Cotton v. District of Columbia
| Decision Date | 31 March 2008 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 05-1047 (RMU). |
| Citation | 541 F.Supp.2d 195 |
| Parties | Latasha COTTON, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Donna Williams Rucker, Duboff & Associates, Chartered, Silver Spring, MD, for Plaintiff.
David A. Jackson, District of Columbia Office of the Attorney General, Washington, D.C, for Defendants.
GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS; DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFF'S 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1985 AND 1986 CLAIMS (COUNT II)
The plaintiff brings this action charging the defendants with a host of constitutional and common law violations arising out of an incident between her and defendant Metropolitan Police Department ("MPD") Officer David C. Wallace. Subsequent to an altercation between the plaintiff and her neighbor, Wallace allegedly used excessive force to subdue and detain the plaintiff without legal basis, causing her physical injuries and severe emotional distress. The plaintiff sues Wallace, a number of his supervisors and the District of Columbia ("D.C." or "the District"). The case is presently before the court on the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs claims.1 Because the court concludes that no constitutional violation occurred, it grants the defendants' motion as to Counts I and III. Because it concludes that the plaintiff cannot prove that the defendant used excessive force, it grants the defendants' motion as to Count IV. Because no reasonable jury could conclude that the plaintiff has proven her negligent supervision and respondeat superior claim, the court grants the defendants' motion as to Count VII. Because it concludes that genuine issues remain as to material facts concerning Wallace's encounter with the plaintiff, it denies the defendants' motion as to Count VI. Because the plaintiff has not pled a prima facie case for Counts V and IX, the court grants the defendants' motion to dismiss those claims. Because the plaintiff consents to the dismissal of Count II, the court dismisses it.
The plaintiff alleges that on the evening of June 7, 2004, she and her neighbor engaged in a verbal altercation while outside the plaintiffs apartment building in Northeast Washington, D.C. Compl. ¶¶ 6-8. The neighbor allegedly brandished a knife and threatened the plaintiff. Id. ¶ 6. Shortly thereafter, Officer Wallace arrived on the scene, and the neighbor returned to her residence inside the plaintiffs apartment building. Id. ¶¶ 7-8. Upon Wallace's arrival, several bystanders informed him of the altercation between the plaintiff and her neighbor and that the woman with the knife (the plaintiffs neighbor) was inside the apartment building. Id. ¶ 9. The plaintiff alleges that Wallace, without provocation, approached her and "pushed the back of her head forward, violently forcing her body forward, thereby tripping [her] and causing her to fall face first, hard to the ground," resulting in physical injuries. Id. ¶ 11. Then, allegedly without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, Wallace handcuffed the plaintiff and yanked her to her feet by pulling on the handcuffs. Id. ¶ 14.
Although the plaintiff asserts that she and several bystanders told Wallace about the confrontation with her neighbor, he failed to investigate the plaintiffs statement that the neighbor had threatened her with a knife. Id. ¶¶ 15, 17. Instead, Wallace led the handcuffed plaintiff to a nearby abandoned building and threatened to arrest her and turn her children over to Child Protective Services if she did not immediately leave the area. Id. ¶ 18. The plaintiff remained compliant but was quite upset by the events. Id. ¶¶ 21, 38. The plaintiffs sister arrived, informed Wallace that the plaintiff suffered from anxiety and requested her release. Id. ¶ 19. Wallace then released the plaintiff on the condition that she return home, collect her clothes and leave her residence with her children. Id. ¶ 22. Wallace waited in his patrol car for the plaintiff and her children to leave the area. Id. ¶ 23.
The plaintiff filed a report with the MPD against Wallace, asserting that his actions violated D.C.Code § 5-123.02. Id. ¶¶ 67. Two supervisory officials from the MPD contacted the plaintiff on the same day as the incident to address the filed report, but she claims that the MPD undertook no formal investigation. Id. ¶¶ 67, 70.
The defendants take issue with several of the plaintiffs allegations. The defendants contend the following facts that contradict those presented by the plaintiff: Wallace approached the scene to find 40-50 people fighting in the street, Defs.' Statement of Material Facts ( ) ¶ 13; Wallace was unable to obtain back up, id. ¶ 14; Wallace feared for his safety, id. ¶ 15; the crowd informed Wallace that a woman present had a knife without identifying which woman it was, id. ¶ 18; and Wallace did not cause the plaintiff to fall to the ground, id. ¶¶ 19-21;
The plaintiff filed suit in this court on May 25, 2005, bringing a mixed bag of claims including constitutional and civil rights violations, false arrest, false imprisonment, assault, battery and negligence. Compl. ¶ 1. On July 20, 2005, defendant MPD Chief Charles Ramsey moved to dismiss the complaint against him arguing that because he is only named in his official capacity, the proper defendant in this action is D.C. Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss ("Def.'s Mot.") at 2. On March 16, 2006, the court granted that motion.
On May 31, 2007, the remaining defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing for various reasons that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all the plaintiffs claims. The plaintiff vigorously opposes the motion as to all the counts except Count II, the dismissal of which she concedes is appropriate. Pl.'s Opp'n at 2. The court accordingly dismisses Count II and considers the parties' remaining legal arguments below.
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Diamond v. Atwood, 43 F.3d 1538, 1540 (D.C.Cir.1995). To determine which facts are "material," a court must look to the substantive law on which each claim rests. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A "genuine issue" is one whose resolution could establish an element of a claim or defense and, therefore, affect the outcome of the action. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must draw all justifiable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor and accept the nonmoving party's evidence as true. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A nonmoving party, however, must establish more than "the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" in support of its position. Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must show that the nonmoving party "fail[ed] to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. By pointing to the absence of evidence proffered by the nonmoving party, a moving party may succeed on summary judgment. Id.
The nonmoving party may defeat summary judgment through factual representations made in a sworn affidavit if he "support[s] his allegations ... with facts in the record," Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C.Cir.1999) (quoting Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 154 (D.C.Cir.1993)), or provides "direct testimonial evidence," Arrington v. United States, 473 F.3d 329, 338 (D.C.Cir.2006). Indeed, for the court to accept anything less "would defeat the central purpose of the summary judgment device, which is to weed out those cases insufficiently meritorious to warrant the expense of a jury trial." Greene, 164 F.3d at 675.
The plaintiff alleges that Wallace violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by depriving her of her Fourth Amendment rights against false imprisonment and false arrest and by using excessive force in doing so. Compl. ¶¶ 25-26. The defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that Wallace is entitled to qualified immunity for his actions and that Wallace did not violate any of the plaintiffs constitutional rights. Defs.' Mot. at 7-12. Even if he did violate a constitutional right, the defendants argue that Wallace is still entitled to qualified immunity because no reasonable officer in the same situation would have believed that his conduct was in violation of the plaintiffs rights. Id. at 12. The court concludes that no constitutional violation occurred, and so it grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity as to the plaintiffs § 1983 claim.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action against any person who, acting under the color of state law, abridges rights guaranteed by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Polk v. District of Columbia, 121 F.Supp.2d 56, 61 (D.D.C.2000); Abramson v. Bennett, 707 F.Supp. 13, 16 (D.D.C.1989). State officials may be entitled to a defense of qualified immunity, however. See ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Garay v. Liriano
...force—during the arrests. Because handcuffing a suspect without more does not constitute excessive force, see Cotton v. Dist. of Columbia, 541 F.Supp.2d 195, 203–04 (D.D.C.2008), the Court will grant summary judgment to the officers on this claim as to Garay's daughters.ii. Brenda Garay Whi......
-
Hargraves v. Dist. of Columbia, Civil Action No. 12–1459 (BAH)
...if they approached the car at 7:30 in the evening, a car with three people in it, without their guns, at the ready"); Cotton v. D.C., 541 F.Supp.2d 195, 203 (D.D.C.2008) (finding use of force to push the plaintiff to the ground and place her in handcuffs during an investigative stop reasona......
-
Katz v. Dist. of Columbia
...responding officers could "reasonably assume [the crime] entailed the use of a weapon"). Compare, e.g. , Cotton v. District of Columbia , 541 F. Supp. 2d 195, 202-04 (D.D.C. 2008) (finding that a single officer responding to a "crowd" of people alleging an altercation involving a knife did ......
-
Wesby v. Dist. of Columbia
...and training of police officers are at issue. See Linares v. Jones, 551 F.Supp.2d 12, 20 (D.D.C.2008); Cotton v. District of Columbia, 541 F.Supp.2d 195, 207 (D.D.C.2008); Parker v. Grand Hyatt Hotel, 124 F.Supp.2d 79, 90 (D.D.C.2000). These cases do not, however, hold that expert testimony......