Coughlin v. Commissioner of Social Services

• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
• Writing for the Court: Before HOPKINS
• Citation: Coughlin v. Commissioner of Social Services, 75 A.D.2d 895, 428 N.Y.S.2d 291 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980)
• Decision Date: 27 May 1980
• Parties: In the Matter of Elsie COUGHLIN, Petitioner, v. The COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SERVICES of the State of New York et al., Respondents.

Page 291

428 N.Y.S.2d 291

75 A.D.2d 895

In the Matter of Elsie COUGHLIN, Petitioner, v. The COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SERVICES of the State of New York et al., Respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

May 27, 1980.

Behrens, Loew & Cullen, Melville (William M. Cullen, Melville, of counsel), for petitioner.

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen., New York City (Joseph F. Wagner and Maryellen Weinberg, Asst. Attys. Gen., New York City, of counsel), for respondent State Com'r.

Before HOPKINS, J. P., and TITONE, MANGANO and RABIN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM DECISION.

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the respondent State Commissioner of Social Services dated July 16, 1979 and made after a statutory fair hearing, which affirmed a determination of the local agency dated April 12, 1979 that petitioner was ineligible for medical assistance.

Petition granted to the extent that the determination is annulled, on the law, without costs or disbursements and the matter is remanded to the respondents for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.

Petitioner Elsie Coughlin, aged 87, a nursing home resident since late 1978, applied for medical assistance on January 22, 1979. Her application was denied on March 23, 1979 on the ground of "excess resources" in the sum of $3880. This figure was reached by treating a savings account in the names of both petitioner and her nephew Edward Reilly as a joint account and crediting one-half of the money in the account as of August 7, 1978 as a resource of the petitioner. When the nephew asked for a review of that decision, a recalculation was done. This time assistance was denied on the ground that the entire bank account belonged to petitioner.

Upon a hearing, the agency representative testified that the account was opened in July, 1968 in petitioner's name only. In April, 1971 the nephew was made a joint tenant. Additional sums were added by petitioner from time to time. No withdrawals were made until October, 1977, when petitioner entered an adult home. The withdrawals went only for petitioner's care. In July, 1978 petitioner was hospitalized. Upon her release in August, 1978 she entered a nursing home, likely as a permanent patient. One week later, her nephew withdrew $20,000 from the savings account, which did not go toward petitioner's care. The agency representative also stated that Mr. Reilly had not declared any of the interest on the account on his tax returns during any period. (No evidence was introduced to support this statement, but it was not denied.) The representative concluded that the withdrawal represented a purposeful transfer that was made to render petitioner's eligible for medical assistance.

Mr. Reilly's testimony with respect to the creation of the joint account was that petitioner told him she wanted him to have the money. At that time (1971) she was in good physical condition and was working. When he withdrew the $20,000 he believed that sum to be one-half of the money which belonged to him as a joint tenant.

The State Commissioner affirmed the local agency's denial of assistance, concluding that all funds were the sole property of petitioner and that the joint tenancy presumption (Banking Law, § 675) had been overcome on the basis of the credible evidence. In addition, the Commissioner concluded that petitioner had failed to overcome the presumption that she had transferred the $20,000 for the purpose of qualifying for medical assistance (Social Services Law, § 366, subd. 1, par. (e)).

Insofar as the State Commissioner premised her determination upon section 366 (subd. 1, par. (e)) of the Social Services Law to wit, a voluntary transfer, she relied in error. That statute and its accompanying regulation (18 NYCRR 360-8) have been held invalid "as applied to individuals who, but for...