Cotter v. Royal Neighbors of America
| Decision Date | 09 June 1899 |
| Docket Number | 11,673 - (168) |
| Citation | 79 N.W. 542,76 Minn. 518 |
| Parties | JOHN COTTER v. ROYAL NEIGHBORS OF AMERICA |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Mower county by the guardian of Willie T. Egan, the beneficiary named in a certificate of membership issued by defendant to Mary Egan, deceased, to recover the sum of $1,000, payable on her death. The case was tried before Kingsley, J., who found in favor of plaintiff. From a judgment entered pursuant to the findings, defendant appealed. Reversed.
Life Insurance -- Suicide -- Insanity.
A certificate of membership in the defendant, a fraternal beneficiary association, provided that "if the member holding this certificate * * * shall die * * * by any means or act which, if used or done by such member while in possession of all natural faculties, would be deemed self-destruction, * * * then this certificate shall be null and void." The member came to her death by taking a quantity of carbolic acid sufficient to cause death administered by her own hands, not by accident; and at the time she took the carbolic acid she was mentally insane, and did not understand the moral quality of her act. Held, that the certificate of membership was null and void; that the act of the member was one which, if done by a sane person "would be deemed self-destruction."
J. G. Johnson and B. D. Smith, for appellant.
Greenman & Dowdall, for respondent.
This was an action brought by the beneficiary upon a certificate of membership issued by the defendant to one Mary Egan, now deceased. The facts stipulated on the trial were that Mary Egan came to her death by taking a quantity of carbolic acid, sufficient to cause death, administered by her own hands, not by accident, and that at the time she took said carbolic acid she was mentally insane, and did not understand the moral nature of her said act. The certificate of membership provided:
"If the member holding this certificate * * * shall die * * * by any means or act which, if used or done by such member while in possession of all natural faculties, would be deemed self-destruction, * * * then this certificate shall be null and void."
The defense, of course, was that under this provision the certificate was, upon the stipulated facts, null and void. The trial judge, in his memorandum, says that this provision is susceptible of two constructions, -- one in favor of the theory of the plaintiff, and the other in favor of the theory of the defendant, -- and that, in accordance with a familiar rule in the law of insurance, he would adopt the construction favorable to the plaintiff; but he does not state what that construction was. If we could agree with the learned trial judge that the provision is reasonably susceptible of a construction favorable to the plaintiff, we would readily and even gladly concur in his conclusion. But, on the contrary, we think that there is no ambiguity in the provision, and that it will admit of but one construction, and that the one contended for by the defendant.
It is difficult to find language in support of this view that will make it more plain than that used in the certificate itself. It was evidently adopted, in view of the decisions of the courts on the subject, so as to exempt the company from liability in case of the selfdestruction of the insured whatever might have been her mental condition at the time of the act. There can be no doubt...
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