County Com'rs of Charles County v. Stevens

• Decision Date: 04 April 1984
• Docket Number: No. 94,94
• Citation: 299 Md. 203,473 A.2d 12
• Parties: , 20 ERC 2080 COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF CHARLES COUNTY, Maryland v. Albert W. STEVENS, t/a A.W. Stevens & Sons. Sept. Term 1983.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 203

299 Md. 203

473 A.2d 12, 20 ERC 2080

COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF CHARLES COUNTY, Maryland v. Albert W. STEVENS, t/a A.W. Stevens & Sons.

No. 94 Sept. Term 1983.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

April 4, 1984.

Thomas C. Hayden, Jr., County Atty., La Plata, for appellant.

Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., Dorothy A. Beatty and Pamela D. Andersen, Asst. Attys. Gen., Baltimore, on brief, amici curiae for State of Maryland, Maryland Environmental Service.

Thomas P. Smith, County Atty., Michael O. Connaughton, Deputy Co. Atty., Steven M. Gilbert and John T. Beamer, II, Associate County Attys., Upper Marlboro, on brief, amicus curiae for Prince George's County, Maryland.

Kathryn J. Dahl, Annapolis (Blumenthal, Delavan, Offutt & Moodispaw, P.A., Annapolis, on brief), for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., ELDRIDGE, COLE, DAVIDSON, RODOWSKY and COUCH, JJ., and CHARLES F. ORTH, Jr., retired, Specially Assigned Judge.

MURPHY, Chief Judge.

We granted certiorari to determine whether a regulation banning disposal, in a county owned and operated landfill facility, of solid waste originating outside the county's borders violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. ¹

I.

The County Commissioners of Charles County own and operate a sanitary landfill in Pisgah, Charles County, Maryland. The purpose of the facility is to provide for the disposal of solid waste generated by Charles County residents. The landfill is part of the County's Solid Waste Plan developed to comply with the requirements of Maryland Code (1982), § 9-501, et seq. of the Health-Environmental Article. Charles County is expressly authorized by Code (1957, 1981 Repl.Vol.), Art. 25, § 14A to construct landfills and "to prescribe and enforce rules and regulations concerning the operation and manner of use of the disposal areas or facilities."

The Pisgah facility is the only sanitary landfill in Charles County. It consists of eighty-seven acres of land with a suitable soil base, an asphalt road offering access to a public road, weight scales, record keeping facilities and the heavy equipment necessary to provide daily soil cover. Commercial haulers must obtain a permit and pay a fee for using the landfill. Noncommercial trucks and utility trailers are also charged a fee. Individuals hauling waste in any other vehicle may use the landfill without charge. The landfill's operation is primarily funded from County tax revenues.

Pursuant to its statutory authority, the County Commissioners adopted "Regulations Governing the Use of Charles County Public Trash Disposal Areas." Regulation 4(d) provides:

"No garbage, trash, or refuse collected outside the territorial limits of Charles County shall be disposed of in any Public Trash Disposal Area of Charles County." (Emphasis supplied.)

The regulation, on its face, governs only public landfills; it has no application to any privately owned facility.

Albert W. Stevens operates a solid waste hauling business within and beyond the territorial limits of Charles County. Stevens' trucks have dumped refuse which was collected outside of Charles County at the Pisgah facility. The County suspended one of Stevens' permits for violating Regulation 4(d). As a result, Stevens filed a Bill of Complaint in the Circuit Court for Charles County seeking a declaration that Regulation 4(d) was unconstitutional under the Commerce, Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the federal constitution and under Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Stevens also sought an injunction barring enforcement of the regulation.

None of the material facts being in dispute, both the County and Stevens moved for summary judgment. The court (Bowling, J.) granted Stevens' motion, concluding that Regulation 4(d) unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause of the federal constitution. Relying on Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 98 S.Ct. 2531, 57 L.Ed.2d 475 (1978); Browning-Ferris v. Anne Arundel Co., 292 Md. 136, 438 A.2d 269 (1981); and Shayne Bros., Inc. v. Prince George's County, Md., 556 F.Supp. 182 (D.Md.1983), the court reasoned that

"The regulation is basically an economic protectionist measure, which places a direct burden on interstate commerce. The Court has found no legitimate local purpose that would justify such a restriction."

The court rejected the County's argument that "a regulation limiting access to a publicly-owned landfill should be subjected to a lesser degree of constitutional scrutiny than a regulation dealing with privately-owned sites." It concluded that Regulation 4(d), even though limited to public landfills, "is invalid because it overtly discriminates against articles in interstate commerce." The County appealed from the lower court's declaratory decree, arguing that it could, consistent with the Commerce Clause, legally prohibit the disposal of solid waste originating outside of the County at its Pisgah landfill facility.

II.

The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, art. I, § 8, cl. 3, performs a dual function. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979). By its express terms, it is a source of Congress' power "To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States ...." It also acts as a limitation on the power of states to pass regulations and impose taxes that affect interstate commerce. Id. at 326, 99 S.Ct. at 1731. In this latter role, the negative implications of the clause have been referred to as the "dormant" ² or "negative" ³ commerce clause. The dormant commerce clause limitations apply with equal force to all laws and regulations that affect interstate commerce whether at the state, county or municipal level. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, Michigan, 362 U.S. 440, 80 S.Ct. 813, 4 L.Ed.2d 852 (1960); Browning-Ferris, supra, 292 Md. at 142 n. 4, 438 A.2d 269.

The decisions of the United States Supreme Court have developed a two part dormant commerce clause analysis. Nondiscriminatory laws and regulations which burden the flow of interstate commerce are subjected to a balancing test:

"Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."

Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142, 90 S.Ct. 844, 847, 25 L.Ed.2d 174 (1970). But where it is shown that a state or local law or regulation discriminates against interstate commerce in favor of local interests, "the burden falls on the State to justify it both in terms of the local benefits flowing from the statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at stake." Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 2446, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977). Thus, as stated in Philadelphia v. New Jersey, supra, 437 U.S. at 624, 98 S.Ct. at 2535, "where simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected ... [, the clearest example of which] is a law that overtly blocks the flow of interstate commerce at a State's borders." (Citations omitted.)

At issue in Philadelphia v. New Jersey, supra, was a statute which made it illegal to dump solid waste originating outside of New Jersey in any landfill within the state. Thus, the statute applied with equal force both to publicly and privately owned landfills. Private New Jersey landfill operators as well as several cities in neighboring states challenged the constitutionality of the law on commerce clause grounds.

Initially, the Supreme Court rejected the state court's holding that the definition of "commerce" for purposes of the dormant commerce clause is much narrower than the scope of that term when used as a source of congressional power. The Court held that restrictions on the interstate transportation of waste were subject to the same level of constitutional scrutiny as restrictions on commerce in other products. Id. at 622-23, 98 S.Ct. at 2534-35. The Court stated that although the statute may have been enacted to further legitimate environmental policies, these goals

"may not be accomplished by discriminating against articles of commerce coming from outside the State unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently. Both on its face and in its plain effect [the law] violates this principle of nondiscrimination." Id. at 626-27, 98 S.Ct. at 2537.

The Court's decision stands for the proposition that a state may not close its borders to waste from other states while permitting unrestricted disposal of refuse generated in the state. The Court said that "it may be assumed as well that New Jersey may pursue [its environmental goals] by slowing the flow of all waste into the State's remaining landfills, even though interstate commerce may incidentally be affected." (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 626, 98 S.Ct. at 2537. The Court continued:

"Also relevant here are the Court's decisions holding that a State may not accord its own inhabitants a preferred right of access over consumers in other States to natural resources located within its borders. West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 [, 31 S.Ct. 564, 55 L.Ed. 716 (1911) ]; Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 [, 43 S.Ct. 658, 67 L.Ed. 1117 (1923) ]. These cases stand for the basic principle that a 'State is without power to prevent privately owned articles of trade from being shipped and sold in interstate commerce on the ground that they are required to satisfy local demands or because they are needed by the people of the State.' "

Id. at 627, 98 S.Ct. at 2537 (quoting Foster Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 10, 49 S.Ct. 1, 3-4, 73 L.Ed. 147 (1928)). In footnote six, the Court reserved...