Counsel v. Dow
Decision Date | 28 May 1987 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. N-85-577 (AHN). |
Citation | 666 F. Supp. 366 |
Parties | Donnell COUNSEL v. John DOW, Superintendent of the New Haven Public Schools; New Haven Board of Education; Department of Education, State of Connecticut; Gerald Tirozzi; Commissioner of Education of the State of Connecticut; and Joyce C. Driskell, Hearing Officer, Connecticut Department of Education. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
Legal Services Organization, Jerome N. Frank, New Haven, Conn., for plaintiff.
John Whelan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Hartford, Conn., Lubbie Harper, New Haven, Conn., for defendant.
RULING ON MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES
The plaintiff, a young adult who is mildly retarded, brought suit on November 22, 1985, alleging a right to education under the Education for the Handicapped Act ("EHA"), 20 U.S.C. Section 1400 et seq., and alleging a denial of due process and a violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. Section 701 et seq. The defendants fall into two groupings: the state defendants, comprised of the Connecticut Department of Education and various state officials; and the local defendants, comprised of the New Haven Board of Education and the superintendent of New Haven public schools. Both the state and local defendants answered the complaint. After negotiations, a consent decree was signed by all parties and entered by the court on July 18, 1986. The decree granted the plaintiff two years of compensatory education at the expense of the state defendants.
On November 3, 1986, the plaintiff filed for attorneys' fees under the Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986 ("HCPA"), Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796, which amended section 615(e)(4) of the EHA as follows:
20 U.S.C. Section 1415(e)(4). President Reagan signed the HCPA into law on August 5, 1986; the provision for attorneys' fees was made retroactive to July 3, 1984, a date immediately before the United States Supreme Court decided Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984). In Smith, the Court found that attorneys' fees are not recoverable under the EHA. Id. at 1005, 104 S.Ct. at 3464. In enacting the HCPA, Congress specifically intended to negate the holding in Smith. See generally S. Rep. No. 112, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 2-3 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1798, 1799-1800. However, at the time the court entered the consent decree in the instant action, the plaintiff was precluded by Smith from seeking attorneys' fees, amounting to $2,633, under the EHA.
Id. at 17, 101 S.Ct. at 1540. The Court found that nothing in the Act's language and structure supported the conclusion that the Act was created pursuant to Congress' power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment: "It is a mere federal-state funding statute." Id. at 18, 101 S.Ct. at 1540.
The defendants argue that the contract analogy in Pennhurst I applies with equal force to the EHA. Under this reasoning, Congress breached the contract when it authorized retroactive attorneys' fees in the HCPA: There was no mutual assent to imposition of such an obligation on the state at the time the contract was formed. The defendants' reliance on Pennhurst I is misplaced, however. The Pennhurst I Court explicitly excluded discussion of Congress' authority to impose affirmative obligations on the states under the spending power or the Fourteenth Amendment. 451 U.S. at 10-11, 101 S.Ct. at 1536. The Court focused on Congressional intent as to an ambiguity in the Act, not on retroactive legislation. Thus, the defendants may not rely on Pennhurst I for the proposition that Congress may never pass retroactive legislation under its spending power. The court concludes that even if the EHA were passed solely under the spending power, the retroactive provisions of the HCPA do not exceed Congress' power under the circumstances in this case.
Moreover, in drawing the contract analogy between the Act and the EHA, the defendants presuppose that Congress enacted the EHA entirely under its spending power. However, language in the EHA and in its legislative history demonstrates that the legislation rests, at least partially, on a Fourteenth Amendment underpinning. Paragraph 9 of Congress' Findings states: "It is in the national interest that the Federal Government assist State and local efforts to provide programs to meet the educational needs of handicapped children in order to assure equal protection of the law." 20 U.S.C. Section 1400(b)(9) (emphasis added). There is no comparable language in the legislation involved in Pennhurst I. The legislative history of the EHA contains the following:
The Committee rejects the argument that the Federal Government should only mandate services to handicapped children if, in fact, funds are appropriated in sufficient amounts to cover the full cost of this education. The Committee recognizes the State's sic; States' primary responsibility to uphold the constitution of the United States and their own State Constitutions and State laws as well as the Congress' own responsibility under the 14th Amendment to assure equal protection of the law.
S. Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1425, 1446 (emphasis added). Congressional intent could not be more clear that the EHA, and the HCPA by implication, was enacted pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.2
The standard of review for economic legislation enacted under the Fourteenth Amendment is the rational basis test.
The strong deference accorded legislation in the field of national economic policy is no less applicable when that legislation is applied retroactively. Provided that the retroactive application of a statute is supported by a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by a rational means, judgments about the wisdom of such legislation remain within the exclusive province of the legislative and executive branches....
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729, 104 S.Ct. 2709, 2717, 81 L.Ed.2d 601 (1984) (citing Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15-16, 96 S.Ct. 2882, 2892, 49 L.Ed.2d 752 (1976)). It is not difficult to conclude that Congress' decision to allow retroactive awards of attorneys' fees under the EHA was rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose: Congress wished that "a parent or legal representative of a handicapped child should be free to select and be represented by the attorney of his/her choice." S. Rep. No. 112, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News 1798, 1803. Thus, the court finds that the provision of the HCPA making attorneys' fees retroactive is constitutional.3
The issue as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to attorneys' fees from the local defendants as well as from the state defendants is more difficult. On the one hand, it is undisputed that the plaintiff obtained the relief he sought. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). On the...
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Counsel v. Dow
...motion for attorney's fees against both the Connecticut and New Haven defendants, awarding Counsel $2,633 in fees. 2 Counsel v. Dow, 666 F.Supp. 366 (D.Conn.1987). The court concluded that HCPA Sec. 5 was a valid exercise of Congress' power under both the Spending clause and the Fourteenth ......
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