Council of Alternative Political Parties v. Hooks, 97-5398.
| Decision Date | 04 August 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-5398.,97-5398. |
| Citation | 121 F.3d 876 |
| Parties | COUNCIL OF ALTERNATIVE POLITICAL PARTIES; Green Party of New Jersey; Natural Law Party; NJ Conservative Party; NJ Libertarian Party; U.S. Taxpayers Party of New Jersey; Albert LaRotonda; Gary Novosielski; Madelyn Hoffman; Jim Mohn; Mary Jo Christian; Jeffrey M. Levine; Tom Blomquist; Bernard Sobolewski; Sal Duscio; Anne Stommel; Leonard Flynn; John Paff; Michael Buoncristiano; Emerson Ellett; Charles Novins; Lowell T. Patterson; Eugene R. Christian; Scott Jones; Richard S. Hester, Sr.; Barbara Hester; Austin S. Lett; Arnold Kokans; Leona Lavone; Shirley Boncheff; Christian Zegler; Victoria Spruiell; Harley Tyler, Appellants, v. Lonna R. HOOKS, Secretary of State of the State of New Jersey, in her Official Capacity, and her Successors. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
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Lenora M. Lapidus (Argued), David R. Rocah, American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey, Newark, NJ, for Appellants.
Peter Verniero, Attorney General of New Jersey, Joseph L. Yannotti, Assistant Attorney General, Donna Kelly (Argued), Senior Deputy Attorney General, Trenton, NJ, for Appellee.
Before: STAPLETON, SCIRICA and McKEE, Circuit Judges.
This appeal requires us to review the district court's denial of preliminary injunctive relief. The district court concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims and found that they would be irreparably harmed in the absence of preliminary relief. However, the court also found that the defendant would be harmed even more severely were preliminary relief to be granted and that the public interest disfavored such relief. Although our standard of review is quite deferential, we will reverse the district court. We conclude that the district court clearly erred in finding that preliminary injunctive relief would inject confusion and disarray into New Jersey's 1997 electoral process and that the court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs preliminary relief.
There are multiple plaintiffs in this case. The Council of Alternative Political Parties is an unincorporated association representing five New Jersey "alternative political parties:" the Green Party, the Natural Law Party, the Conservative Party, the Libertarian Party, and the U.S. Taxpayers Party.1 Each of these five alternative political parties is also a plaintiff. In addition, there are twenty-seven individual plaintiffs, all of whom are either candidates desiring to run for state office as nominees of these alternative parties or are supporters of these parties. Some of the plaintiff candidates have qualified for a place on the November 4, 1997 general election ballot while others have tried to do so but failed.
Plaintiffs initiated this action on April 8, 1997. In it they challenge the constitutionality of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:13-9, which requires all candidates seeking placement on New Jersey's general election ballot to file nominating petitions no later than 54 days prior to the primary election. Valid nominating petitions must be signed by a number of registered voters specified by law. The number of signatures required depends on the office being sought. For example, alternative party candidates for governor must file petitions signed by at least 800 registered voters. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:13-5. Only 100 signatures are required for alternative party candidates for State Senate; candidates for the General Assembly who file joint petitions need collect just 50 signatures. See id. Alternative political parties may only nominate candidates through the petition procedure. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:13-1.
In accordance with state law, the primary election this year was held on June 3, 1997. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:2-1. Nominating petitions and signatures had to be filed with defendant, the Secretary of State, no later than 54 days prior to this date, which was April 10, 1997. Plaintiffs contend that the April filing date imposes an unconstitutional burden on their right of free association, right to vote, and right to equal protection of the laws.
The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the Secretary from refusing to accept their nominating petitions if submitted on or before July 28, 1997. In effect, they sought an extension — for candidates of alternative political parties — of the deadline for collecting signatures and filing nominating petitions. The date July 28, 1997 was not chosen at random. It is the 99th day preceding the general election and is, therefore, the date that nominating petitions for alternative party candidates for president would be due if this were a presidential election year. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:13-9.
On June 16 the district court held a hearing on the plaintiffs' motion and then denied them relief. The court found that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on the merits of their claim that New Jersey's April filing deadline imposes an unconstitutional burden on the rights of alternative political parties, their candidates, and voters who might support them. It also found that, without a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm, because they would be unable to fully exercise their voting and associational rights. However, the court also declared that granting preliminary relief at this late date would inject disorder and disarray into the electoral process and unduly interfere with the November 1997 general election. Hence, the court concluded that the Secretary would be more harmed from entry of a preliminary injunction than the plaintiffs would be from denial of relief. It also believed the public interest in a fair and orderly 1997 election disfavored granting plaintiffs relief.
Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal and sought expedited review and an injunction pending appeal. We expedited the appeal and heard oral argument on July 21. That same day we entered an order reversing the district court and directing it to enter a preliminary injunction enjoining the Secretary from refusing to accept nominating petitions submitted by named candidate plaintiffs and candidates of the plaintiff alternative political parties on or before July 28, 1997. This opinion expresses our reasons for that action.2
Our cases recognize four factors to be considered in assessing a motion for a preliminary injunction. They are: (1) whether the movant has shown a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant will be irreparably injured by denial of relief; (3) whether granting preliminary relief will result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) whether granting the preliminary relief will be in the public interest. See American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey v. Black Horse Pike Regional Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1477 n. 2 (3d Cir.1996) (in banc). Here, all four factors favor granting relief.
We agree with the district court that the plaintiffs established a likelihood of success on the merits. In Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983), the Supreme Court invalidated Ohio's requirement that candidates for president desiring a place on that state's general election ballot had to file nominating petitions and statements of candidacy by March 20 of the election year. The challenge was brought by John Anderson, who declared his 1980 independent candidacy for president on April 24 of that year, by which time it was too late for him to qualify for Ohio's November ballot. Anderson claimed that Ohio's early filing deadline unconstitutionally burdened the voting and associational rights of himself and his supporters.
In assessing these claims, the Court explained that each provision of a state's election code inevitably affects the right of association and the right to vote. Id. at 788, 103 S.Ct. at 1569-70. However, "`as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.'" Id. (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 1279, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974)). Thus, in assessing the merits of a constitutional challenge to a specific provision of a state's election laws, a court must carefully weigh competing factors.
It must first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It then must identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, the Court must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of those interests; it also must consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights.
Id. at 789, 103 S.Ct. at 1570.
When we consider the character and magnitude of the injuries to plaintiffs' rights resulting from New Jersey's April 10 filing deadline, we discover that the plaintiffs suffer from two of the same injuries asserted in Anderson. First, as the Court explained, issues and candidates do not remain static over the course of an election campaign. Id. at 790, 103 S.Ct. at 1571. By depriving alternative political parties of the opportunity to recruit and nominate candidates after early April, New Jersey's filing deadline substantially restricts the abilities of these parties and their supporters to react to events occurring after April 10. In particular, New Jersey's Democrats and Republicans can base their nomination decisions on everything that precedes the June 4 primary, but the candidate-selection calculations of alternative political parties must cease 54 days earlier. Moreover, as was true in Anderson, voters are burdened by the deadline's preclusion of the possibility of independent...
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