Cotton Club v. Oklahoma Tax Com'n

• Decision Date: 08 May 1945
• Docket Number: 31801.
• Citation: 158 P.2d 707,195 Okla. 403,1945 OK 146
• Parties: COTTON CLUB et al. v. OKLAHOMA TAX COMMISSION.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

158 P.2d 707

195 Okla. 403, 1945 OK 146

COTTON CLUB et al. v. OKLAHOMA TAX COMMISSION.

No. 31801.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

May 8, 1945

Appeal from Tax Commission.

Proceeding on the appeal of the Cotton Club and others from an order of the Oklahoma Tax Commission denying the Cotton Club's application for a retailer's beer permit.

Affirmed.

The statute prohibiting the sale of 3.2 beer on certain premises where public dancing is permitted is not violative of state constitution relating to inherent rights of people.37 O.S.Supp.1943, §§ 211-218, 216;O.S.1941 Const. art. 2, § 2.

Syllabus by the Court.

1.The provisions of H.B. 198, S.L.1943, 37 O.S.1941, §§ 211-218 prohibit the issuance of retail beer dealers' licenses to those who purpose selling beer on the premises where dancing is conducted, under the conditions stated; but sec. 6 of said Act(sec. 216supra) makes an exception thereto and makes the prohibition inapplicable to 'private dances conducted for recreational purposes and not for profit by bona fide * * * clubs * * *'.Two individuals organized a private club in the nature of a 'proprietary club', and they purpose selling memberships in said club to a limited number and to conduct recreational activities for the members of the club only, and they purpose conducting dances and selling beer on the club premises, and from all of the club activities they expect to make a profit which belongs to the individual proprietors.The Oklahoma Tax Commission found from stipulation of the parties and from the plan of organization and proposed operation, that the dancing was not to be conducted for recreational purposes, but was to be conducted for profit, and that said organization did not come within the exceptions as provided in sec. 6 of said Act: Held, the finding of the Commission is correct.

2.The 'police power' is an inherent attribute of State sovereignty, under which the State, within constitutional limitations, may determine what is dangerous and injurious to public order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of society.

3.In determining the question of the constitutionality of a statute, and as to whether it is in violation of the 'equal protection' clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, the following fundamental principles are important:

(a) The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary.

(b) A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in some inequality.

(c) When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed.

(d) One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.

4.The Legislature is not bound, in order to support the constitutional validity of its regulation, to extend it to all cases which it might possibly reach.It is free to recognize degrees of harm, and it may confine its restrictions to those classes of cases where the need is deemed to be clearest.

5.The Legislature and not the courts must determine the policy of the State to be voiced in statutory enactments.Legislative power, not wisdom, is the concern of the courts.

6.Statute, 37 O.S.1941, §§ 211-218, examined and found not to be in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States by reason of its terms in prohibiting the sale of 3.2 beer on certain premises where public dancing is permitted.

7. 37 O.S.1941, §§ 211 to 218, is not violative of either Art. II, sec. 32 or Art. II, sec. 2 of the Oklahoma Constitution.

8.Legislative Act regulating sale of 3.2 beer and operation of public dances, and exempting certain classes from provisions of Act will be sustained where such classification is neither unreasonable, capricious nor arbitrary.

Hal Welch, of Hugo, for plaintiffs in error.

E. L. Mitchell and W. D. Hereford, both of Oklahoma City, for defendants in error.

BAYLESS Justice.

This appeal from an order of the Oklahoma Tax Commission involves the correctness of said order denying the application of the Cotton Club for a retailer's beer permit under the provisions of H.B. 198, c. 2a, S.L.1943, 37 Oklahoma Statutes 1941, §§ 211-218.The Cotton Club, deeming itself within the exceptions in section 6 of said Act, section 216, supra applied for a retailer's beer permit, and upon hearing on said application the parties stipulated to certain facts.On this stipulation of facts the Oklahoma Tax Commission ruled as a matter of fact and law that the application should be denied.This appeal followed.Section 6 reads in part, 'The limitations on the sale of Beverages, and issuance of licenses therefor, contained in Sections 1,2and5 of this Act, should not be applicable to * * * private dances conducted for recreational purposes and not for profit by bona fide lodges, posts, clubs, fraternal, benevolent, or charitable organizations; * * *.'It was agreed that the Cotton Club is an organization created by Erne and Atoka Cotton, husband and wife, by written charter in which the membership is limited to 300, for which an initial fee and a monthly fee is charged, and that members of the Club only may avail themselves of the privileges provided therein.The Cottons urge that it is what is described in 14 C.J.S., C...