Cotton v. Cotton, No. 2008-CA-00626-COA (Miss. App. 1/26/2010), 2008-CA-00626-COA.
| Decision Date | 26 January 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 2008-CA-00626-COA.,2008-CA-00626-COA. |
| Parties | EDDIE J. COTTON, APPELLANT v. FANNIE M. COTTON, APPELLEE. |
| Court | Mississippi Court of Appeals |
MYERS P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶ 1. Eddie J. Cotton appeals the chancery court's division of property after his marriage to Fannie M. Cotton was annulled. He claims that: (1) the property division was against precedent requiring good faith by the party seeking equitable distribution in a void marriage; (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the chancellor's finding that Fannie did not know she needed a divorce before she could remarry; and, alternatively, (3) the incorrect legal standard was applied because the chancellor did not properly apply the Ferguson factors. Finding no abuse of discretion in the chancellor's equitable award, we affirm the judgment of the chancery court.
¶ 2. Fannie filed for a divorce from Eddie based on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. Eddie counterclaimed for an annulment, alleging that Fannie had never obtained a divorce from her first husband, Johnny L. Tate, before she married Eddie. Fannie was married to Tate on June 26, 1962. On September 26, 1969, Fannie married Eddie; however, there was no evidence that Fannie and Tate were ever divorced. The chancellor ruled that Fannie's bigamy rendered the marriage void and granted an annulment.1
¶ 3. The chancellor further held that Fannie's economic contributions to the purported marriage over the past thirty-seven years entitled her to an equitable distribution of the assets accumulated by the parties during that time. After a hearing, the chancellor divided the property as follows: (1) Fannie was awarded forty percent of Eddie's retirement account; (2) Eddie was awarded a 1999 Cadillac automobile; (3) Fannie was awarded a 1993 Chevrolet automobile and a 1991 Mazda truck; (4) Eddie was ordered to pay Fannie one-half of the equity in the marital home if he wished to remain in the home; otherwise the home was ordered to be sold and divided equally between the parties; (5) the couple's interest in a house and lot in Memphis, Tennessee, titled to Eddie and two others who are not party to this action, was awarded solely to Eddie; (6) a house in Quitman County titled in both parties' names was ordered to be sold and the proceeds divided equally; (7) acreage in Tunica County titled in both names was to be sold, and the proceeds were to be divided equally between the parties, with the monthly rent of $300 to be divided equally until the property is sold; and (8) all of the various household items requested by Fannie were awarded to her since Eddie made no objection.
¶ 4. "In domestic relations cases, [the appellate court's] scope of review is limited by the substantial evidence/manifest error rule." Samples v. Davis, 904 So. 2d 1061, 1063-64 (¶9) (Miss. 2004) (citing Jundoosing v. Jundoosing, 826 So. 2d 85, 88 (¶10) (Miss. 2002)). We "will not disturb the chancellor's opinion when [it is] supported by substantial evidence unless the chancellor abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or an erroneous legal standard was applied." Id. at 1064 (¶9) (quoting Holloman v. Holloman, 691 So. 2d 897, 898 (Miss. 1996)). However, questions of law are reviewed de novo. Amiker v. Drugs for Less, Inc., 796 So. 2d 942, 945 (¶7) (Miss. 2000).
¶ 5. For clarity and economy we shall address Eddie's first two issues together. Eddie argues, first, that Mississippi law requires a party to a void marriage must have entered into that marriage in good faith before the chancellor may award any form of equitable relief. Because we find this assertion without merit, we find it unnecessary to address Eddie's second issue of whether the chancellor erred in finding that Fannie entered the void marriage in good faith.
¶ 6. At the outset, we recognize that "the legal relationship of husband and wife may be created only in conformity with the procedures authorized by the statute law of this state." Pickens v. Pickens, 490 So. 2d 872, 875 (Miss. 1986). However, "[w]here parties live together without benefit of marriage and where, through their joint efforts, accumulate real property or personal property, or both, a party having no legal title nevertheless acquires rights to an equitable share enforceable at law." Williams v. Mason, 556 So. 2d 1045, 1049 (Miss. 1990) (citing Pickens, 490 So. 2d at 875-76; Taylor v. Taylor, 317 So. 2d 422, 423 (Miss. 1975); Chrismond v. Chrismond, 211 Miss. 746, 757-58, 52 So. 2d 624, 629 (1951)). Such a remedy is only available where "the couples had . . . either been married or contended to have married." Nichols v. Funderburk, 883 So. 2d 554, 558 (¶11) (Miss. 2004).
¶ 7. As we have said, Eddie asserts that Fannie may not recover, not because their marriage was void, but because Fannie did not enter into the void marriage in good faith. On appeal, Eddie appears to concede that the other requirements for an equitable division were met, at least as to some of the property at issue.
¶ 8. Certainly, there is substantial evidence in the record that Fannie and Eddie lived together for much of their thirty-seven years of apparent marriage. They secured a marriage license, undertook a marriage ceremony before a minister, and held themselves out to the community as man and wife. Eddie and Fannie raised four children over the course of their void marriage, including two natural children of the parties born to the purported marriage, a relative that the couple adopted after the purported marriage, and a child of Fannie's marriage to Tate born prior to her purported marriage to Eddie. All of the children had reached the age of majority prior to Fannie's suit for divorce.
¶ 9. It also appears beyond dispute that the record contains substantial evidence that Fannie contributed to the accumulation of much of the couple's real and personal property. Testimony indicated that Fannie worked outside the home when she was able. After she was placed on social security disability, Fannie's checks were deposited directly into Eddie's checking account. Additionally, the chancellor correctly considered Fannie's non-pecuniary contributions. The supreme court has stated:
In determining what is an equitable division [of property obtained during a non-marital cohabitation following a marriage or attempted marriage of the parties], the chancellor is by no means limited to a consideration of the earnings of the parties and cash contributions made by each to the accumulation of the properties. As any freshman economics student knows, services and in kind contributions have an economic value as real as cash contributions. In such situations, where one party to the relationship acts without compensation to perform work or render services to a business enterprise or performs work or services generally regarded as domestic in nature, these are nevertheless economic contributions. They are to be valued by reference to the cost of similar services in the marketplace. Where, as here, the man accepted the benefit of such services, he will not be heard to argue that he did not need them and that their economic value should not be considered as the woman's economic contributions to the joint accumulation of property between them.
Pickens, 490 So. 2d at 876 (internal citation omitted). Testimony also indicated that Fannie was the primary caregiver for the children. She prepared the family meals, laundered and pressed the family's clothes, and otherwise kept the house during the purported marriage. The record supports the chancellor's findings that Fannie's domestic efforts enabled, or at least assisted in allowing, Eddie to work outside the home as the primary breadwinner.
¶ 10. Recognizing Fannie's contributions to the accumulation of the couple's assets, many of which are held in his possession or exclusively titled in his name,2 Eddie argues that the chancellor erred in ordering an equitable distribution because Fannie did not enter into the marriage in good faith. Specifically, Eddie cites to the supreme court's holding in Chrismond. There, the supreme court affirmed a chancellor's equitable distribution of a couple's property where the putative wife had entered into the void marriage in good faith and had substantially contributed to the accumulation of the couple's assets. Chrismond, 211 Miss. at 757, 52 So. 2d at 629.
¶ 11. The Chrismond court did not hold, however, that a showing of good faith is absolutely required before a putative spouse may seek an equitable distribution of the property. In fact, noting that some character of relief had often been granted to putative spouses in other jurisdictions, the supreme court cited Werner v. Werner, 53 P. 127 (Kan. 1898), as "one of the leading cases on the point." Werner not only does not mention good faith as a prerequisite for recovery but embraces the opposite proposition, as the putative wife in that case was aware that her prior marriage had not ended by death or divorce. Id. at 128.
¶ 12. Instead, the court addressed the good faith issue twenty-five years later in Taylor v. Taylor, 317 So. 2d 422 (Miss. 1975), and reached the opposite result that Eddie urges.
¶ 13. In Taylor, the supreme court considered facts almost identical to Eddie's allegations in the case at bar — there was no question that Mrs. Taylor had entered a bigamous marriage without a good faith belief that her prior marriage had been dissolved by death or divorce. After ending eighteen years of purported marriage, the chancellor ordered Mr. Taylor to pay Mrs. Taylor monthly "support" for a period of three years. The supreme court affirmed that...
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