Couch v. Schultz

• Decision Date: 16 March 1992
• Docket Number: Docket No. 131147
• Citation: 193 Mich.App. 292,483 N.W.2d 684
• Parties: George G. COUCH and Ronald L. Jordan, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Timothy SCHULTZ, Defendant-Appellee. 193 Mich.App. 292, 483 N.W.2d 684
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 684

483 N.W.2d 684

George G. COUCH and Ronald L. Jordan Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Timothy SCHULTZ, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 131147.

193 Mich.App. 292, 483 N.W.2d 684

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Oct. 8, 1991, at Houghton.

Decided March 16, 1992, at 9:20 a.m.

Released for Publication May 19, 1992.

[193 MICHAPP 292] George G. Couch, in pro. per.

Ronald L. Jordan, in pro. per.

[193 MICHAPP 293] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Gay Secor Hardy, Sol. Gen., and Jason Julian, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant.

Before GILLIS, P.J., and GRIBBS and MICHAEL J. KELLY, JJ.

GRIBBS, Judge.

In this defamation action, plaintiffs appeal as of right from an order of the circuit court granting summary disposition in favor of defendant pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8). We affirm.

Plaintiffs are inmates in the custody of the Department of Corrections. Defendant is a corrections officer. Defendant filed a prison major misconduct report against plaintiffs, charging them with sexual misconduct (sodomy). A prison disciplinary hearing was held, and plaintiffs were found guilty of the charge.

Before the disciplinary hearing, plaintiffs filed this action against defendant in circuit court, alleging that he had defamed them by filing the major misconduct report. Subsequently, defendant filed his motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8). The trial court, in granting defendant's motion, held that a prison disciplinary hearing is a "judicial proceeding" in which witnesses enjoy absolute immunity from liability for defamation, and, therefore, defendant's major misconduct report was an absolutely privileged communication for which liability could not attach.

The issue on appeal, whether a disciplinary hearing is a "judicial proceeding" in which witnesses are afforded an absolute privilege from liability for defamation, is an issue of first impression in Michigan. Because we believe a prison disciplinary hearing has many attributes of a judicial proceeding, and because we believe strong policy reasons support a finding of absolute privilege[193 MICHAPP 294] under these circumstances, we hold that a prison disciplinary hearing is a "judicial proceeding" and statements made in relation to such hearings are absolutely privileged.

It is well settled in Michigan that statements made during the course of legislative proceedings, statements made during the course of judicial proceedings, and communications by military and naval officers are absolutely privileged. Raymond v. Croll, 233 Mich. 268, 272-273, 206 N.W. 556 (1925); Timmis v. Bennett, 352 Mich. 355, 362, 89 N.W.2d 748 (1958). "Judicial proceedings" may include any hearing before a tribunal or administrative board that performs a judicial function. See generally Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed), Defamation, Sec. 114 and footnotes cited there, pp. 816-821. An absolutely privileged communication is one for which no remedy is provided for damages in a defamation action because of the occasion on which the communication is made. Schlinkert v. Henderson, 331 Mich. 284, 290, 49 N.W.2d 180 (1951). A privileged occasion is an occasion where the public good requires that a person be freed from liability for the publication of a statement that would otherwise be defamatory. Id. Public policy is the principle underlying the doctrine of absolute privilege. Timmis, supra 352 Mich. at 362, 89 N.W.2d 748.

If absolute privilege applies, there can be no action for defamation. Parks v. Johnson, 84 Mich.App. 162, 166, 269 N.W.2d 514 (1978); Tocco v. Piersante, 69 Mich.App. 616, 628, 245 N.W.2d 356 (1976). The question whether a privilege attaches is a question of law for the trial court. Lawrence v. Fox, 357 Mich. 134, 97 N.W.2d 719 (1959); Peterfish v. Frantz, 168 Mich.App. 43, 49, 424 N.W.2d 25 (1988); Tocco, supra 69 Mich.App. at 628, 245 N.W.2d 356.

In this case, we are concerned with the absolute privilege for statements made during the course of [193 MICHAPP 295] judicial proceedings. Statements made by witnesses during the course of such proceedings are absolutely privileged, provided they are relevant, material, or pertinent to the issue being tried. Rouch v. Enquirer & News, 427 Mich. 157, 164, 398 N.W.2d 245 (1986); Sanders v. Leeson Air Conditioning Corp., 362 Mich. 692, 695, 108 N.W.2d 761 (1961); Meyer v. Hubbell, 117 Mich.App. 699, 709, 324 N.W.2d 139 (1982). The immunity extends to every step in the proceeding and covers anything that may be said in relation to the matter at issue, including pleadings and affidavits. See Stewart v. Walton, 254 Ga. 81, 326 S.E.2d 738 (1985) (complaint); Gunter v. Reeves, 198 Miss. 31, 21 So.2d 468 (1945) (search warrant); Jenson v. Olson, 273 Minn. 390, 141 N.W.2d 488 (1966) (testimony at civil service hearing). The judicial proceedings privilege should be liberally construed so that participants in judicial proceedings are free to express themselves without fear of retaliation. Sanders, supra 362 Mich. at 695, 108 N.W.2d 761; Meyer, supra 117 Mich.App. at 709, 324 N.W.2d 139.

Although Michigan courts have not addressed the issue now before us, the United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a related issue in Shelly v. Johnson, 849 F.2d 228 (C.A. 6, 1988). The Shelly court held that because Michigan "prison hearing officers are in fact professional hearing officers in the nature of administrative law judges," they are entitled to absolute judicial immunity. Id., at 230. The decision in Shelly was based on several factors, including: (1) the statutory requirement that a prison hearing officer be a professional; (2) the roles and duties of a hearing officer are spelled out at length in the statute; (3) a prison hearing officer is subject to disqualification at the request of a prisoner upon a showing of bias or for other valid reasons; (4) a hearing officer's decision must be in writing and must include [193 MICHAPP 296] findings of fact; and (5) a hearing officer's decision is subject to judicial review in the Michigan courts. Id.

Although the Shelly decision is not binding precedent in this Court, we find the reasoning employed to be helpful in resolving the issue in the present case: whether a disciplinary hearing is a "judicial proceeding" in which participants are afforded absolute privilege from liability for defamation. We base our decision in part on the fact that a prison disciplinary hearing has many attributes of a judicial proceeding, including: (1) the...