Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Broan Nutone, LLC
| Docket Number | 8:20-CV-1356 |
| Decision Date | 07 November 2023 |
| Parties | COUNTRY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY doing business as MiddleOak, Plaintiff, v. BROAN NUTONE, LLC, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
APPEARANCES:
RUPP PFALZGRAF LLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
DE LUCA LEVINE LLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
O'CONNOR, O'CONNOR LAW FIRM
Attorneys for Defendant
OF COUNSEL:
PHILLIP A. OSWALD, ESQ.
JEFFREY M. ZIELINSKI, ESQ.
KENNETH TODD LEVINE, ESQ.
THADDEUS S. KIRK, ESQ.
DENNIS A. FIRST, ESQ.
ELIZABETH J. GROGAN, ESQ.
ORDER ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE
This case is set for a jury trial on Monday, November 13, 2023, at 9:30 a.m. in Utica, New York. Plaintiff, Country Mutual Insurance Company (“Country Mutual” or “plaintiff') and defendant, Broan Nutone, LLC (“Broan” or “defendant”) have moved in limine to exclude certain evidence in advance of trial. Dkt. Nos. 44, 45, 59. Both parties have opposed their counterpart's motions. Dkt. Nos. 61, 62.
This action arises from a fire that occurred at an apartment building owned by Country Mutual's insured, Chason Management, LLC. See Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff brought suit against Broan, arguing that the fire was caused by the malfunctioning of an exhaust fan manufactured by defendant. See Id. Plaintiff originally asserted claims against defendant for strict products liability, negligence, and breach of warranties. See id. However, only plaintiffs strict products liability claim remains for trial.[1] See Dkt. No. 60 at 2.[2]
A party may seek a ruling on the admissibility of certain anticipated evidence by filing a motion in limine. Walker v. Schult, 365 F.Supp.3d 266, 275 (N.D.N.Y. 2019) ( the “term is used in the broad sense to refer to any motion, whether made before or during trial, to exclude anticipated prejudicial evidence before the evidence is actually offered”). “Evidence should be excluded on a motion in limine only when the evidence is clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds.” Id. “The movant has the burden of establishing that the evidence is not admissible for any purpose.” Id. “The trial judge may reserve judgment on a motion in limine until trial to ensure the motion is considered in the proper factual context.” Id. Finally, “[t]he court's ruling . . . is subject to change when the case unfolds.” Id.
Country Mutual's two motions in limine seek to exclude certain expert witness testimony and preclude cumulative expert witness testimony. See Dkt. Nos. 44, 59. Broan's motion in limine seeks to preclude plaintiff from offering into evidence or referring to prior incidents involving exhaust fans. Dkt. No. 45.
As noted supra, the sole claim remaining for trial is strict products liability. “Under New York law, a manufacturer who places into the stream of commerce a defective product which causes injury may be held strictly liable.” Reynolds-Sitzer v. EISAI, Inc., 586 F.Supp.3d 123, 129 (N.D.N.Y. 2022) (cleaned up). There are three types of product defects recognized under New York law: (1) a manufacturing defect; (2) a design defect; and (3) a warning defect. Id. (citing McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 154-55 (2d Cir. 1997)).
In the present matter, Country Mutual asserts that the exhaust fan at issue in this case was: (1) defectively manufactured because its internal temperature control failed to activate and prevent an overheating incident that led to the fire; and (2) defectively designed because its internal temperature control was in a location that may not allow it to detect overheating events. See Dkt. No. 57 at 8.
To establish a strict products liability claim based on a manufacturing defect, a plaintiff “must prove: (1) a defect which existed at the time the product left the defendant's control, due to an error in the manufacturing process; (2) a causal connection between the defect and the injury; and (3) damages.” Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Electrolux Home Prod., Inc., 440 F.Supp.3d 211, 219 (W.D.N.Y. 2020) (citation omitted).
To prevail on a strict products liability claim predicted on a design defect, a plaintiff “must show: (1) the product as designed posed a substantial likelihood of harm; (2) it was feasible to design the product in a safer manner; and (3) the defective design was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injury.” Reynolds-Sitzer, 586 F.Supp.3d at 129-30 (citation omitted).
Country Mutual's first motion seeks to preclude Broan's experts, James Smolka (“Smolka”) and Dennis Scardino (“Scardino”), from providing certain testimony at trial. See Dkt. No. 44-1. Specifically, plaintiff takes issue with the experts' conclusion, outlined in their joint report, that the fire resulted from Long-Term, Low-Temperature Ignition of Wood (“LTLTIW”). Id. at 5-6. The phenomenon of LTLTIW occurs when a heating source in close proximity to wood causes the wood to char, lowering the ignition temperature of the wood and resulting in self-ignition. Dkt. No. 62 at 9. Plaintiff asserts that the experts should be precluded from providing testimony related to LTLTIW because the phenomenon is “scientifically unproven, unpredictable, and untested,” and “its application to the facts of this case is equally unreliable and questionable.” Dkt. No. 44-1 at 6, 17.
In opposition, Broan argues that LTLTIW is a well-documented scientific phenomenon that has been observed by fire investigators for decades. Dkt. No. 62 at 8. In fact, defendant maintains that Scardino “has personally observed LTLTIW on multiple occasions in his decades as a fire investigator.” Id. at 11. Moreover, defendant asserts that Smolka and Scardino reliability applied LTLTIW to the relevant facts and concluded that the phenomenon caused the fire at issue in this case. Id. at 15-16.
The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Upstate Jobs Party v. Kosinski, 559 F.Supp.3d 93, 121 (N.D.N.Y. 2021). Pursuant to Rule 702, an expert is permitted to testify so long as: “the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,” “the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data,” “the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods,” and “the expert has reliably applied those principles and methods to the facts of the case.” FED. R. EVID. 702.
“While the proponent of expert testimony has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the admissibility requirements of Rule 702 are satisfied, the district court is the ultimate ‘gatekeeper.'” United States v. Williams, 506 F.3d 151, 160 (2d Cir. 2007) (cleaned up). “In this gatekeeping role, ‘the district court should consider the indicia of reliability identified in Rule 702.'” United States v. Jones, 965 F.3d 149, 161 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Amorgianos v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 265 (2d Cir. 2002)).
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Supreme Court set forth a list of factors, in addition to the criteria set forth in Rule 702, that bear on the determination of reliability. 509 U.S. 579, 579-80 (1993). The factors outlined in Daubert include: whether a theory or technique has been or can be tested, “whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication,” the technique's “known or potential rate of error” and “the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation,” and whether a particular technique or theory has gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community. Id. at 593-94. Importantly, the factors outlined in Daubert do not constitute a “definitive checklist or test.” Id. at 593. “Rather, the inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is a flexible one, and the gatekeeping inquiry must be tied to the facts of a particular case.” Amorgianos, 303 F.3d at 266 (cleaned up).
Notably, the Second Circuit has held that under Rule 702, there is a general presumption of admissibility of evidence. Chery v. Conduent Educ. Servs., LLC, 581 F.Supp.3d 436, 447 (N.D.N.Y. 2022) (citing Hilaire v. DeWalt Indus. Tool Co., 54 F.Supp.3d 223, 235 (E.D.N.Y. 2014)). “In other words, ‘the rejection of expert testimony is the exception rather than the rule.'” Id. (citation omitted). “Thus, ‘[t]o the extent that a party questions the weight of the evidence upon which the other party's expert relied or the conclusions generated from the expert's assessment of that evidence, it may present those challenges through cross-examination of the expert.'” Id. (citing R.F.M.A.S., Inc. v. So, 748 F.Supp.2d 244, 252 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)).
Measured against this standard, Smolka and Scardino's testimony related to LTLTIW shall not be precluded. A review of the joint report demonstrates that the experts' opinions are sufficiently reliable to pass muster under Rule 702 and Daubert. Accordingly, Country Mutual's first motion in limine shall be denied.[3]
Country Mutual's second motion in limine seeks to preclude Smolka and Scardino from providing cumulative testimony. See Dkt. No. 59. In particular, plaintiff requests that if both experts are called to testify “each expert's trial testimony should be limited to specific aspects of their joint report that do not overlap with the other expert's testimony.” Id. at 8. In support of this request, plaintiff argues that allowing the experts to supply duplicative testimony would be prejudicial “insofar as it would risk wrongly conveying to [a] jury that more than one expert has reached their conclusions, affecting the weight possibility given to such testimony.” Id. Plaintiff also asserts that allowing cumulative...
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