Coulston v. INTERNATIONAL BROTH. OF TEAMSTERS, ETC., 76-2788.

• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
• Writing for the Court: BRODERICK
• Citation: Coulston v. INTERNATIONAL BROTH. OF TEAMSTERS, ETC., 423 F.Supp. 882 (E.D. Pa. 1976)
• Decision Date: 15 December 1976
• Docket Number: No. 76-2788.,76-2788.
• Parties: Edward I. COULSTON v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN, AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, et al.

423 F. Supp. 882

Edward I. COULSTON v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN, AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, et al.

No. 76-2788.

United States District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania.

December 15, 1976.

Elliott D. Goldberg, Phoenixville, Pa., Lawrence Evans Grant, Paoli, Pa., for plaintiff.

Mark P. Muller, Philadelphia, Pa., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BRODERICK, District Judge.

This action was originally filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County, Pennsylvania. Defendants petitioned to remove the action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 and posted the bond required by 28 U.S.C. § 1446. In response, plaintiff filed a motion to remand the action to state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Therefore, the sole issue for determination is whether this case should be remanded to the state court.

The complaint alleges that plaintiff is an independent trucking hauler who was engaged in leasing vehicles to Kulp and Gordon, Inc. It further alleges that Kulp and Gordon, Inc., had entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement with the defendant, Local 384, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America (hereinafter "Union"). Plaintiff, in his complaint, seeks damages against the Union and its business agent, Ray J. Pesta, for the alleged common-law tort of malicious interference with plaintiff's contractual relationship with Kulp and Gordon, Inc.

The removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, provides in part:

(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.

Thus, in order to remove a civil action from the state court pursuant to this statute, the District Court of the United States must have original jurisdiction of the action.

The defendants, in their Amended Petition for Removal, assert that the plaintiff's claim "is one over which the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has original and exclusive jurisdiction under Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 185, and/or § 303 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 187 . .." Plaintiff's complaint makes no mention of any such cause of action. Defendants contend, however, that the facts pleaded in the complaint "allege a violation of the `unfair labor practice' provisions, more specifically the secondary boycott provisions contained in Section (8)(b)(4)(i)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act 29 U.S.C. § 158."

It is well established that federal question jurisdiction must appear on the face of the complaint in order to remove a legal action form the state court to the federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. La Chemise Lacoste v. Alligator Co., Inc., 506 F.2d 339, 343 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 937, 95 S.Ct. 1666, 44 L.Ed.2d 94 (1975). "`The controversy must be disclosed upon the face of the complaint, unaided by the answer or by the petition for removal.'" Id. at 344, citing Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 57 S.Ct. 96, 98, 81 L.Ed. 70 (1936). See also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 415 U.S. 125, 94 S.Ct. 1002, 1004, 39 L.Ed.2d 209 (1974). "If the federal question arises only as a defense . . . removal jurisdiction will not exist." PAAC v. Rizzo, 502 F.2d 306, 313 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1108, 95 S.Ct. 780, 42 L.Ed.2d 804 (1975).

Looking to the complaint, this Court finds that plaintiff's claim is based solely upon a state cause of action, the common-law tort of malicious interference with a contract. We find United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966) highly persuasive authority. In that case, one of plaintiff's allegations against the defendant union was that of "`unlawful conspiracy and an unlawful boycott aimed at him . . . to maliciously, wantonly and willfully interfere with his contract of employment and with his contract of haulage.'" Id. at 1136. In holding that pendent jurisdiction over this claim was proper, the Court stated that while "the allowable scope of the state claim implicates the federal doctrine of pre-emption . . . this interrelationship does not create statutory federal question jurisdiction." Id. at 1139. (emphasis...