Cotton v. Rockett
| Decision Date | 28 November 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 3:18cv2127/LAC/EMT |
| Parties | DAVID EARL COTTON, JR., Plaintiff, v. DETECTIVE ROCKETT, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
Plaintiff David Earl Cotton, Jr. ("Cotton"), a pre-trial detainee of the Walton County Jail, is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action. Presently before the court is Cotton's Amended Complaint (ECF No. 12), as well as his "Motion to Change Venue/Jurisdiction" (ECF No. 10) and "Habeas Corpus Motion to Dismiss" (ECF No. 11).
The case was referred to the undersigned for the issuance of all preliminary orders and any recommendations to the district court regarding dispositive matters. See N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2(C); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Upon screening the Amended Complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), it is the opinion of the undersigned that this action should be dismissed.
Cotton names sixteen Defendants in this case: (1) Detective Jonathan Rockett with the Defuniak Springs Police Department, (2) Detective Austin Arnold with the Defuniak Springs Police Department, (3) Investigator Joseph Paul, with the Walton County Sheriff's Office, (4) "Unnamed Deputy in Arrest Report" with the Walton County's Sheriff's Office, (5) Judge Kelvin Clyde Wells, a judge for the Walton County Circuit Court, (6) Michael A. Adkinson, Jr., Sheriff of Walton County, (7) Mark Weeks, Police Chief/City Marshal of Defuniak Springs, (8) Matthew J. Richardson, Assistant State Attorney, (9) Frankie White, Assistant Public Defender, (10) Bruce Miller, Public Defender, (11) William "Bill" Eddins, State Attorney, (12) Office of the State Attorney for Walton County, (13) Office of the Public Defender for Walton County, (14) Office of the City Marshal/Defuniak Springs Police Department, (15) Walton County Sheriff's Office, and (16) Walton County Jail.Cotton is currently facing criminal charges in the Walton County Circuit Court, Case No. 2018-CF-000326, specifically, one count of battery of a law enforcement officer (Count 1), one count of resisting arrest with violence (Count 2), two counts of possession of a controlled substance without a prescription (Count 3 and Count 5), and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia (Count 4).
Cotton alleges that on April 18, 2018, Detective Rockett and Detective Arnold trespassed on the private property of Ms. Lorretta Miller without a search warrant, and executed a warrant for his arrest issued by a court in Holmes County, Florida, for his failure to appear. Cotton alleges the Detectives also arrested him for the offenses with which he is charged in the pending Walton County case. Cotton alleges the Detectives illegally executed the Holmes County arrest warrant, by virtue of the fact that they were employees of the Defuniak Springs Police Department, and Loretta Miller's home (where the Detectives executed the warrant) was outside the city limits of Defuniak Springs. Cotton also alleges the Detectives were not authorized by Florida law to execute warrants. Cotton alleges the Detectives attempted to conceal the fact that they illegally executed the Holmes County warrant by falsifying information in the arrest report (for example, by stating that an employee of the Walton County Sheriff's Office (specifically, Investigator Paul) was present when the Detectives executed the Holmes County warrant). Cotton alleges after his arrest, the Detectives transported him to the Walton County Jail.
Cotton alleges on April 20, 2018, Judge Wells determined that probable caused existed to detain him on the Walton County charges, and Judge Wells set bond in the amount of $50,000, based upon the information in the arrest report. Cotton alleges the Public Defender's Office was appointed to represent him on the Walton County charges. Cotton alleges Assistant Public Defender White filed a motion to suppress evidence based upon the illegal execution of the Holmes County arrest warrant, but APD White subsequently withdrew the motion to suppress despite her knowledge that the arrest report was fabricated and the arrest took place outside the Defuniak Springs city limits. Cotton alleges APD White has not deposed all of the witnesses identified in the arrest report (for example, Ms. Lorretta Miller and Defendant "Unnamed Deputy in Arrest Report"), and White refused to provide him a copy of his "discovery" until October 5, 2018. Cotton alleges White tried to persuade him to accept a plea. Cotton alleges White has "totally misrepresented" him and provided "total ineffective assistance of counsel." Cotton claims he is innocent of the charge of battery on a law enforcement officer.
Cotton alleges neither APD White nor Assistant State Attorney Richardson has sought dismissal of the charges despite their knowledge that the arrest report was fabricated with facts suggesting that the Detectives were engaged in the lawful performance of their duties when they arrested him. Cotton alleges ASA Richardson attempted to introduce false evidence at the suppression hearing. Cotton alleges the State Attorney Defendants (the State Attorney's Office, State Attorney William Eddins, and Assistant State Attorney Matthew Richardson) are using the false evidence to maliciously prosecute him.
Cotton alleges he missed a court date on October 30, 2018, because an officer at the Walton County Jail fabricated an allegation that he attempted to spit on her. Cotton alleges a disciplinary team at the Jail found him guilty of the infraction.
Cotton brings claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution, based upon a lack of probable cause and intentional fabrication of the arrest report, in violation of the Fourth Amendment (ECF No. 12 at 9-10).2 Cotton also asserts his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent has been violated (id. at 7). Cotton claims he is being denied effective assistance of counsel, in violation of the Sixth Amendment (id. at 5-6, 10). He also claims he is being subjected to slavery, in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment (id. at 10). Cotton claims he is being denied his right to a fair trial, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment (id. at 7, 14). He also claims he is notallowed to express himself, and is "ordered to be quiet" and "told when to eat, sleep, and drink," in violation of the First Amendment (id. at 7). Cotton additionally claims he is being subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, because is suffering severe stress and humiliation as a result of being falsely arrested and held against his will on false allegations (id.).
Cotton seeks habeas corpus relief and dismissal of the Walton County charges on the ground that the arrest report was intentionally fabricated (see ECF No. 11; ECF No. 12 at 12). Cotton also seeks "to sue for the maximum amounts" (id. at 9).
The court is statutorily required to review Cotton's Amended Complaint to determine whether this action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). To survive dismissal at the screening phase, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A claim is plausible on its face where "the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citation omitted). Plausibility means "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief." Id. (quotation and citation omitted).
The determination of whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citation omitted). The pleader is not entitled to relief "where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct." Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). The court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Id. at 678 (quotation and citation omitted). And "bare assertions" that "amount to nothing more than a formulaic recitation of the elements" of a claim "are conclusory and not entitled to be assumed true." Id. at 681 (quotation and citation omitted). Stated succinctly:
Pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. In civil rights cases, Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks and alteration omitted).
As previously noted, Cotton seeks dismissal of the pending criminal charges and habeas corpus relief (see ECF No. 11). Cotton's claims for injunctive relief are barred from the court's consideration by the Younger abstention doctrine. Pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669 (1971) and Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 91 S. Ct. 764, 27 L. Ed....
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