Couch v. Brooks

• Decision Date: 06 December 2021
• Docket Number: Civil Action 4:20-CV-00199-JHM
• Parties: LOGAN L. COUCH, PLAINTIFF v. BRANDON BROOKS, et al. DEFENDANTS
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky

LOGAN L. COUCH, PLAINTIFF v. BRANDON BROOKS, et al. DEFENDANTS

Civil Action No. 4:20-CV-00199-JHM

United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Owensboro Division

December 6, 2021

Logan L. Couch, pro se counsel of record

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Joseph H. McKinley Jr., Senior Judge

This matter is before the Court on a motion for summary judgment by Defendants Brandon Brooks (“Brooks”), Bobby Oldham (“Oldham”), and Deputy Dotson (“Dotson”) (cumulatively “Defendants”). [DN 47]. Plaintiff Logan L. Couch (“Couch”), pro se, filed a response [DN 48], and the Defendants filed a reply [DN 51]. Fully briefed, this matter is ripe for decision. The Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

Couch is a pretrial detainee at the Grayson County Detention Center (“GCDC”). In an attachment to his verified Complaint [DN 1-1], he makes the following allegations:

At appx 1:20 pm on 11/9/2020, . . . Brooks (J-94) approached the door of Grey Cell 298 in the [GCDC] . . . and instructed all offenders, while pointing his jail issued taser gun, to sit down. Officer Brooks then entered Grey Cell 298 and began aggressively yanking, with excessive force, on the television cords causing the cords to break from thier [sic] connections. Officer Brooks then grabbed a hotpot (a electrical device with a cylander [sic] pitcher attached used for boiling water) and threw it, in anger, hitting a inmate by the name of Marvin C. Norris. The hotpot was full of boiling water and the contents of the pitch all landed on [me and Norris] and [my] legal documents used for fighting [my] ongoing Federal case. Due to COVID-19, [I am] currently unable to re-obtain these documents thus cannot properly defend his self on the matter. . . . Both inmates suffered 3rd degree burns on the right arm. Officer Brooks then continued to scream insults and point his taser gun at inmates. While Officer Brooks continued his angry tyraid [sic] other Officers remained at the door of Grey Cell 298. It was later discovered that names of these other Officers were Bobby Oldham (J-54), Deputy Dotson (J-96), and Deputy Captain John Doe, who refused to give his name or badge number.

[Norris] was then taken to be seen by medical. [I] was initially ignored of [my] injuries, after informing and trying several times to show the Officers [my] burn injuries . . . . At apprx 2:40 pm Officer Bobby Oldham (J-54) escorted [me] to medical care where [I] was seen by Nurse Desiree Walton (J-15) regarding the medical request form. [Walton] (J-15) applied burn ointment and applied a bandage to the burn. [I] was then escorted back to Grey Cell 298 by Bobby Oldham (J-54).

[Id. at 9-10]. Based upon these allegations, Couch claimed that every Defendant violated his rights under the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. [DN 1-1 at ¶¶ 1-14]. He also asserted state law claims against Brooks. [Id. at ¶ 1].

Pursuant to the Court's 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) review, the Court dismissed his First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment claims, his Fourteenth Amendment claims for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, and his claims for “aiding and abetting” against all Defendants. [DN 8 at 4-9]. Additionally, both Couch and the Court dismissed several GCDC officials as defendants in this suit. [Id. at 9]; [DN 15]. The Court allowed the following claims to proceed in this action: a Fourteenth Amendment excessive-force claim against Brooks in his individual capacity; Fourteenth Amendment claims for failure to intervene in the excessive-force incident against Oldham and Dotson in their individual capacities; and state-law claims of assault and negligence against Brooks. [DN 8]. The Defendants now move for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. [DN 47].

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Before the Court may grant a motion for summary judgment, it must find that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of specifying the basis for its motion and identifying that portion of the record that demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Once the moving party satisfies this burden, the non-moving party thereafter must produce specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue of fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).

Although the Court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the non-moving party must do more than merely show that there is some “metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Instead, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require the non-moving party to present specific facts showing that a genuine factual issue exists by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

The fact that a plaintiff is pro se does not lessen his obligations under Rule 56. “The liberal treatment of pro se pleadings does not require the lenient treatment of substantive law, and the liberal standards that apply at the pleading stage do not apply after a case has progressed to the summary judgment stage.” Johnson v. Stewart, No. 08-1521, 2010 WL 8738105, at *3 (6th Cir. May 5, 2010) (citations omitted). The Sixth Circuit has made clear that, when opposing summary judgment, a party cannot rely on allegations or denials in unsworn filings and that a party's “status as a pro se litigant does not alter [this] duty on a summary judgment motion.” Viergutz v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 375 Fed.Appx. 482, 485 (6th Cir. 2010); see also United States v. Brown, 7 Fed.Appx. 353, 354 (6th Cir. 2001) (affirming grant of summary judgment against a pro se plaintiff because he “failed to present any evidence to defeat the government's motion”). However, statements in a verified complaint that are based on personal knowledge may function as the equivalent of affidavit statements for purposes of summary judgment. Weberg v. Franks, 229 F.3d 514, 526 n.13 (6th Cir. 2000); Williams v. Browman, 981 F.2d 901, 905 (6th Cir. 1992).

III. Discussion

In his Complaint, Couch raises both federal and state law claims. For his federal claims, Couch raises two constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. First, he alleges Brooks applied excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. [DN 1 at ¶ 1]. Second, he alleges Oldham and Dotson also violated the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to intervene in that excessive force incident. [DN 1 at ¶¶ 11-13]. For his state law claims, he alleges Brooks committed assault and negligence against him. [DN 1 at ¶ 1]. In response, the Defendants claim they are entitled to qualified immunity-both under federal and state law. [DN 47-1 at 11-14]. The Court addresses each of these arguments in turn.

A. Federal Claims

The Defendants assert qualified immunity in response to Couch's § 1983 claims. “[O]fficers are entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983 unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly established at the time.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S.Ct. 577, 589 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Although a defendant ordinarily bears the burden of proof for an affirmative defense, a plaintiff bears the burden of overcoming qualified immunity.” Crawford v. Tilley, No. 20-6391, 2021 WL 4699442, at *5 (6th Cir. Oct. 8, 2021). “In cases with multiple defendants, we assess qualified immunity ‘in the context of each individual's specific conduct.'” Ricks v. Pauch, No. 20-1778, 2021 WL 4775145, at *3 (6th Cir. Oct. 13, 2021) (quoting Hopper v. Plummer, 887 F.3d 744, 756 (6th Cir. 2018)).

1. Violation of a Constitutional Right

Couch alleges two constitutional violations under the Fourteenth Amendment. First, he contends Brooks violated the Constitution by applying excessive force to a pretrial detainee. Second, he contends Dotson and Oldham failed to intervene in that alleged exercise of excessive force. The Court addresses each in turn.

a. Defendant Brooks's Excessive Force

First, Couch alleges Brooks exercised excessive force by throwing a hotpot near him, burning him with hot water. Since Couch is a pretrial detainee, “the Fourteenth Amendment's more generally applicable Due Process Clause governs to bar a government official's excessive use of force.” Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 472 (6th Cir. 2013). The Supreme Court clarified the Fourteenth Amendment standard for excessive force claims in Kingsley v. Hendrickson. 576 U.S. 389 (2015). Kingsley established “a two-prong inquiry for Fourteenth Amendment excessive-force claims.” Hale v. Boyle Cnty., No. 20-6195, 2021 WL 5370783, at *4 (6th Cir. 2021). First, “an official must purposefully, knowingly, or (‘possibly') recklessly engaged in the alleged physical contact with the detained person. Mere negligent or accident will not suffice.” Id. (citing Kingsley, 576 U.S. 396-97 (internal citations omitted)). Second, “the official's use of force must be objectively unreasonable.” Id.^[1]

Turning to the first Kingsley prong, the issue is whether Brooks “purposefully, knowingly, or (‘possibly') recklessly engage[d] in the alleged physical contact with” Couch. Hale, 2021 WL 5370783, at *4. According...