Council of Ins. Agents & Brokers v. Juarbe-Jimenez, No. CIV. 04-1556(JAF).
| Decision Date | 30 March 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV. 04-1556(JAF). |
| Parties | The COUNCIL OF INSURANCE AGENTS & BROKERS, Plaintiff, v. Dorelisse JUARBE-JIMENEZ, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Guillermo J. Ramos-Luina, Rivera, Tulla & Ferrer, Hato Rey, PR, PHV Daniel S. Blynn, PHV Scott A. Sinder, Collier Shannon Scott PLLC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.
Leila Alvarado-Gonzalez, Lag Legal Partners & Services, Noel Gonzalez-Miranda, Noel S. Gonzalez Miranda Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Defendant.
Plaintiff, Council of Insurance Agents + Brokers, brings the present action against Defendant, Dorelisse Juarbe-Jiménez, the Insurance Commissioner of Puerto Rico, alleging violations under the Privileges and Immunities Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. Docket Document No. 1. Plaintiff seeks, inter alia, declaratory and injunction relief. Id.
Defendant moves for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring the present complaint. Docket Document No. 15. Plaintiff opposes the motion and moves for summary judgment. Docket Document No. 16. Defendant filed an opposition to Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment, Docket Document No. 20, and a separate response to Plaintiff's opposition to Defendant's summary judgment motion. Docket Document No. 22. Plaintiff filed a reply to Defendant's opposition to its cross-motion for summary judgment. Docket Document No. 25.
We derive the following factual summary from Plaintiff's complaint, the statements of facts submitted by Defendant in its motion for summary judgment and by Plaintiff in its opposition and cross-motion for summary judgment. Docket Document Nos. 1, 15, 16.
Plaintiff is a trade organization founded in 1913, whose members are comprised of over 300 commercial insurance agencies and brokerage firms based outside of Puerto Rico. Plaintiff's members place over $80 Billion annually in insurance premiums, which represents over three-quarters of the premiums placed in the United States commercial marketplace. Plaintiff also represents its members' individual officers, directors, principals, and employees, who are licensed by the Office of the Insurance Commissioner of Puerto Rico to act as nonresident insurance agents and brokers. These agents and brokers reside outside of Puerto Rico, but regularly sell insurance covering risks located partially or entirely within the Commonwealth.
Defendant is the Insurance Commissioner of Puerto Rico and is statutorily charged with administering the insurance laws in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico under 26 P.R. LAWS ANN. § 203 (1997 & Supp.2001).
Under Puerto Rico law, insurance agents and brokers must be licensed by the Office of the Commissioner of Insurance of Puerto Rico. Insurers are prohibited from effectuating "any direct insurance upon or relative to any person, property, or other subject of insurance resident, located, or to be performed in Puerto Rico, except through a licensed agent of such insurer residing in Puerto Rico." 26 P.R. LAWS ANN. § 329(1). Those policies effectuated must be countersigned by the insurer's manager, general agent or licensed agent who resides in Puerto Rico. Id. § 329(2). Licensed nonresident agents and brokers may not solicit insurance in Puerto Rico, but are permitted to place insurance which has been directly procured from the insured outside of Puerto Rico. Id. § 927(1). Licensed nonresident insurance agents and brokers may only place insurance in Puerto Rico through a licensed resident agent or broker and such policies or contracts of insurance must be countersigned by a licensed Puerto Rico resident agent. Id. § 927(2).
Plaintiff challenges the statutes at issue under the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, arguing that the Puerto Rico statutes unlawfully discriminate solely on the basis of their residency. Docket Document No. 1. Plaintiff filed a complaint on June 15, 2004, requesting that we declare the disputed statutes unconstitutional and enjoin the Insurance Commissioner of Puerto Rico from taking any further action pursuant to these provisions. Docket Document No. 1. On January 18, 2005, Defendant moved for summary judgment claiming that Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue these claims on behalf of its members. Docket Document No. 15. On January 31, 2005, Plaintiff filed a joint opposition and a cross-motion for summary judgment. Docket Document No. 16. On March 7, 2005, Defendant filed an opposition to Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment, Docket Document No. 20, and on March 10, 2005, filed a response to Plaintiff's opposition to Defendant's summary judgment motion. Docket Document No. 22. Plaintiff filed a reply to Defendant's opposition to its cross-motion for summary judgment. Docket Document No. 25. We consider the parties' dispositive motions in turn.
Motion for Summary Judgment Standard under Rule 56(c)
The standard for summary judgment is straightforward and well-established. A district court should grant a motion for summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, and answers to the interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56©. A factual dispute is "genuine" if it could be resolved in favor of either party, and "material" if it potentially affects the outcome of the case. Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir.2004).
The moving party carries the burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; however the burden "may be discharged by showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 331, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The burden has two components: (1) an initial burden of production, which shifts to the nonmoving party if satisfied by the moving party; and (2) an ultimate burden of persuasion, which always remains on the moving party. See id. at 331.
The non-moving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleadings, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). Summary judgment exists "to pierce the boilerplate of the pleadings and assess the proof in order to determine the need for trial." Euromodas, Inc. v. Zanella, 368 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir.2004) (citing Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 794 (1st Cir.1992)).
Defendant argues that we should dismiss Plaintiff's case, as Plaintiff lacks Article III standing. Docket Document No. 15. Pursuant to Article III of the Constitution, federal courts only have jurisdiction over actual cases or controversies. See U.S. CONST. art. III; Am. Postal Workers Union v. Frank, 968 F.2d 1373, 1374 (1st Cir.1992). "[S]tanding... can be one of the controlling elements in the definition of a case or controversy under Article III," ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 613, 109 S.Ct. 2037, 104 L.Ed.2d 696 (1989), and "[s]tanding `is perhaps the most important of [the jurisdictional] doctrines.'" FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990) (internal citation omitted). "Standing is a `threshold question in every federal case, determining the power of the court to entertain the suit.'" N.H. Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Gardner, 99 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir.1996)(quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)). "If a party lacks standing to bring a matter before the court, the court lacks jurisdiction to decide the merits of the underlying case." United States v. AVX Corp., 962 F.2d 108, 113 (1st Cir.1992). "[I]t is the burden of the `party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor' `clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute.'" FW/PBS, Inc., 493 U.S. at 231, 110 S.Ct. 596 (internal citations omitted).
"The `irreducible constitutional minimum of standing' contains three requirements." Donahue v. City of Boston, 304 F.3d 110, 115 (1st Cir.2002) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). First, a plaintiff must show that he has "`suffered or is threatened by injury in fact to a cognizable interest.'" Id. (quoting Save Our Heritage, Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 269 F.3d 49, 55 (1st Cir.2001)). Second, the asserted injury must be "(a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Third, the plaintiff must show that it is likely and not just speculative, that "the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." Id. at 561.
"Associational," or "representational," standing permits organizations, in certain circumstances, to premise standing entirely upon injuries suffered by their members. Am. Postal Workers Union, 968 F.2d at 1374. "This doctrine does not eliminate the constitutional requirement of a live case or controversy between the parties, but it recognizes that injury to an organization's members may satisfy Article III and allow the organization to litigate in federal court on their behalf." Id. (citing UAW v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 281, 106 S.Ct. 2523, 91 L.Ed.2d 228 (1986)).
Courts employ a tripartite test to evaluate associational standing. Id. The plaintiff association must show that "(a) at least one of its members possesses standing to sue in his or her own right — i.e., that the member can satisfy the three...
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