County of Los Angeles v. Smith, B124218

Citation88 Cal.Rptr.2d 159,74 Cal.App.4th 500
Decision Date23 August 1999
Docket NumberNo. B124218,B124218
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals
Parties, 136 Ed. Law Rep. 994, 1999 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8747 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Joanne SMITH, Defendant and Appellant.

Gil Garcetti, District Attorney, Patrick Moran, and Susan E. Skelding, Deputy District Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Thomas E. Beltran, Van Nuys, and Margaret S. Oppel, Santa Barbara, for Defendant and Appellant.

TURNER, P.J.

I. INTRODUCTION

WELFARE AND INSTITUTIONS CODE SECTION 9031 provides in relevant part: "The ... mother ... liable for the support of a minor ... shall be liable for the reasonable costs of support of the minor while the minor is placed, or detained in, or committed to, any institution ... or pursuant to an order of the juvenile court." In this case, we determine whether the mother of a very disturbed minor who is a ward of the court pursuant to section 602 may be liable for the "reasonable costs of support" (§ 903) when he is placed in a special education facility given the provisions of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. (20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.)

This is an appeal and cross-appeal from a judgment in a proceeding brought under section 11350 by the County of Los Angeles, (the county), for a child support order against Joanne Smith for her minor child, Michael F., who is in a foster care placement after he became a ward of the court pursuant to section 602. The judgment denied any request for an order for prospective child support but ordered restitution of benefits paid under the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families program which was formerly referred to as Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).

The county appeals from that portion of the judgment determining Ms. Smith was not liable for prospective support from the first day of the month following the hearing in this case based upon the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.) which provides a "free appropriate public education" to all minor children with disabilities under the specified circumstances. The county argues the trial court erred in determining this issue in a child support proceeding pursuant to sections 11350 and 11350.1 2 Sections 11350 and 11350.1 were enacted by California to implement child support programs in compliance with federal mandates under title IV-D of the Social Security Act. (42 U.S.C. § 602 et seq.)

The mother appeals from that portion of the judgment determining she is liable for retroactive payments of $6,944 from the date the county first expended the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families funds on behalf of the minor to the first day of the month following the hearing when the court determined that her son was in fact eligible for a free appropriate public education pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. The mother contends the county is a political subdivision of the state which is involved in the education of children with disabilities. Hence, Ms. Smith argues the county has an independent duty to comply with the provisions of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, which requires that her son be provided a residential placement without cost to her. This is because the minor has been determined to be seriously emotionally disturbed.

We conclude that, based on the evidence before the trial court and its factual findings, it properly concluded that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act prevents the county from securing reimbursement for future costs incurred in connection with care provided for the minor. We agree with and affirm the trial court's determination that Ms. Smith was not responsible for the future support costs to be incurred for the care of her son. However, we conclude that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act also prevents the county from securing reimbursement for past costs of care provided for the minor while he was subject to an individualized education plan; hence, we, with respect, disagree with that portion of the judgment which imposed a duty on the mother to reimburse the county for past costs of care for the minor when he was subject to care pursuant to an individualized education plan. We therefore reverse the order providing for retroactive support while the minor was subject to individualized education plan.

II. The INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT
A. Statutory Construction and Supremacy Clause Jurisprudence

Resolution of the present case is dependent in material part on the application of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, a federal statute. Because we are applying a federal statute, we follow rules of statutory construction enunciated by the United States Supreme Court. In Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno (1990) 494 U.S. 827, 835, 110 S.Ct. 1570, 108 L.Ed.2d 842, quoting from Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania (1980) 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 64 L.Ed.2d 766, the United States Supreme Court held: "The starting point for interpretation of a statute 'is the language of the statute itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.' " The United States Supreme Court has noted that "the statutory language controls its construction" (Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Cenance (1981) 452 U.S. 155, 158, fn. 3, 101 S.Ct. 2239, 68 L.Ed.2d 744) and that " '[t]here is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by which the [L]egislature undertook to give expression to its wishes.' " (Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc. (1982) 458 U.S. 564, 571, 102 S.Ct. 3245, 73 L.Ed.2d 973.) In interpreting a statute, the United States Supreme Court has noted: " 'In expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.' [Citations.] Our objective in a case such as this is to ascertain the congressional intent and give effect to the legislative will." (Philbrook v. Glodgett (1975) 421 U.S. 707, 713, 95 S.Ct. 1893, 44 L.Ed.2d 525.) On another occasion, the court stated, "We do not, however, construe statutory phrases in isolation; we read statutes as a whole." (United States v. Morton (1984) 467 U.S. 822, 828, 104 S.Ct. 2769, 81 L.Ed.2d 680, fn. omitted.) Further, in interpreting a statute, the Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of avoiding: "absurd results" (United States v. Turkette (1981) 452 U.S. 576, 580, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d 246); " 'an odd result' " (Public Citizen v. Department of Justice (1989) 491 U.S. 440, 454, 109 S.Ct. 2558, 105 L.Ed.2d 377); or "unreasonable results whenever possible." (American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson (1982) 456 U.S. 63, 71, 102 S.Ct. 1534, 71 L.Ed.2d 748.) Moreover, the Supreme Court has noted, "Judicial perception that a particular result would be unreasonable may enter into the construction of ambiguous provisions, but cannot justify disregard of what Congress has plainly and intentionally provided." (Commissioner v. Asphalt Products Co., Inc. (1987) 482 U.S. 117, 121, 107 S.Ct. 2275, 96 L.Ed.2d 97.) In Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., supra, 458 U.S. at page 571, 102 S.Ct. 3245, the court stated: "Nevertheless, in rare cases the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters, and those intentions must be controlling.... [Citations.]" When a statute is unambiguous, its language cannot "be expanded or contracted by the statements of individual legislators or committees during the course of the" legislative process. (West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey (1991) 499 U.S. 83, 98-99, 111 S.Ct. 1138, 113 L.Ed.2d 68.)

Additionally at issue is the application of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution in terms of California's obligation to comply with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act as to Ms. Smith. (U.S. Const., art. VI, cl.2.) The Supremacy Clause can limit state court enforcement of delinquency court reimbursement costs. In Gregory v. Ashcroft (1991) 501 U.S. 452, 460, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 115 L.Ed.2d 410, the United States Supreme Court described the effect of the Supremacy Clause as follows: "The Federal Government holds a decided advantage in this delicate balance: the Supremacy Clause. U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. As long as it is acting within the powers granted it under the Constitution, Congress may impose its will on the States. Congress may legislate in areas traditionally regulated by the States. This is an extraordinary power in a federalist system. It is a power that we must assume Congress does not exercise lightly." The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly relied on the Supremacy Clause to preempt state laws on a variety of subjects related to judicial proceedings. (Block v. North Dakota (1983) 461 U.S. 273, 288-289, 103 S.Ct. 1811, 75 L.Ed.2d 840 [Congressionally adopted statute of limitations binding on states pursuant to Supremacy Clause, the Tenth Amendment notwithstanding]; Fidelity Federal Sav. and Loan Assn. v. de la Cuesta (1982) 458 U.S. 141, 150-159, 102 S.Ct. 3014, 73 L.Ed.2d 664 [California courts must enforce due-on-sale clause because of regulation promulgated by Federal Home Loan Bank]; FERC v. Mississippi (1982) 456 U.S. 742, 760-761, 102 S.Ct. 2126, 72 L.Ed.2d 532 [Supremacy Clause permits federal regulation of state public utility despite Tenth Amendment]; Testa v. Katt (1947) 330 U.S. 386, 389-393, 67 S.Ct. 810, 91 L.Ed. 967 [under Supremacy Clause, Rhode Island courts must enforce federally mandated price controls]; Hauenstein v. Lynham (1879) 100 U.S 483, 488-491, 25 L.Ed. 628 [Virginia courts required by Supremacy Clause to enforce terms of Swiss-American treaty in probate case].) Preemption...

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