Cottle v. Vahsaw
| Decision Date | 08 March 2023 |
| Docket Number | 20-10052 |
| Parties | LEO MCCLENT COTTLE, Petitioner, v. ROBERT VASHAW, Warden, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
In 2017, Leo McClent Cottle faced multiple criminal charges for taking part in a robbery of a home that led to the homeowner being hit in the head with a pistol and punched multiple times.
Cottle's pretrial summary shows an early plea offer, which stated that the “[p]rosecutor will offer” a sentence “at the bottom of the guidelines range as correctly scored by the court.” (ECF No. 8-7, PageID.221.) At the time of this early plea offer, however, the prosecution and the defense had different views of Cottle's guidelines range, with the prosecution anticipating a range of 171 to 285 months and the defense anticipating a range of 108 to 180 months. (Id.) Cottle did not accept this plea offer.
Eventually Cottle accepted a second plea offer and pled guilty to felony firearm and armed robbery, but the felony firearm conviction was dismissed at sentencing. (ECF No. 8-7, PageID.229; ECF No. 8-5, PageID.186.) The second plea offer provided that if the guidelines as scored by the court were at least 108 to 180 months, the prosecutor would recommend a sentence within the guidelines as scored. (ECF No. 85, PageID.186.) The sentencing court ultimately found the guidelines range to be 108 to 180 months and imposed a minimum sentence[1] of 180 months. (ECF No. 8-6 PageID.187, 204-205.)
Cottle argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in explaining the first plea offer to him. Specifically, he argues that “[t]rial counsel failed to adequately, and effectively explain that she had calculated the guidelines correctly and that the offer actually meant the defendant would serve a minimum of 9-years' incarceration, as opposed to the risk of spending at least a minimum of 15-years' incarcerated if he rejected the offer and failed to succeed a[t] trial.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.26.)
Cottle raised this claim before the trial court in a motion to correct an invalid sentence, which was denied. (ECF No. 8-2; ECF No. 8-3, PageID.107.) He then asked for leave to file an appeal with the Michigan Court of Appeals, which was denied with a single sentence: “The Court orders that the delayed application for leave to appeal is DENIED for lack of merit in the grounds presented.” People v. Cottle, No. 343141 (available at ECF No. 8-7, PageID.208). Cottle did not fare any better with the Michigan Supreme Court. People v. Cottle, 503 Mich. 889 (Mich. 2018) (available at ECF No. 8-8).
That brought Cottle to this Court, where he asks for a writ of habeas corpus on the same grounds. Because the state court's decision was neither contrary to clearly established federal law nor involved the unreasonable application of such law, the Court will deny Cottle's petition.
Before the Court considers the substance of Cottle's claim, a word on the standard.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) (and 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in particular) “confirm[s] that state courts are the principal forum for asserting constitutional challenges to state convictions.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011); see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 182 (2011). So to obtain relief in federal court, habeas petitioners who challenge “a matter ‘adjudicated on the merits in State court' [must] show that the relevant state court ‘decision' (1) ‘was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,' or (2) ‘was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings.'” Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S.Ct. 1188, 1191 (2018) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). “A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision.” Harrington, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011). And a state court's factual determinations are presumed correct on federal habeas review, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), and review is “limited to the record that was before the state court.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). But if the state courts did not adjudicate a claim “on the merits,” “AEDPA . . . does not apply and [this Court] will review the claim de novo.” Bies v. Sheldon, 775 F.3d 386, 395 (6th Cir. 2014).
Before proceeding, therefore, the Court must determine if the state courts adjudicated Cottle's claim on the merits. As described previously, the Michigan Court of Appeals issued a one-sentence denial of Cottle's application for leave to appeal the trial court's ruling on his motion to correct his sentence. (ECF No. 8-7, PageID.208.) It purports to be on the merits. (Id. ().)
Supreme Court precedent is clear that such a denial should be presumed to be on the merits, and thus, AEDPA's deferential standard of review applies. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 99 (). Though the Michigan Court of Appeals referenced a “delayed” application, there is no indication that its dismissal was procedural as it does not cite any court rules and the decision states that it is on the merits of “the grounds presented.” (See ECF No. 8-7, PageID.208.)
So in considering Cottle's petition, the Court will focus on whether the state court's decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law[.]” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. And because the Michigan Court of Appeals did not provide reasons for its holding, the Court will “look through the unexplained decision” to the trial court's decision which “does provide a relevant rationale[.]” See Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S.Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).
Now to the merits. Cottle claims that his trial counsel's ineffective explanation caused him to reject an initial plea offer which was more favorable than the plea offer that he eventually accepted. See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162 (2012) (). He claims that “had he taken the [first] offer, he would have received a minimum sentence of 108 months instead of 15 years.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.23.) In other words, he claims ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea-bargaining process.
To prove this claim, Cottle must generally show that (1) counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) that there is a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). In the context of plea bargaining, the prejudice prong is satisfied by showing that (1) “but for the ineffective advice of counsel there is a reasonable probability that the plea offer would have been presented to the court,” (2) “the court would have accepted its terms,” and (3) “the . . . sentence . . . under the offer's terms would have been less severe than under the judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed.” Lafler, 566 U.S. at 164.
The state trial court denied Cottle's claim following oral argument, concluding that had Cottle accepted the initial plea offer, “he would have accepted one that was in fact in this Court's mind a gamble as it relates to the number of years he would have served.” (ECF No. 8-3, PageID.105.) According to the trial court, Cottle would first “have to gamble” that the trial judge would have scored his guidelines range in his favor though one of the variables was contested. (Id.) And two, Cottle would have to gamble that the trial court would have followed the prosecutor's recommended sentence of the bottom of that range. (Id.) The trial court found that “perhaps because of all these unknown[s], defendant rejected this offer[.]” (Id.)
Specific to the Strickland test, the trial court found no support that Cottle's trial counsel was deficient in her explanation of the first offer. (Id. at PageID.106.) And it also found the prejudice prong was not met because Cottle could not show that “but for counsel's errors . . . he would have been guaranteed and would have received a minimum sentence of 9 years.” (Id. at PageID.107.)
Cottle presents no basis to disrupt this decision.
Start with the first prong of the Strickland test. The state court's decision that trial counsel's performance was not constitutionally deficient is not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. “Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential, since it is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence[.]” Maslonka v. Hoffner, 900 F.3d 269, 280 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Thus, courts must “indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id.
And here, there is nothing in the record indicating that trial counsel's explanation of the first plea offer was deficient. The trial court found that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary, and Cottle did not offer an affidavit or any sworn testimony from himself or...
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