions Technician Felicia Dudley (“Dudley”) had not seen or heard any disturbance until approximately 1:40 A.M. when she received an intercom call from Parnell, who reported that Decedent was not breathing and needed medical attention. UMF 60–61. Dudley immediately contacted Deputies Garcia–Gonzalez, Davis, and Hobbs, and requested that they respond to Decedent's and Parnell's cell. UMF 61.

When the Deputies arrived, it appeared that Decedent was asleep. UMF 67. They soon determined that Decedent had died, apparently by ligature strangulation with a bed sheet. UMF 70. Decedent's death is estimated to have occurred on April 23, 2012, between 12:40 A.M. and 1:40 A.M. UMF 71. “With ligature strangulation, [Decedent] could have died within minutes.” UMF 72.

It is undisputed that Parnell killed Decedent. See Doc. 60–1 at 33 (Defendants stating that “[a]ssuming as we do that Parnell murdered [Decedent] ...”). Plaintiffs assert that the reason Parnell killed decedent was because Decedent's trial defense was adverse to Parnell in that Decedent's attorney argued Decedent was an unwilling participant and Parnell was wholly at fault.

III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mrs. Cotta filed this case on March 12, 2013, individually, as a representative of the Estate, and on the behalf of Madison, Decedent's daughter. Doc. 1. Because Madison is a minor, this Court appointed Mrs. Cotta as Madison's guardian ad litem on July 5, 2013. Doc. 20. Mrs. Cotta filed a first amended complaint on August 4, 2013 (Doc. 26) and a second amended complaint (“the SAC”)—currently the operative complaint—on May 28, 2014. The SAC names Kaylianna, Decedent's daughter and Madison's half-sister, as an additional Plaintiff. SAC at ¶ 5.

Plaintiffs assert four causes of action.⁶ Plaintiffs' first claim is brought against Henderson under § 1983 for exhibiting deliberate indifference to Decedent's serious safety needs in violation of Decedent's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. SAC at ¶¶ 25–28. Plaintiffs' second claim is a Monell⁷ claim against the County. Id. at ¶¶ 29–32. Plaintiffs' third claim is brought...