Cottrell v. Greenwell

• Decision Date: 25 February 2021
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:17-cv-00041-RGJ-CHL
• Parties: JOHN COTTRELL Plaintiff v. DAVE GREENWELL, ET AL. Defendants
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky

JOHN COTTRELL Plaintiff v. DAVE GREENWELL, ET AL. Defendants

Civil Action No. 3:17-cv-00041-RGJ-CHL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY LOUISVILLE DIVISION

February 25, 2021

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff John Cottrell ("Cottrell") alleges violations of various Kentucky laws and seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Bullitt County, Kentucky, and Bullitt County Sheriff Dave Greenwell ("Greenwell"). [DE 49]. Defendants move for summary judgment on all claims. [DE 80-1]. Cottrell moves the Court to reconsider its prior grant of summary judgment on his KRS § 342.197, KRS § 344.010, and 29 U.S.C. § 2601 claims. [DE 91-1 at 1045]. Cottrell also moves for permission to file an amended response to Defendants' motion for summary judgment. [DE 91]. All parties filed unopposed motions for leave to exceed the page limits set forth in LR 7.1(d). [DE 90; DE 94]. Briefing is complete, and the motions are ripe. [DE 89; DE 91; DE 95; DE 96; DE 98]. For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS IN PART, DENIES IN PART Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 80], GRANTS Cottrell's Motion to Submit Amended Combined Response insofar as the Amended Combined Response is permitted but DENIES it as to the Motion to Reconsider [DE 91], GRANTS Cottrell's Motion to Exceed Page Limits [DE 90], and GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Exceed Page Limits [DE 94].

I. BACKGROUND

Cottrell was the Chief Deputy of the Bullitt County Sheriff's Department ("BCSO") from January 2011 to October 2016. [DE 91-1 at 1021]. Cottrell served under Sheriff Dave Greenwell. Id. In his role of Chief Deputy, Cottrell ran the day-to-day operations of the department and made hiring and policy decisions for the BCSO. Id.; [DE 80-3 at 780-81].

In May 2014, federal agents stopped a Kentucky man in Riverside, California and recovered more than $420,000 from hidden compartments within his vehicle. [DE 24-2 at 336]. Federal agents determined that the vehicle was registered to Leonard Mattingly ("Mattingly"). [DE 89-2 at 889]. Mattingly operated a car dealership in Bullitt County and was friends with Greenwell. Id. Federal agents contacted Michael Halbleib ("Halbleib"), captain of BCSO's drug task force. Id. Based on his conversation with the federal agents, Halbleib believed that they were "trying to tie this vehicle and the Mattinglys into the Mexican cartel." Id. Cottrell told Halbleib to investigate Mattingly and the relationship between Mattingly and Greenwell. Id.; [DE 24-2 at 337]. Halbleib and his team began surveilling Mattingly's dealership. [DE 89-2 at 889]. Halbleib believed that Greenwell "tipp[ed] off" Mattingly that they were surveilling his business. Id. at 890. Halbleib periodically communicated with federal law enforcement agents and Larry Fentress, a federal prosecutor in the Western District of Kentucky, about his ongoing investigation. Id.

Meanwhile, in August 2016, Cottrell injured his knee at work while arresting a suspect. [DE 91-1 at 1025]. Cottrell sought medical attention and was restricted to desk duty. Id. at 1026. Cottrell relayed this information to the Department's office manager, Myrtle French ("French"). Id. French ask Cottrell to bring in documentation of his injury for his workers' compensation claim. Id. at 1027. Cottrell did not immediately provide her with this information, and French complained to Greenwell about Cottrell's delay. [DE 91-6 at 1107]. The parties dispute whether Greenwell knew that Cottrell intended to file a workers' compensation claim. [DE 96 at 1262; DE 98 at 1271].

In October 2016, Cottrell received a letter from Greenwell stating that he was terminated for absence without leave. [DE 91-1 at 1029]. After Cottrell was terminated, Halbleib and other detectives discovered and recovered contraband from his office, including marijuana and pills. [DE 91-19 at 1207]. Halbleib and Michael Murdoch, another BCSO detective, investigated Cottrell. [DE 91-11 at 1159]. Based on their investigation, Cottrell was indicted in state court for committing multiple felonies. [DE 91-1 at 1033]. In March 2019, state prosecutors dismissed all charges against him. Id. at 1034.

Cottrell filed suit in January 2017. [DE 1]. Defendants removed the case to this Court. Id. Defendants moved to dismiss Cottrell's KRS § 61.102, KRS § 15.520, and § 1983 procedural due process claims. [DE 10]. The Court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss. [DE 38]. Defendants also moved for summary judgment [DE 11] and the Court granted it on Cottrell's KRS § 344.010, KRS § 342.197, and 29 U.S.C. § 2601 claims. [DE 38].

Defendants now move for summary judgment on Cottrell's remaining claims. [DE 80]. Cottrell moves the Court to reconsider its dismissal of his KRS § 344.010, KRS § 342.197, and 29 U.S.C. § 2601 claims. [DE 91].

II. STANDARD

Summary judgment is required when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of specifying the basis for its motion and showing the lack of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Once the moving party satisfies this burden, the non-moving party must produce specific facts showing a material issue of fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). "Factual differences are not considered material unless the differences are such that a reasonable jury couldfind for the party contesting the summary judgment motion." Bell v. City of E. Cleveland, 125 F.3d 855 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252).

A district court considering a motion for summary judgment may not weigh evidence or make credibility determinations but must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Daugherty v. Sajar Plastics, Inc., 544 F.3d 696, 702 (6th Cir. 2008); Williams v. Int'l Paper Co., 227 F.3d 706, 710 (6th Cir. 2000). The non-moving party must do more than show some "metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Instead, the non-moving party must show a genuine factual issue exists by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record" or by "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute[.]" Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(c)(1)(A)-(B); see also Shreve v. Franklin Cty., Ohio, 743 F.3d 126, 132 (6th Cir. 2014). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving party]." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252.

III. DISCUSSION

Cottrell moves to file an amended response [DE 91] to Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Hearing no objection, the Court grants Cottrell's motion and has considered the amended response as part of its analysis. Both parties also move [DE 90; DE 94] for leave to exceed the page limit established in LR 7.1 (d). The Court grants those motions as well.

A. Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendants move for summary judgment on Cottrell's KRS §15.520, KRS § 61.101, KRS § 337.385, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. [DE 80-1 at 727].

1. KRS §15.520¹

"Federal courts must apply state substantive law, including immunities, when dealing with supplemental state law claims in federal court." Shepherd v. Floyd Cty., 128 F. Supp. 3d 976, 980 (E.D. Ky. 2015) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 80 (1938)). "[A] sheriff is a county official and absent a waiver thereof is cloaked with sovereign immunity when sued in his official capacity." Harlan Cty. v. Browning, No. 2012-CA-000148-MR, 2013 WL 657880, at *2 (Ky. App. Feb. 22, 2013). Under Kentucky law, Greenwell is cloaked with sovereign immunity, absent a waiver by the General Assembly. The Supreme Court of Kentucky "will find waiver only where stated by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as will leave no room for any other reasonable construction." Withers v. University of Kentucky, 939 S.W.2d 340, 346 (Ky. 1997) (citation, formatting, and quotation marks omitted).

"In 1980, the Kentucky legislature enacted what is commonly referred to as the 'Police Officer's Bill of Rights.' The statute provides certain procedural protections to officers employed by local governments that receive appropriations from the Commonwealth's general fund." Seger v. City of Lancaster, 930 F. Supp. 2d 821, 822 (E.D. Ky. 2013) (citing KRS §15.520). The General Assembly enacted KRS § 15.520 "[i]n order to establish a minimum system of professional conduct for officers of local units of government of this Commonwealth" and "to deal fairly and set administrative due process rights in certain disciplinary matters concerning those officers of an employing unit of government that participates in the Kentucky Law Enforcement Foundation Program fund administered pursuant to KRS 15.430 and, at the same time, to provide a means for redress by the citizens of the Commonwealth for wrongs allegedly done to them by officerscovered by this section." KRS § 15.520(2) (2015 version). "Officer" means "a person employed as a full-time peace officer by a unit of government that receives funds under KRS 15.410 to 15.510 who has completed any officially established initial probationary period of employment lasting no longer than twelve (12) months not including, unless otherwise specified by the employing agency, any time the officer was employed and completing the basic training required by KRS 15.404." KRS § 15.520(1)(h) (2015 version). KRS § 15.520 constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity if the plaintiff is an "officer." See Wheeler v. Ward, No. 319CV00059GNSCHL, 2020 WL 1442904, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 24, 2020) ("To the extent this statute applies to deputy sheriffs such as Wheeler, it would constitute a waiver of...