Coulter v. Lindsay, 627 WDA 2016

Citation159 A.3d 947
Decision Date07 April 2017
Docket NumberNo. 627 WDA 2016,627 WDA 2016
Parties Jean COULTER, Appellant v. Alexander H. LINDSAY, Jr., Lindsay Law Firm, Joseph Victor Charlton and Patricia Lindsay, Appellees
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania

Jean Coulter, appellant, pro se.

David J. Rosenberg, Pittsburgh, for appellees.

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., OLSON and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.

OPINION PER CURIAM:

Serial Appellant, Jean Coulter, appeals pro se from the order entered on April 1, 2016. In this case, we hold that Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 233.1 is not void for vagueness under the federal and state constitutions and that our Supreme Court had the authority under the Pennsylvania Constitution to promulgate Rule 233.1. We also hold that Appellant's repeated, frivolous appeals to this Court warrant the awarding of attorney's fees and issuance of a filing injunction. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion and the accompanying order.

The relevant factual background and procedural history of this case are as follows. On May 11, 2007, Appellant pled nolo contendere to aggravated assault1 for the brutal abuse of her minor daughter. See Commonwealth v. Coulter , CP–10–CR–0000727–2006 (C.C.P. Butler). As a result of the heinous abuse of her daughter, the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County terminated Appellant's parental rights as to her daughter. See In the Interest of A.C. , CP–10–DP–0000051–2006 (C.C.P. Butler). Alexander H. Lindsay, Jr., Lindsay Law Firm, Joseph Victor Charlton, and Patricia Lindsay (collectively "Appellees") represented Appellant during both the criminal and termination proceedings.

Over the ensuring decade, Appellant filed dozens of actions in both the state and federal courts of this Commonwealth. For example, on March 2, 2015, Appellant filed a complaint against Appellees in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. In that complaint, Appellant "allege[d] that [Appellees] conspired with one another to deny her [ ] due process in those court proceedings." Coulter v. Lindsay , 2015 WL 11117718, *1 (W.D.Pa. Mar. 6, 2015) (hereinafter " Lindsay "). That complaint was dismissed with prejudice. See id.

On May 4, 2015, Appellant instituted the instant action in the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County. In her complaint, Appellant conceded that she was raising the same exact claims that she raised in Lindsay . On December 22, 2015, Appellant filed a motion seeking the trial court's recusal. Appellant's recusal motion was denied that same day. On February 8, 2016, Appellant filed her fifth amended complaint. On March 11, 2016, Appellees filed preliminary objections. In their preliminary objections, Appellees argued that Appellant's claims were barred by res judicata . Moreover, Appellees argued that, to the extent Appellant's claims were not barred by res judicata , the trial court should dismiss the complaint under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 233.1 (frivolous actions filed by pro se plaintiffs). Finally, Appellees argued that Appellant failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. On March 28, 2016, Appellant filed preliminary objections to Appellees' preliminary objections.

The trial court heard argument on Appellant's and Appellees' preliminary objections on April 1, 2016. That same day, the trial court overruled Appellant's preliminary objections, sustained Appellees' preliminary objections, and dismissed Appellant's complaint. This timely appeal followed.2 The appeal of this case was argued before this Court on January 10, 2017. On January 19, 2017, Appellant filed a motion seeking the recusal of all three members of this panel.

Appellant presents five issues for our review:

1. [Did the trial court err by denying Appellant's recusal motion?
2. Did the trial court err by concluding that Appellant's claims were barred by res judicata and by dismissing her complaint pursuant to Rule 233.1 ?
3. Does Rule 233.1 violate the United States and Pennsylvania constitutions?
4. Did the trial court err in concluding that Appellant's claims were barred by the statute of limitations?
5. Did the trial court err in concluding that Appellant failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted?]

Appellant's Brief at 4–5.3

Preliminarily, we must consider Appellant's recusal motion. Appellant argues that all three members of this panel should recuse from this case because the panel was not randomly assigned. She also argues that all three members of this panel are biased against her. This argument is waived. "A party seeking recusal or disqualification is required to raise the objection at the earliest possible moment, or that party will suffer the consequence of being time barred." In re Lokuta , 608 Pa. 223, 11 A.3d 427, 437 (2011) (internal alterations and citation omitted). In this case, the earliest opportunity to raise the recusal issue was at oral argument. Appellant, however, did not move for recusal until nine days after this case was argued. Accordingly, Appellant waived any argument related to the recusal of the three members of this panel.

Moreover, even if Appellant preserved her recusal claim, it is frivolous. This case was assigned to this panel pursuant to 210 Pa.Code § 65.5(C)(1)(a). Specifically, a member of this Court originally assigned to hear this case became unavailable to participate in the disposition of this case and the President Judge appointed a replacement.4 Accordingly, all relevant internal operating procedures regarding panel composition were followed with respect to this case.

As to Appellant's claims of bias, when
considering a recusal request, the jurist must first make a conscientious determination of his or her ability to assess the case in an impartial manner, free of personal bias or interest in the outcome. The jurist must then consider whether his or her continued involvement in the case creates an appearance of impropriety and/or would tend to undermine public confidence in the judiciary.

Commonwealth v. Brown , 141 A.3d 491, 498 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted).

All three members of this panel individually determined that they are capable of assessing the case in an impartial manner, free of personal bias. Moreover, all three members of this panel individually determined that their involvement in this case does not create the appearance of impropriety and will not undermine public confidence in the judiciary. Although all three judges of this panel are familiar with Appellant, that fact does not necessitate recusal. Cf. Commonwealth v. Abu–Jamal , 553 Pa. 485, 720 A.2d 79, 90 (1998) (Familiarity with the defendant and prior adverse rulings do not require recusal). Moreover, as discussed infra , there are few (if any) members of this Court who are unfamiliar with Appellant and her repeated, vexatious, and frivolous litigation. Accordingly, we deny Appellant's recusal motion directed at the members of this panel.

Turning to the merits of the issues raised by Appellant, she first argues that the trial court erred in denying her recusal motion. We review "the trial court's denial of the recusal motion for abuse of discretion." Becker v. M.S. Reilly, Inc. , 123 A.3d 776, 778 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). The trial court was required to apply the same standard that the members of this panel applied when ruling on Appellant's recusal motion. See Brown , 141 A.3d at 498 (citation omitted).

Appellant's claims of bias, and the appearance of bias, are frivolous. Appellant argues that the trial court took all necessary actions in order to get its desired result. The record belies this assertion. The trial court acted with great restraint in permitting Appellant to continually amend her frivolous complaint and held a hearing on the parties' respective preliminary objections. Instead of imposing harsh sanctions for her violations of the rules of civil procedure, the trial court instead simply overruled Appellant's preliminary objections and sustained Appellees' preliminary objections. We ascertain no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of Appellant's recusal motion.

In her second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her complaint pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 233.1, which provides, in relevant part:

Upon the commencement of any action filed by a pro se plaintiff in the court of common pleas, a defendant may file a motion to dismiss the action on the basis that
(1) the pro se plaintiff is alleging the same or related claims which the pro se plaintiff raised in a prior action against the same or related defendants, and
(2) these claims have already been resolved pursuant to a written settlement agreement or a court proceeding.

Pa.R.C.P. 233.1(a). "To the extent that the question presented involves interpretation of rules of civil procedure, our standard of review is de novo . To the extent that this question involves an exercise of the trial court's discretion in granting a motion to dismiss, our standard of review is abuse of discretion." Coulter v. Ramsden , 94 A.3d 1080, 1086 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied , 631 Pa. 719, 110 A.3d 998 ( 2014) (hereinafter " Ramsden III ").

As this Court has explained, Rule 233.1 does not
mandate the technical identity of parties or claims imposed by res judicata or collateral estoppel; rather, it merely requires that the parties and the claims raised in the current action be "related" to those in the prior action and that those prior claims have been "resolved." These two terms are noteworthy in their omission of the technical precision otherwise associated with claim and issue preclusion; whereas parties and/or claims are to be "identical" under the purview of those doctrines, Rule 233.1 requires only that they be sufficiently related to inform the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, whether the plaintiff's claim has in fact been
...

To continue reading

Request your trial
8 cases
  • Coulter v. Coulter
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania
    • April 25, 2023
    ...just six years ago “[Jean's] conduct is the definition of vexatious” and highlighted Jean's “repeated abuse of our judicial system.” Coulter, 159 A.3d at 954. We caution Jean, explained more below, she cannot re-litigate state law estate claims not decided in her favor. And Jean cannot stat......
  • Gross v. Mintz
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Superior Court
    • October 13, 2022
    ...and vexatious litigation will justify an order prohibiting further filings without permission of the court." Coulter v. Lindsay , 159 A.3d 947, 956 (Pa. Super. 2017) (quoting Chipps v. U.S.D.C. for the M.D. of Pa. , 882 F.2d 72, 73 (3d Cir. 1989) ). Pennsylvania Appellate Courts have issued......
  • Brown v. Quest Diagnostics Clinical Labs., Inc., 1907 MDA 2017
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Superior Court
    • May 1, 2019
    ...of the trial court's discretion in granting a motion to dismiss, our standard of review is abuse of discretion." Coulter v. Lindsay , 159 A.3d 947, 952 (Pa.Super. 2017), appeal denied , 643 Pa. 125, 172 A.3d 1108 (2017), cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S.Ct. 2576, 201 L.Ed.2d 293 (2018), ......
  • Scheib v. Friedman
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
    • November 2, 2023
    ... ... ranging from 1997 to 2016 ...          In July ... 2022, Respondent filed the ... Court.[6] See Coulter v. Lindsay, 159 A.3d ... 947, 954 (Pa. Super. 2017) (where pro se ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT