County Line Joint Venture v. City of Grand Prairie, Tex., 87-1304

• Decision Date: 18 March 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-1304,87-1304
• Citation: County Line Joint Venture v. City of Grand Prairie, Tex., 839 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1988)
• Parties: COUNTY LINE JOINT VENTURE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The CITY OF GRAND PRAIRIE, TEXAS, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 1142

839 F.2d 1142

COUNTY LINE JOINT VENTURE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The CITY OF GRAND PRAIRIE, TEXAS, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 87-1304.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

March 18, 1988.

William Charles Bundren, Jackson, Walker, Winstead, Cantwell & Miller, Dallas, Tex., for plaintiff-appellant.

George A. Staples, Jr., Staples, Foster & Hampton, Hurst, Tex., R. Clayton Hutchins, City Atty., Grand Prairie, Tex., for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Before CLARK, Chief Judge, BRIGHT, ^* Senior Circuit Judge and GEE, Circuit Judge.

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge:

County Line Joint Venture (County Line) brought suit for injunctive relief and monetary damages against the City of Grand Prairie, Texas (City) on the grounds that it violated County Line's constitutional and state-created rights by applying a city zoning ordinance which automatically extinguished County Line's specific use permit (SUP) for six months of non-use. The constitutional violations allegedly committed by the City include a denial of procedural due process, substantive due process, equal protection and fifth and fourteenth amendment taking. The district court ¹ granted summary judgment in favor of the City on the procedural due process issue and dismissed the entire action. We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment as to the procedural due process issue but reverse the district court's dismissal of this action and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

County Line owns certain real property located in Grand Prairie, Texas. In 1976, County Line sought and received an SUP permitting it to sell alcoholic beverages on the premises. ² In February 1985, the city council passed an ordinance entitled Sec. B-713 which automatically terminates all SUPs that are not used for a period of six months. ³ The City gave public notice in a local newspaper that it was considering such an amendment and subsequently held a public hearing on the proposed ordinance.

On November 27, 1985, County Line's current tenant applied to the city secretary for an alcoholic beverage license, dance hall license, and a mechanical amusement device license. The city secretary checked the records to determine whether issuance of such licenses was appropriate. Her research disclosed that the property had been unoccupied for approximately one year and that pursuant to Ordinance Sec. B-713, County Line no longer possessed an SUP. Because no license could be issued without an SUP, the secretary denied the license applications.

Following the city secretary's denial, County Line attempted to appeal the city secretary's decision regarding the SUP's termination to the zoning board of adjustments and appeals. The zoning board determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear any complaint regarding a city secretary decision because the zoning board had jurisdiction over zoning matters which, by definition, did not include the city secretary's licensing decisions of an official of the city. County Line brought this claim for relief for violation of its civil rights and pendant state claims in United States District Court.

Both parties moved for summary judgment on the procedural due process claim. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, and it apparently assumed that there were no other remaining federal claims. The district court then declined to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining pendant state law claims. With such a disposition, the district court granted a dismissal of the action. County Line then brought the present appeal.

We now turn to County Line's claim that its constitutional rights have been violated by the City of Grand Prairie.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Due Process

In an attempt to delineate the relationship between property owners' rights and zoning ordinances, courts and commentators indicate that the existence of procedural due process rights depends upon how the court views zoning ordinances and decisions. D. Mandelker, J. Gerand & E. Sullivan, Federal Land Use Law, Sec. 2.03 (1986); Developments in the Law--Zoning, 91 Harv.L.Rev. 1427 (1978). The City asserts that this court should view the City's conduct in adopting and applying Sec. B-713 as a legislative act.

Generally, if the court views the governmental conduct as legislative, the property owner has no procedural due process rights. "When the legislature passes a law which affects a general class of persons, those persons have all received procedural due process--the legislative process. The challenges to such laws must be based on their substantive compatibility with constitutional guarantees." 2 R. Rotunda, J. Nowak & J. Young, Treatises on Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure, Sec. 17.8, p. 251 (1986). The large number of people affected by the legislative process ensures that the legislature will act reasonably. Rogin v. Bensalem Township, 616 F.2d 680, 693-94 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1029, 101 S.Ct. 1737, 68 L.Ed.2d 223 (1981).

County Line urges this court to view the ordinance and its application under an administrative/adjudicative model. County Line argues that it has a protectable property interest in the SUP and that the City violated its right to procedural due process when the City considered and enacted the statute without giving County Line personal notice. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). Further, County Line argues that the City violated County Line's right to procedural due process when the City failed to give County Line personal notice and a hearing prior to the time the ordinance operated to extinguish its SUP. County Line also contends that the City violated its due process rights when the city secretary denied the requested licenses because County Line did not have the proper zoning.

If the action of the city council is viewed as administrative/adjudicative, procedural due process rights may attach. These procedural rights follow only if the landowner establishes a property right created by state or local law. The amount of process due depends upon the balancing of interests as enunciated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). ⁴

Conduct of a municipal body is likely to be deemed legislative when an elected group, such as a city council, makes a general zoning decision which applies to a large group of interests. Conversely, a municipal body's action may be more likely termed adjudicative if an appointed group, such as a zoning board, makes a specific decision regarding a specific piece of property. See Developments, supra.

As a preliminary matter to resolving whether the city council acted in an administrative or legislative capacity in enacting the ordinance, we review this court's decisions in South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 901, 94 S.Ct. 1625, 40 L.Ed.2d 119, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 837, 95 S.Ct. 66, 42 L.Ed.2d 64 (1974); Couf v. DeBlaker, 652 F.2d 585 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 921, 102 S.Ct. 1278, 71 L.Ed.2d 462 (1982); and Shelton v. City of College Station, 780 F.2d 475 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 905, 106 S.Ct. 3276, 91 L.Ed.2d 566, cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 89, 93 L.Ed.2d 41 (1986).

In Pruitt, the plaintiffs/appellants owned land zoned partially for residential use and partially for commercial use. The landowners sought to have the property rezoned to accommodate apartments. The local planning commission recommended the change, but the county commissioners denied the request. The landowners asserted that the county commissioners violated the owners' rights to equal protection and due process of law when the commission, according to the owners, failed to explain the basis for its decision. The court, en banc, held that "local zoning is a quasi-legislative procedure, not subject to federal juridical consideration in the absence of arbitrary action." 491 F.2d at 7. The court went on to hold that this view is applicable to the adoption of comprehensive zoning plans as well as the reclassification of a particular piece of property.

Thus, Pruitt expresses the viewpoint that a zoning decision, made by an elected body such as a county commission, should be deemed legislative, not administrative.

In Couf, a developer purchased waterfront property with the intent of building condominiums. At the time of purchase, the zoning permitted the desired building. However, by the time the developer finally applied for a building permit, the city commission instructed the planning commission that all property on the waterfront, including the developer's property, be "down zoned," and the planning commission should refuse to accept applications for building permits. The developer asserted that he was deprived of his property without due process of law.

The court determined that Pruitt controlled the disposition of the procedural due process claim. The court stated as follows:

Our opinions repeatedly characterize local zoning decisions as "legislative" in nature. (Citations omitted.) If this word is used advisedly--as it appears to be--then the plaintiffs cannot complain of a denial of procedural due process, for no constitutional limitation on legislative procedure is relevant here. (Citations omitted.)

652 F.2d at 590. Again, this court reaffirmed its view that zoning decisions, at least those made by elected bodies, are legislative, thus no procedural due process rights apply.

In Shelton, the landowner sought a variance for the parking requirements which would be enforced if the landowner changed the type of business conducted on the premises. 780 F.2d at 477. All three attempts to convince the city zoning board to grant the variance failed. The landowner then brought suit, claiming a violation of substantive and...