Cotto v. Municipality of Aibonito
| Decision Date | 31 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL NO. 10-2241(JAG) |
| Parties | ENDALIS ALVARADO COTTO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MUNICIPALITY OF AIBONITO, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
GARCIA-GREGORY, D.J.
This is a political discrimination action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("section 1983"), the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., (the "FMLA") and various Commonwealth of Puerto Rico laws. (Docket No. 1, ¶¶ 26, 33, 37-39, 41). Pending before the Court is William Alicea-Perez ("Alicea"), Santos Solivan-Rivera ("Solivan"), Luis Jacob Rivera-Mercado ("Rivera-Mercado"), and Lissandra Maldonado-Alvarado's ("Maldonado") motion to dismiss (Docket No. 17) and the Municipality of Aibonito's (the "Municipality") (collectively, "Defendants") motion to dismiss (Docket No. 18). For the reasons discussed below, the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants' motions to dismiss.
The facts contained in the complaint, which are assumed to be true, are as follows:1
Plaintiff Ednalis Alvarado Cotto ("Alvarado"), a resident of Cayey, Puerto Rico, is an active member of the Popular Democratic Party ("PDP"), and has attended political caravans and electoral colleges in support of the PDP. (Docket No. 1, ¶¶ 9). In 2004 and 2008, Alvarado participated in the PDP electoral campaign. Id.
In 1999, non-party Alberto Diaz Robles ("Robles"), a member of the PDP, was the Municipality's mayor. (Docket No. 1, ¶ 10). Sometime around February of that year, Robles' "conduit" hired Alvarado as the Municipality's "Office System Auxiliary I." (Docket No. 1, ¶¶ 3, 10). In November of 2008, Alicea, a member of the New Progressive Party ("NPP"), was elected as the Municipality's mayor. (Docket No. 1, ¶¶ 11-12). Once Alicea assumed the Municipality's mantle, Defendants, who are all NPP members, allegedly began to humiliate, harass and discriminateagainst Alvarado because of her PDP affiliation.2 (Docket No. 1, ¶¶ 13, 26, 33, 37-39, 41).
Alvarado states that she faces undue pressure, unreasonable terms and conditions in her work environment, a hostile work environment, treatment inferior to other employees and diminished working conditions. (Docket No. 1, ¶¶ 13, 16, 26, 36). Specifically, Plaintiffs pled that Alvarado is denied breaks, has her computer access limited, is subject to increased monitoring, has her functions and instructions constantly changed, is subject to unfounded admonishment letters, involuntary transfers and has her rights under the FMLA interfered with. Id. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants made derogatory and discriminatory comments relating to Alvarado's PDP membership and work performance. (Docket No. 1, ¶ 32).
Around March of 2010, Alvarado's son fell ill and was admitted to the hospital. (Docket No. 1, ¶ 17). Alvarado was granted leave from work for five (5) days to tend to her son. Id. Nevertheless, Maldonado, the Municipality's Director of Human Resources, purportedly told Alvarado that her leave would be deducted from her vacation days.3 Although Alvarado requested an explanation from Alicea and Maldonado, she never received one. Id.
In June of 2010, Maldonado and nonparty Sandra Rivera ("Rivera"), the director of the Municipality's Federal Program Office ("FPO"), assigned Alvarado a task to complete for the FPO. (Docket No. 1, ¶ 18). After Rivera-Mercado replaced Rivera as the FPO director, Alvarado met with Rivera-Mercado to discuss the assignment she was completing for the FPO. Id. Rivera-Mercado told Alvarado that although she was not required to work for the FPO, she may continue her assignment as long as Alvarado's other duties were unaffected. Id. Rivera-Mercado told Alvarado that if she became overwhelmed with work, she could return the assignment to Rivera-Mercado's office. Id.
Alvarado allegedly spoke to Alicea about Maldonado's apparent hostility on July 12, 2010. (Docket No. 1, ¶ 19). According to Alvarado, despite knowing about the discrimination, Alicea did not remedy the situation. Id. Rather, Alicea permitted and promoted the discrimination, harassment and undue pressure. Id. Alvarado states that Defendants' discriminatory behavior escalated after Alvarado complained to Alicea. Id.
On August 7, 2010, Maldonado sent Alvarado a memorandum assigning her new duties as medical plan biller. (Docket No. 1, ¶ 20). The work was to be performed for the Human Resources Office, not the FPO. Id. Subsequently, Alvarado met with Rivera-Mercado to inform her of Alvarado's new assignment and return the work Alvarado was performing for the FPO. (DocketNo. 1, ¶ 21). Alvarado told Rivera-Mercado that she would continue monitoring the developments in the FPO since the assignment stalled pending completion of a construction project. Id. Alvarado maintained files so she could continue the project once the construction resumed.4 Id.
On August 18, 2010, Alvarado received a letter from Solivan, the Municipal Secretary, purportedly admonishing her for refusing to perform duties assigned to her. (Docket No. 1, ¶ 22). Solivan told Avarado that the admonishment was based on a letter Rivera-Mercado sent to Maldonado. Apparently, Rivera-Mercado told Maldonado that Alvarado failed to perform duties for the FPO. (Docket No. 1, ¶ 23-24). Although Alvarado demanded an explanation, Defendants never investigated and Alvarado was never given an opportunity to respond to the admonishment. (Docket No. 1, ¶ 25). The complaint states that Alvarado never refused work for the FPO, she merely told Rivera-Mercado about her new duties. (Docket No. 1, ¶ 21).
Alvarado received another admonishment letter on August, 9, 2010. (Docket No. 1, ¶ 27). According to Alvarado, she received the letter because she asked to bring her son to work after her son's caretaker faced an emergency. Id. Alvarado received the admonishment despite an internal memorandum, whichwas previously circulated to employees, stating that employees are permitted to bring their children to work in emergency situations. (Docket No. 1, ¶ 28). Alvarado avers that the other employees were not admonished for bringing their children to work. (Docket No. 1, ¶ 29).
At some point thereafter, Maldonado sent Alvarado another letter stating that she exhibited a pattern of absenteeism. (Docket No. 1, ¶ 30). The letter states that Alvarado was absent from work for twenty three (23) days. According to Alvarado, nineteen (19) of those days were authorized: ten (10) days of annual vacation leave, five (5) days when her son was hospitalized and four (4) days that Alicea "granted to the Municpality['s] employees to be used from their vacation days."5 Id. Alvarado asked Alicea to intervene on her behalf, but Alvarado has yet to receive an answer. (Docket No. 1, ¶ 31).
Alvarado states that Defendants' actions caused her to suffer emotional and mental harm and forced her to receive treatment. (Docket No. 1, ¶ 36, 40). Defendants' discriminatory acts against Alvarado also allegedly caused injury to her spouse Jesus Ramirez Rodriguez ("Ramirez") and the conjugal partnership established between them (the "Conjugal Partnership"). (Docket No. 1, ¶ 42). Ramirez states that he suffered anxiety afterwatching Alvarado's mental health deteriorate. (Docket No. 1, ¶ 43).
Alvarado, Ramirez, and the Conjugal Partnership (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), commenced the instant action by filing a complaint on December 17, 2010. (Docket No. 1). Plaintiffs brought suit under (1) section 1983 alleging that their rights under the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution were violated;6 (2) the FMLA; and (3) various Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Laws.7 The gravamen of Plaintiffs' complaint is that Defendants discriminated against Alvarado because of her PDP affiliation. (Docket No. 1, ¶¶ 26, 33, 37-39, 41).
On March 18, 2011, Alicea, Santos, Rivera and Maldonado moved the Court pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)("Rule 12(b)(6)") to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint. (Docket No. 17). On the sameday, the Municipality also moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (Docket No. 18). Plaintiffs responded to both motions on April 27, 2011. (Docket No. 25). The Municipality replied on May 16, 2011. (Docket No. 30). Alicea, Santos, Rivera and Maldonado did not submit a reply.
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss an action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must plead sufficient facts "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
In Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño Burset, 640 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2011), the First Circuit distilled from Twombly and Iqbal a two-pronged test designed to measure the sufficiency of a complaint. First, the reviewing court must identify and disregard "statements in the complaint that merely offer legal conclusions couched as fact, or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action." Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 12 (internal punctuation omitted). In this analysis, the remaining non-conclusory factual allegations must be taken as true, even ifthey are "seemingly incredible," or that "actual proof of those facts is improbable." Id. Finally, the court assesses whether the facts taken as a whole "state a plausible, not merely a conceivable, case for relief." Id.
In conducting this test, a court must not attempt to forecast the likelihood of success even if recovery is remote and unlikely. Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 12. Thus, "[t]he relevant inquiry forces on the reasonableness of the inference of liability that the plaintiff is asking the Court to draw from the facts alleged in the complaint." Id. at 13.
The Court's analysis is divided into four parts. In the first part, the Court addresses whether Ramirez has standing...
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