Couch v. Zoning Commission of Town of Washington

• Citation: 141 Conn. 349,106 A.2d 173
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Decision Date: 16 June 1954
• Parties: COUCH et al. v. ZONING COMMISSION OF TOWN OF WASHINGTON. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 173

106 A.2d 173

141 Conn. 349

COUCH et al. v. ZONING COMMISSION OF TOWN OF WASHINGTON.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

June 16, 1954.

David Cramer, Litchfield, Clayton L. Blick, Litchfield, for appellant (defendant).

Walter M. Pickett, Jr., Waterbury, for appellees (plaintiffs).

Before INGLIS, C. J., and BALDWIN, O'SULLIVAN, WYNNE and DALY, JJ.

O'SULLIVAN, Associate Justice.

The town of Washington is predominantly rural in character. The zoning regulations now in force in the town became effective on December 15, 1939. Of the zonal classifications into which the town is divided, two are designated for business. Washington Zoning Regs., § 1 (1939, as amended). These are known as the Washington Depot and the New Preston Village districts. Each contains a wide variety of commercial establishments. Another classification is called the farming and residence district. It consists of all areas not otherwise zoned. Most of the land abutting route 25, an improved state highway running through the town and connecting Litchfield and New Milford, is presently zoned for farming and residential purposes.

As far back as February, 1951, the defendant, hereinafter called the commission, became concerned with the limited area available for the location of new commercial enterprises. By August of that year, the members of the commission had reached the conclusion that immediate steps should be taken to increase the business areas, either by enlarging the existing districts or by creating new ones. From then on, the commission held numerous meetings and engaged in many discussions aimed at the ultimate setting up of additional zonal space for business purposes. In seeking a solution of the problem, the commission had the benefit of suggestions emanating not only from its own membership but also from various civic organizations in the community. But, whatever the source, the various suggestions were throughly explored by the commission through discussion and through personal examination of the areas to be affected.

At a meeting held on September 9, 1952, the commission received a petition signed by over seventy residents, requesting the zoning for business of a strip of land on each side of route 25 for the entire seven miles of its course through the town. A public hearing was held on the petition on October 3, 1952. Approximately one hundred persons were in attendance, and everyone who wished to express his views had ample opportunity to do so. While most of those present were favorably inclined to the idea, the members of the commission questioned the wisdom of devoting such a lengthy strip of land to business uses. After further discussion among themselves, they reached the conclusion that two sections along route 25 should be zoned for business. Accordingly, at a meeting held on October 16, 1952, the commission took the following action respecting one of the two sections: 'It was then voted to establish a new business district on Route 25, from the New Milford Town line to the present New Preston Business District; the same to be of a width of 600 * * * feet on both sides of said route, measured from the center of the highway (or a total width of 1200 * * * feet including the highway).' At a meeting held on the next day, the commission, acting upon the other section, 'unanimously resolved to establish a Business District on Route 25, the more northerly end to be the west bank of the Shepaug River at that point where crossed by Route 25, the more southerly end to be at the intersection of Route 25 and of a road known at this time as Couch Road and running in a northerly direction from the intersection and into the Town of Warren; and it was further resolved that the said Business District be of a width of 600 * * * feet on both sides of Route 25, as measured from the center of the highway and between the designated points on Route 25 (or a total width of 1200 * * * feet including the highway). It was further resolved that the said Business District should be known as 'The Woodville Business District,' and that the more southerly Business District voted at the meeting of October 16, 1952 be known as 'The Marble Dale Business District."

The minutes of the meeting of October 17, 1952, also state: 'The Zoning Commission bases its decision to establish the two said Business Districts upon the following reasons: 1. The growing need for additional business area in the Town. 2. Route 25 presents the most adaptable locations. 3. Two separate business districts on Route 25 are desirable. 4. The two areas chosen seem unlikely for future residential or farming development, due to ever-increasing heavy traffic.'

A duly warned public hearing on the two districts was held on November 10, 1952. Several persons spoke for and several against the plan. After the hearing, the commission met in executive session and unanimously voted to approve the plan for the reasons specified in the minutes of the meeting of October 17, 1952.

The plaintiffs, describing themselves as residents and taxpayers of the town, appealed to the Court of Common Pleas from the action of the commission in adopting the changes in the zoning regulations. The vital conclusion upon which the court relied in sustaining the appeal was that the commission had acted arbitrarily and illegally in that (1) the creation of the zones was not in accordance with a comprehensive plan and therefore was violative of § 837 of the General Statutes, and (2) the vote of the commission in establishing the zones was taken before the public hearing required by § 157b of the 1951 Cumulative Supplement, as amended, Cum.Supp.1953, § 282c. Whether the court was correct in its conclusion is determinative of the appeal which the commission has taken to this court.

Section 837 provides in part: '[All zoning] regulations shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan and shall be designed to lessen congestion in the streets; to secure safety from fire, panic and other dangers; to promote health and the general welfare; to provide adequate light and air; to prevent the overcrowding of land; to avoid undue concentration of population and to facilitate the adequate provision for transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks and other public requirements. Such regulations shall be made with reasonable consideration as to the character of the district and its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and with a view to conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout [the] municipality.' The gist of this statute is that zoning regulations must possess two characteristics: first, they must be expressive of a plan which is comprehensive, and second, they must promote the public welfare. Fairlawns Cemetery Ass'n Inc., v. Zoning Commission, 138 Conn. 434, 439, 86 A.2d 74. The second point does not require any examination on our part. The four reasons recorded by the commission in its minutes clearly indicate that the regulations are aimed at the promotion of the public welfare of the town. The first requirement, however, is entitled to a more extended discussion.

'A 'comprehensive plan' means 'a general plan to control and direct the use and development of property in a municipality or a large part of it by dividing it into districts according to the present and potential use of the properties.' Bishop v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 133 Conn. 614, 618, 53 A.2d 659, 662; State ex rel. Spiros v. Payne, 131 Conn. 647, 652, 41 A.2d 908; Bartram v. Zoning Commission, 136 Conn. 89, 93, 68 A.2d 308. The comprehensive plan to which § 837 refers may originate in either of two agencies. Chapter 45 of the General Statutes authorizes municipalities to create planning commissions. § 854. These commissions, when established, are empowered to prepare, adopt and amend plans of development for their respective communities. § 856. No municipality is obliged, however, to establish a planning commission, and the statutory authority granted to towns, cities and boroughs under chapter 43 for the establishment of a zoning commission is not conditioned on a simultaneous exercise of the powers granted under chapter 45. When, therefore, a community establishes a zoning commission under chapter 43 but fails to take any action under chapter 45 to create a planning commission, the former commission necessarily has the power to set up a comprehensive plan of its own. See Hills v. Zoning Commission, 139 Conn. 603, 610, 96 A.2d 212.

The comprehensive...