Coty v. Town of Millinocket

• Decision Date: 21 April 1982
• Citation: 444 A.2d 355
• Parties: Henry COTY v. TOWN OF MILLINOCKET and Employers Fire Insurance Company.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 355

444 A.2d 355

Henry COTY v.TOWN OF MILLINOCKET and Employers Fire Insurance Company.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued March 1, 1982.

Decided April 21, 1982.

Gross, Minsky, Mogul & Singal, P.A., George C. Schelling(orally), Bangor, for plaintiff.

Mitchell & Stearns, Kevin M. Cuddy(orally), Bangor, for defendants.

Before McKUSICK, C. J., and GODFREY, NICHOLS, ROBERTS, CARTER and WATHEN, JJ.

CARTER, Justice.

For the fourth time, the parties are before this Court with respect to Henry Coty's claim for Workers' Compensation benefits stemming from a work-related injury that occurred while Coty was in the employ of the Town of Millinocket(Town).SeeCoty v. Town of Millinocket, Me., 423 A.2d 524(1980)(Coty III);Coty v. Town of Millinocket, Me., 393 A.2d 156(1978)(Coty II);Coty v. Town of Millinocket, Me., 391 A.2d 826(1978)(Coty I).Because we find the decision of the Commissioner provides an inadequate basis for review, we vacate the decision and remand for further proceedings.

The facts of the case are more fully set forth in our prior decisions.SeeCoty III, 423 A.2d at 524-26;Coty I, 391 A.2d at 827-29.In brief, Coty injured his leg on September 18, 1973, while working as a laborer for the Town.He received benefits for total incapacity until February 1974 when he returned to work for the Town and benefits were then terminated by agreement.In 1975, Coty filed two Petitions, both seeking further compensation benefits for total incapacity for work as of July 1974.¹The first was filed while Coty was still employed by the Town; the second after he was discharged from his job on August 15, 1975.

The claim for benefits was denied by the Commissioner and Coty appealed.We sustained that appeal and remanded to the Commissioner because, in part, the decree of the Commissioner manifested confusion or misunderstanding of the principles of law relating to incapacity and its relation to work search.Coty I, 391 A.2d at 830.In Coty III, the follow-up decision to Coty I, the Commissioner, after hearing additional testimony, again denied the employee's Petition and the employee appealed.This appeal was sustained on the basis that the Commissioner's findings, despite the employee's request for further findings of fact, were inadequate to allow effective appellate review of the decision.Coty III, 423 A.2d at 526.We remanded the case with directions to the Commissioner to make additional findings of fact and conclusions of law on the basis of the existing record.Coty III, 423 A.2d at 526-27.

The Commissioner's decision on remand denied benefits to Coty as follows:

On the basis of the testimony already in the record, we conclude as follows:

From January 1, 1975 until August 15, 1975Henry Coty worked as a laborer for the Town of Millinocket.He claimed compensation for partial disability during that period.

He stayed off the job for about 32 days during that period of time because he was ordered to perform work which, he says, he couldn't do because of his injured knee.It is our impression from the evidence on that question, that when Mr. Coty stayed away from work it was because he disliked the particular assignments given him not because he couldn't do them.

We find that he was not partially incapacitated during the period from January 1, 1975 to August 15, 1975.

On August 15, 1975 the Town of Millinocket terminated Mr. Coty's employment.He claims compensation for total or partial disability until December 30, 1975.We find he continued to have substantial work capacity and that although he probably was precluded by his knee injury from heavy labor, we are not convinced that he could not have obtained work which would have paid him as much or more than he earned before he was hurt.Mr. Coty is not entitled to compensation for total or partial from January 1, 1975 to December 31, 1975.

The Petition is denied.

The employee appeals this decision from the pro forma decree of the Superior Court, Penobscot County, affirming the decision of the Commissioner.On appeal, we address two issues: (1) the import of the Commissioner's failure to make additional findings to those set out above following the employee's § 99 request and (2) the legal adequacy of the Commissioner's decision.

I.

The employee asserts that the Commissioner erred in failing to make additional findings of fact and conclusions of law following the employee's request for findings pursuant to 39 M.R.S.A. § 99(1978).²In reply to this argument, the employer suggests that because the request for findings is still outstanding before the Commissioner, the instant appeal is premature.We find that the employee's appeal of the Commissioner's decision without obtaining final action on the § 99 request for findings acts as a withdrawal of the request and we conclude that the employee is precluded from asserting the alleged error on appeal.The appeal is, thus, properly before this Court.

The procedural framework by which the Commissioner issues additional findings of fact and conclusions of law following his initial determination of a Petition results in the creation of complementary duties.The Commissioner has an affirmative duty under § 99 to make findings of fact and conclusions of law when requested by a party.Smith v. Young Women's Christian Association, Me., 438 A.2d 1276, 1278(1982);Leo v American Hoist & Derrick Co., Me., 438 A.2d 917, 926(1981).The parties, in order to assist the Commissioner in carrying out his duty, are under an obligation to submit proposed findings when so ordered by the Commissioner.Id.;Coty III, 423 A.2d at 527.

We have stressed the importance of full findings of fact and conclusions of law as of vital assistance to the Commissioner in rendering his ultimate decision and to the Law Court in carrying out its appellate function.

Specific findings permit stricter review.Rather than assuming that the Commissioner made particular findings of fact or applied certain legal principles, an appellate court can review the actual findings made and the legal principles actually applied.Furthermore, section 99 anticipates that upon making specific findings the Commissioner may reconsider, revise or reverse his original decision.Thus, possible error can be corrected at the Commission level.

(Citation omitted.)Smith, 438 A.2d at 1278;seeLeo, 438 A.2d at 926;Dufault v. Midland-Ross of Canada, Ltd., Me., 380 A.2d 200, 203(1977).We have also noted the significant aid provided by proposed findings.³Proposed findings allow the Commissioner to "obtain the full benefit of the adversary system in carrying out the responsibilities imposed upon him by section 99."Coty III, 423 A.2d at 527.

The failure of either the parties or the Commissioner to fully meet their responsibilities within the framework of the fact-rendering process inhibits the satisfaction of the objectives and benefits of full and complete fact-finding articulated above.The importance of the functions to be performed by the Commissioner and by the parties cannot be overstated.A failure on the part of the Commissioner to make findings will often compel this Court to remand the case to the Commissioner with an order to comply with the mandate of § 99.SeeSmith, 438 A.2d at 1278-79;Gallant v. Boise Cascade Paper Group, Me., 427 A.2d 976, 977(1981).A party's failure to submit proposed findings may deprive him of his right to receive additional findings of fact and conclusions of law because this dereliction in meeting the Commissioner's order may justify the Commissioner's denial of the request for findings or allow the Commissioner to view the request as withdrawn.Leo, 438 A.2d at 926.The Commissioner may also have the authority to set in motion the procedures for adjudicating a party in contempt, in an appropriate case, for failure to comply with an order of the Commission.39 M.R.S.A. § 93(5);seeLeo, 438 A.2d at 927 n.7.

It follows that when the error asserted on appeal is the Commissioner's failure to satisfy a § 99 request, the reasons underlying the Commissioner's failure to make findings must be evident from the record so that we can evaluate the propriety of the Commissioner's inaction.SeeLeo, 438 A.2d at 927(record insufficient to determine whether the Commissioner's denial of request for findings was proper).In short, the issue on appeal is whether the failure to render additional findings pursuant to § 99 relates to the neglect of the Commissioner in not making the findings or the neglect of the parties in not submitting proposed findings.Moreover, since under § 99 the running of the time for taking an appeal is terminated by a motion for further findings, some final action on a motion for additional findings is necessary in order for this Court to ascertain whether an appeal is premature or otherwise untimely.

Since a party must initially request additional findings and the requesting party has the greatest motivation in seeing that such findings are made, ⁴we hold that the ultimate responsibility rests upon the requesting party to assure that some type of action on the § 99 request is taken so that an adequate record is developed for a reviewing court to ascertain whether the Commissioner's failure to make findings is wrongful.Inasmuch as a party must request findings in order to give rise to the Commissioner's statutory duty to make findings, he also bears the continuing obligation to follow through on this request by submitting proposed findings when so ordered by the Commissioner and by assuring that some positive action is taken with respect to the request for findings.A number of options are available to the party in this respect.For example, after the submission of proposed findings as ordered and upon the expiration of a reasonable period within which the Commissioner could render findings, a party could seek a ruling from the Commissioner as to the basis for his noncompliance...