Cotton v. United States, 8332.

Decision Date03 January 1966
Docket NumberNo. 8332.,8332.
Citation355 F.2d 480
PartiesLouis Samuel COTTON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Charles L. Fagin, Oklahoma City, Okl., for appellant.

James R. Ward, Topeka, Kan. (Newell A. George, Kansas City, Kan., with him on brief), for appellee.

Before MURRAH, Chief Judge, and BREITENSTEIN and SETH, Circuit Judges.

MURRAH, Chief Judge.

This appeal involves the propriety of the ruling of the trial court which permitted the government to inquire of the accused-witness whether he had been previously adjudicated a juvenile delinquent under the Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5032, for the same type of offense for which he was then on trial.

The question arose in this way. The appellant was on trial for the possession of a stolen treasury check in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1708, and attempting to utter and publish same in violation of § 495. On direct examination he testified that he had been previously convicted and had served a sentence for another violation of the same laws. Government counsel then inquired outside the presence of the jury whether it would be proper to cross-examine the defendant on another offense for which he had been convicted while a juvenile. The court ruled that it would be proper to inquire not whether he had been convicted, but whether he had been adjudicated a juvenile delinquent and the basis of it as going to the credibility of the witness.

Over the objections of defense counsel, appellant admitted he had been adjudged a juvenile delinquent under the mail theft statute, had been sentenced under the Youth Act and served a period of time in Englewood, Colorado.

The federal statute applicable here, § 5032, pertinently provides that in the event the juvenile is proceeded against by information "* * * no criminal prosecution shall be instituted for the alleged violation." It does not expressly provide, as do some state statutes, that adjudication of delinquency shall not be used against the delinquent in any other proceedings or trial. But, an adjudication of juvenile delinquency and commitment under the Act is not a conviction of or sentence for a crime. The very purpose of the Act is to avoid prosecution of juveniles as criminals. See Fagerstrom v. United States, 8 Cir., 311 F.2d 717. It was "the legislative intent that a juvenile delinquency proceeding shall result in the adjudication of a status rather than the conviction of a crime." See Historical Note following § 5033, 18 U.S.C.

The government argues that since the purpose of the statute is to permit rehabilitation without the stigma of a prior record, the delinquent may avail himself of the shield so long as he earns the right to invoke it. But, a subsequent conviction for the same type of offense as the one for which he was adjudicated a delinquent, and for which he is now on trial, renders him unworthy of the shielding protection of the Act; that having admitted one previous conviction, it is not in derogation of the protective provisions of the Act to require him to disclose the prior adjudication.

Most of the state statutes relating to the adjudication of juvenile delinquency expressly prohibit the use of such adjudication against the delinquent in any other court or proceeding. Typical of these statutes is the one in the District of Columbia which expressly provides that "The disposition of a child or any evidence given in the court shall not be admissible as evidence against the child in any case or proceeding in any other court * * *." D.C.Code...

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23 cases
  • United States v. Jenkins
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • April 5, 1974
    ...to the clear mandate of the Juvenile Delinquency Act, as prior conviction. See United States v. Williams, supra; Cotton v. United States, 355 F.2d 480 (10th Cir. 1966); Fagerstrom v. United States, 311 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1963). This omission of a specific finding of delinquency, however, is......
  • Hu Yau-Leung v. Soscia
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • May 26, 1981
    ...States v. King, 482 F.2d 454, 456 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1076, 94 S.Ct. 594, 38 L.Ed.2d 483 (1973); Cotton v. United States, 355 F.2d 480, 481 (10th Cir. 1966); United States v. Hoston, 353 F.2d 723, 724 (7th Cir. 1965); Fagerstrom v. United States, 311 F.2d 717, 720 (8th Cir. U......
  • U.S. v. Canniff
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • August 13, 1975
    ...311 F.2d 717, 720 (8th Cir. 1963), and may not be used to attack a defendant's credibility in a later proceeding, see Cotton v. United States, 355 F.2d 480 (10th Cir. 1966); 18 U.S.C. § 5038. Furthermore, the purpose of a federal juvenile delinquency proceeding, like New York's youthful off......
  • Com. v. Ferrara
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • June 20, 1975
    ...juvenile witness not a party to the case at bar. Thomas v. United States, 74 U.S.App.D.C. 167, 121 F.2d 905 (1941). Cotton v. United States, 355 F.2d 480 (10th Cir. 1966). Hammac v. State, 44 Ala.App. 459, 212 So.2d 849 (1968). State v. Guerrero, 58 Ariz. 421, 120 P.2d 798 (1942). People v.......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
4 books & journal articles
  • FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
    • United States
    • Colorado Bar Association Evidence in Colorado - A Practical Guide (CBA) Subject Index
    • Invalid date
    ...adjudication is not usable for impeachment. Thomas v. United States, 74 App.D.C. 167, 121 F.2d 905 (1941); Cotton v. United States, 355 F.2d 480 (10th Cir. 1966). This conclusion was based upon a variety of circumstances. By virtue of its informality, frequently diminished quantum of requir......
  • Chapter 12 - § 12.2 IMPEACHMENT
    • United States
    • Colorado Bar Association Colorado Courtroom Handbook for Civil Trials (2022 ed.) (CBA) Chapter 12 Evidence — Testimony
    • Invalid date
    ...In general, evidence of a witness's juvenile adjudications may not be used to impeach the witness. See Cotton v. United States, 355 F.2d 480, 482 (10th Cir. 1966). ➢ Arrests. Arrests are not admissible to establish the general character of the witness. However, the circumstances surrounding......
  • Chapter 12 - § 12.2 • IMPEACHMENT
    • United States
    • Colorado Bar Association Colorado Courtroom Handbook for Civil Trials (CBA) Chapter 12 Evidence — Testimony
    • Invalid date
    ...In general, evidence of a witness's juvenile adjudications may not be used to impeach the witness. See Cotton v. United States, 355 F.2d 480, 482 (10th Cir. 1966). ➢ Arrests. Arrests are not admissible to establish the general character of the witness. However, the circumstances surrounding......
  • Rule 609 IMPEACHMENT BY EVIDENCE OF A CRIMINAL CONVICTION
    • United States
    • Colorado Bar Association Colorado Rules and C.R.S. of Evidence Annotated (CBA)
    • Invalid date
    ...adjudication is not usable for impeachment. Thomas v. United States, 74 App.D.C. 167, 121 F.2d 905 (1941); Cotton v. United States, 355 F.2d 480 (10th Cir. 1966). This conclusion was based upon a variety of circumstances. By virtue of its informality, frequently diminished quantum of requir......
1 provisions
  • 28 APPENDIX U.S.C. § 609 Impeachment By Evidence of a Criminal Conviction
    • United States
    • US Code 2023 Edition Title 28 Appendix Federal Rules of Evidence Article VI. Witnesses
    • January 1, 2023
    ...adjudication is not usable for impeachment. Thomas v. United States, 74 App.D.C. 167, 121 F.2d 905 (1941); Cotton v. United States, 355 F.2d 480 (10th Cir. 1966). This conclusion was based upon a variety of circumstances. By virtue of its informality, frequently diminished quantum of requir......

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