Countryway Ins. Co. v. Slaugenhoup

• Decision Date: 22 February 2008
• Docket Number: No. 07cv1593.,07cv1593.
• Citation: 619 F.Supp.2d 190
• Parties: COUNTRYWAY INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff(s), v. Walter P. SLAUGENHOUP, Walter C. Slaugenhoup, Dustin C. Sams an incapacitated person, Julie L. Raybuck his guardian, Defendant(s).
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

619 F.Supp.2d 190

COUNTRYWAY INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff(s), v. Walter P. SLAUGENHOUP, Walter C. Slaugenhoup, Dustin C. Sams an incapacitated person, Julie L. Raybuck his guardian, Defendant(s).

No. 07cv1593.

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania.

February 22, 2008.

Louis C. Long, Pietragallo Gordon Alfano Bosick & Raspanti, LLC, Pittsburgh, PA, for Plaintiff.

Matthew B. Taladay, Hanak, Guido and Taladay, Dubois, PA, Robert J. Donahoe, Bethel Park, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ARTHUR J. SCHWAB, District Judge.

I. Introduction.

Before the Court in this declaratory judgment action, brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, are cross-motions for summary judgment filed on behalf of plaintiff, Countryway Insurance Company ("Countryway" or "insurer"), defendant Dustin Sams (the "victim"), and defendants Walter P. Slaughenhoup ("insured", "son" or "insured son") and Walter C. Slaughenhoup ("father"). Countryway, who issued a farmowner's insurance policy to the insured son, seeks a declaration that it not be required to defend and indemnify the insured son for a negligence action which brought against him (as well as the father).

After careful consideration of the cross motions for summary judgment, the responses thereto, the supporting briefs, and the materials submitted in support of summary judgment, the Court finds that the policy language at issue is ambiguous, and therefore, must be construed in favor of coverage. Accordingly, Countryway has a duty to defend and indemnify the insured son in the suit brought by the victim. Therefore, the Court will grant the motion for summary judgment brought by Sams (the victim) (doc. no. 28), will grant the motion for summary judgment brought by the Slaugenhoups (insured son and father) (doc. no. 31), and will deny the motion for summary judgment brought by Countryway (doc. no. 18).

II. Summary Judgment Standards.

Summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) is appropriate "`if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Woodside v. School Dist. of Philadelphia Bd. of Educ., 248 F.3d 129, 130 (3d Cir.2001), quoting Foehl v. United States, 238 F.3d 474, 477 (3d Cir.2001) (citations omitted). In deciding a summary judgment motion, the court must "view the evidence ... through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden" to determine "whether a jury could reasonably find either that the plaintiff proved his case by the quality and quantity of the evidence required by the governing law or that he did not." Anderson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 297 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir.2002), quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

When the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party's burden can be "discharged by `showing'—that is, pointing out to the District Court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the moving party has carried this burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party who cannot rest on the allegations of the pleadings and must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d Cir.1993). Thus the non-moving party cannot rest on the pleadings, but instead must go beyond the pleadings and present "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial," Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e), and cannot rely on unsupported assertions, conclusory allegations, or mere suspicions in attempting to survive a summary judgment motion. Williams v. Borough of W. Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir.1989) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986)). The non-moving party must respond "by pointing to sufficient cognizable evidence to create material issues of fact concerning every element as to which the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, Div. Of Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 643 n. 3 (3d Cir.1998), quoting Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 762 n. 1 (3d Cir.1994).

"In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make credibility determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence; instead, the non-moving party's evidence `is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.' Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)." Marino v. Industrial Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir.2004.) See also Doe v. County of Centre, PA, 242 F.3d 437, 446 (3d Cir.2001) (court must view facts in the light most favorable, draw all reasonable inferences and resolve all doubts, in favor of the nonmoving party).

III. Material Facts.

There are no genuine issues of material fact, only issues about the appropriate inferences and legal consequences of the undisputed material facts, and unless noted, the following facts are not disputed.

Background

On the morning of July 17, 2006, father and son, who were farmers and were the joint owners of a combine, had determined that the combine had a flat tire. Son jacked up the combine, removed the tire, and placed the tire in the bed of a pickup truck owned by father. After placing the tire in the pickup truck, son exclaimed, "There you are, Pap, go get her fixed." Father, the owner and driver of the pickup truck, was 93 years old, had a history of glaucoma, and was not wearing his glasses despite a driver's license requirement that he wear corrective lenses when operating a motor vehicle. Father was driving his pickup truck to get the tire fixed on July 17, 2006, when his car collided with the victim on Route 58 in front of father's home in Clarion County, Pennsylvania, causing the victim severe injuries.

On October 22, 2007, the victim (through his guardian, Julie L Raybuck) filed a two count amended complaint¹ against both the father and the son in the Court of Common Pleas of Clarion County alleging (1) a claim for negligent operation of the motor vehicle against the father; and (2) a negligence claim under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302A against the insured son.

According to the amended complaint, the insured son was negligent in several respects in placing the tire in the bed of the pickup truck of his father, when he allegedly knew father was not in a physical condition to drive, when he allegedly requested, permitted, utilized, and allowed father to transport the tire for repair, and when failed to prohibit father from transporting the tire for repair (doc. no. 20-6).

The Farmowner's Insurance Policy Issued by Countryway

The starting point of this or any insurance coverage dispute is, of course, the insurance policy. Son was issued a farmowner's insurance policy ("the policy") with Countryway in 2006. The policy period was from May 10, 2006 to May 10, 2007.

The Personal Liability Coverage (Farm) Endorsement in the policy provided liability coverage, as follows:

Coverage L—Liability—"We" pay, up to "our" "limit", all sums for which an "insured is liable by law" because of "bodily injury" or "property damage" cause by an "occurrence" to which this coverage applies. "We" will defend a suit seeking damages if the suit resulted from "bodily injury" or "property damages" not excluded under this coverage. "We" may make investigations and settled claims or suits that "we" decide are appropriate. "We" do not have to provide a defense after "we" have paid an amount equal to "our" "limit" as a result of a judgment or written settlement.

Doc. No. 21 at 5.

The Personal Liability Coverage (Farm) Endorsement contains the following exclusion, which is central to the coverage dispute:

1. Exclusions That Apply to Coverages L and M—This Personal Liability Coverage does not apply to:

f. "bodily injury" or "property damage" which results from liability imposed by law on an "insured" for the use of a "motorized vehicle," aircraft or watercraft, except if coverage is provided for by an Incidental Motorized Vehicle or Watercraft Coverage.

Doc. No. 21 at 6.²

The Incidental Motorized Vehicle or Watercraft Coverage then goes on to list several scenarios which are subject to coverage, however, the parties agree that none of them are applicable here and therefore, the Court will not recount them.

IV. The Law.

There is no dispute that Pennsylvania law governs the interpretation of the policy. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania summarized the law of insurance contract interpretation in 401 Fourth Street, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Group, 583 Pa. 445, 879 A.2d 166 (2005), where it stated as follows:

[W]e begin our analysis by setting forth the well-established rules of insurance contract interpretation. "The task of interpreting [an insurance] contract is generally performed by a court rather than by a jury." Madison Construction Co. v. Harleysville Mutual Ins. Co., 557 Pa. 595, 735 A.2d 100, 106 (1999) (citations omitted); Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. American Empire Ins. Co., 503 Pa. 300, 469 A.2d 563, 566 (1983). The purpose of that task is to ascertain the intent of the parties as manifested by the terms used in the written insurance policy. Gene & Harvey Builders, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Manufacturers' Association Ins. Co., 512 Pa. 420, 517 A.2d 910, 913 (1986) (quoting Standard Venetian Blind Co. (citations omitted)). When the language of the policy is clear and unambiguous, a court is required to give effect to that language. Id. When a provision in a policy is ambiguous, however, the policy is to be construed in favor of the insured to further the...