Coughlin v. Ryan

• Decision Date: 31 October 1868
• Parties: MARGARET COUGHLIN et al., Respondents, v. EDMUND RYAN, Adm'r of the Estate of JOHANNA RYAN, deceased, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

43 Mo. 99

MARGARET COUGHLIN et al., Respondents,

v.EDMUND RYAN, Adm'r of the Estate of JOHANNA RYAN, deceased, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1868.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court.

Morris & Peabody, for appellant.

I. The personal property of the wife, in possession of the husband before her death, goes to her husband absolutely at her death, as at common law. (10 Mo. 368; 32 Mo. 532; 25 Mo. 367.)

II. At common law, marriage amounts to an absolute gift to the husband of all the goods, personal chattels, and other personal estate of which the wife is actually or beneficially possessed at that time in her own right, and of such other goods and chattels and personal estate as come to her during the marriage. (2 Story Eq. Jur., 2d ed., §§ 1402, 1403, 1405; 2 Kent Com., 10th ed., 135; 2 Blackst. Com. 435.)

III. The husband in this case was in possession of the money in question before his wife's death, because it issued from chattels real held by the wife, and the husband by law became possessed of the wife's chattels real upon marriage. (2 Kent Com. 133; 2 Blackst. Com. 434-5; Reeve Dom. Rel. 81, 94.)

IV. The husband was in possession of said money before the death of his wife, because the facts show that the same came to the possession of the wife during coverture, and the possession of the wife is the possession of the husband. (32 Mo. 532; 25 Mo. 367; 7 Pick. 65; 37 Ala. 536; 1 Hill., S. C., 191; 8 Porter, 36; 9 Vesey, Jr., 154.)

V. The husband was in possession of the money in question at the death of his wife, because the deposit of the same with a private individual constituted a bailment, and the possession of the bailee is the possession of the bailor. (Story Bailm. § 95; 1 Pars. Cont., 4th ed., 572-80; 32 Mo. 532; 8 Porter, 36.)

VI. This case does not come within the statute of 1857 (Sess. Acts 1857, p. 666), and, if it did, that statute could in no wise affect the rights of defendant to the money in question. The statutes of New York of 1848-9 (3 Rev. Stat. N. Y., 5th ed., p. 239, §§ 75-7) are as broad as the statute of 1857; and it is held that those statutes do not affect the husband's rights to his wife's personal property at her decease. (17 How. Pr. 243; 22 N. Y. 110; 24 N. Y. 372; 12 N. Y. 202; 35 Mo. 181; 17 Mo. 47.)

VII. The fact that the husband abandoned his wife cannot affect his rights to said money. (Bell v. Bell, 37 Ala. 536; Bell v. Bell, 36 Ala. 466; Molony v. Kennedy, 10 Sim. 254; Stewart v. Stewart, 7 Johns. Ch. 229-247; Code Ala. 325, § 5.)

VIII. From the facts of this case, it cannot be said that the money in question was for the separate and exclusive use and benefit of the wife, and that her husband was a mere trustee. (2 Story Eq. Jur., 2d ed., §§ 1380-4; 2 Swanst. 97-112; 9 Vesey, Jr., 369.)

IX. It is insisted that, upon the legal grounds above stated, the defendant is entitled to the money on deposit with Peter Richard Kenrick at the decease of his wife.

X. The court cannot consider the decision of the Circuit Court so far as it was adverse to plaintiffs, and to which they did not object, and from which they did not appeal. “It is only the objection which the appellant raises which can be considered an appeal. If a party admits to appeal he virtually assents to the judgment.” (Bell v. Holford, 1 Duer, 58; Glassner v. Wheaton, 2 E. D. Smith, 352; Beach v. Raymond, id. 496; 18 N. Y. 368.)

XI. There is no separate property shown by this case to have been in the wife, to constitute which, it must appear clearly and unequivocally, by express words, or by necessary implication. (Rider v. Hulse, 24 N. Y. 379; Walker v. Walker, 25 Mo. 367.) If the case showed a separate estate, and thus by law the husband became the trustee of his wife, her separate property undisposed of at her death would vest in the husband. The separate property, in such case, being a mere creature of equity for the benefit of the wife, ceases at her death, and the husband becomes the absolute owner of the property, discharged of any trust. (Molony v. Kennedy, 10 Sim. 254; 1 Am. Lead. Cas. in Eq. 401; Stewart v. Stewart, 7 Johns. Ch. 245.)

Bakewell & Farish, for respondents.

That portion of the property which was the proceeds of personal exertions of deceased, belonged to deceased, in her own right, by virtue of “An act for the benefit of married women.” (Sess. Acts 1857, p. 666; see also Gentry v. McReynolds, 12 Mo. 533.)

The money on deposit was a chose in action, and not in possession. It matters not that this money was the proceeds of rents. The lease was a chattel real, and as such might have been sold by the husband. He might have collected the rents; but the rent, when collected, became personal property--money; and when collected and deposited by the wife it became a chose in action, for which suit might have been brought; but he having failed to reduce it to possession in the lifetime of his wife, it did not survive to him. The money was deposited to the credit of the wife, and an action at law on the part of the husband would have been necessary to have obtained possession of it. This may have been inferred from the fact that it was not as husband, but as administrator of deceased, that he did and was enabled to get possession of it.

The property was not in possession of the wife at the time of her death. This is not a case of specific personal property in the hands of a bailee, but was money deposited in bank or with a banker. The identical money deposited, of course, was not in the hands of the depositee, and all that remained of it was an indebtedness for so much money deposited. It is not necessary that it should have been evidenced by a note, but it is the same thing, being an account, showing that the depositee owed the depositor a certain amount of money. It was a chose in action, beyond all controversy; and as such, according to the doctrine in Leakey v. Maupin, 10 Mo. 368, not having been reduced to possession by the husband during the life of his wife, he is not entitled to the same, but it goes to her heirs. (Clancy on Rights of Married Women, 111; Nash v. Nash, 2 Mad. Ch. 411; Gates v. Robinson, 6 Mees. & W. 422; Scarpellini v. Atcheson, 7 Ad. & Ell., N. S., 874; Latourette v. Williams, 1 Barb., S. C., 9; Schuyler v. Hoyle, 5 Johns. Ch. 210.)

BAKER, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

This case was submitted on an agreed statement of facts, the essential part of which is as follows:

“Johanna Ryan was married to Edward Ryan, January 6, 1850, and they continued to live together as man and wife about two or five years, when he abandoned her, and they never lived together afterward. At the time of their marriage she held certain leasehold property in the city of St. Louis, for which she paid ground rent and taxes, and individually collected and received the rents of houses, which she had put upon said property, up to the time of her death. Said lease expired on the first day of July, 1866. In the year 1852 said Johanna Ryan bought other leasehold property in the city of St. Louis, for which she paid ground rent and taxes on the same, and individually collected and received the rents for the same till the year 1860, at which time she sold the same for $500, and received the proceeds of said sale. The amounts realized by the deceased from the sale of said lease, and the rents received as aforesaid, she deposited, in her own name, with Peter Richard Kenrick, from time to time, and drew out on her own order portions of said moneys as she required the same. At the time of her death there remained so deposited to her credit the sum of thirteen hundred and five...