County of Beaver v. Armstrong
Decision Date | 05 January 1863 |
Citation | 44 Pa. 63 |
Parties | The County of Beaver <I>versus</I> Armstrong. |
Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
The first, second, and third specifications of error turn upon the legality of the exercise of the power conferred by the 17th section of the Act of the 7th April 1853 on the county commissioners of Beaver county, to subscribe to the capital stock of the Cleveland and Pittsburgh Railroad Company, and to issue bonds in payment of such subscription. The learned judge in the court below held that the subscription was made, and the bonds, with coupons attached, were issued in strict conformity to law, and the reasons he has assigned in his charge, and the numerous decisions of this court, clearly show that he was right in coming to this conclusion. Contenting ourselves, therefore, with the reasoning of the court below, we assume that the bonds and coupons were legally binding on the county of Beaver, and this brings us to the fourth specification of error, which was the real point argued before us.
The suit was brought on coupons, of five bonds of the county of Beaver, to the railroad company or bearer for the payment of one thousand dollars each, thirty years after date, with semi-annual interest at the rate of six per centum per annum from the date. The bonds were dated 15th September 1853, and the principal and interest were payable at the office of the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company, in the city of New York. The coupons were numbered from eight to fourteen, inclusive, for the payment of $30 interest from the 15th of September 1857 to the 15th of September 1860, inclusive. The bonds stipulated that the interest was payable upon the delivery of the coupons severally at the said office in New York. It appeared that these coupons were left unpaid, and that no provision was made for the payment in New York or elsewhere, and that the county disputed the legal obligation of the bonds and coupons, and declined payment. Having therefore decided that the plaintiff could recover on the coupons, the next question was whether he was entitled to interest on them. This question the court decided in the affirmative, at the same time making a very learned argument to show that they were wrong. This forms the subject of the fourth specification of error, and this brings us to the consideration of whether such coupons are recoverable without interest no matter what may be the delays interposed by the corporation or individuals issuing such bonds and coupons, which pass from hand to hand by delivery merely.
Before proceeding to the determination of this question it will be proper to state clearly in what light these coupons, settled in this case to be legally issued, and to be held by a person against whom there is neither legal nor equitable defence to the recovery of the amount on their face, are to be considered. In Gorgier v. Mieville, 3 B. & C. 45, Ld. Chief Justice Abbott, in 1824, in speaking of bonds issued by the king of Prussia, said:
This case was preceded four years before, by Wookey v Pole, 4 B. & Ald. 1, where it was held that exchequer bills were negotiable, and were of the same nature as notes and bills of exchange. The opinions of the judges examine all the early cases, and are very instructive as to the principles upon which instruments for the payment of money assume the character and qualities of negotiable paper. Lord Chief Justice Abbott, speaking of the exchequer bill which was the subject of the suit, says:
"For these reasons, I am of opinion that exchequer bills are negotiable, and may be transferred in the same manner as bills of exchange, and that in those bills, as in bills of exchange, the property passes with the possession, by every mode of transfer, fraud and collusion apart."
Best, Justice, said:
And the same doctrine was held to be applicable to bonds issued by the Russian, Danish, and Dutch governments: Attorney-General v. Bouwens, 4 M. & W. 171. The same principles were enunciated two years afterwards by Chancellor Walworth, in The State of Illinois v. Delafield, 8 Paige 527, and affirmed by the Court of Errors: Delafield v. State of Illinois, 2 Hill 159. Mr. Webster, in his argument before the chancellor, p. 531, says: And the chancellor said, p. 533: "If these securities, therefore, pass into the hands of bonâ fide holders who have no notice of any irregularity, or want of authority on the part of the officers or agents of the state, who put them in circulation, the complainant is both legally and equitably bound to pay them to such holders." Mr. Justice Bronson, delivering the opinion of the Court of Errors, says, p. 177: "The bonds are negotiable instruments, the title to which will pass by mere delivery; and although void in the hands of the appellant, they will be valid securities in the hands of a bonâ fide holder."
The same doctrine was applied by the chancellor in Stoney v. American Life Insurance Company, 11 Paige 635, to certificates of deposit. "The company," said he, page 637, "was bound to pay its certificates to the holders thereof; for such certificates are legal on their faces, and bonâ fide holders who have bought them without knowing that they were not in fact issued at Baltimore, and upon actual deposits in trust, can recover on them even if they were issued in this state in violation of our restraining laws."
In The Mechanics' Bank v. The New York and New Haven Railroad Company, 3 Kernan 599, Mr. Justice Comstock,...
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In re Chicago, RI & P. Ry. Co.
...instruments and other undisputed liquidated demands for money, they bear interest from the date of maturity. County of Beaver v. Armstrong, 44 Pa. 63, 8 Wright 63; North Pa. R. Co. v. Adams, 54 Pa. 94, 93 Am.Dec. 677; Philadelphia & R. R. Co. v. Knight, 124 Pa. 58, 16 A. 492; Appeal of Cadw......
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...of the essential differences in the nature of coupons and warrants, they do not necessarily rest upon the same basis. See County of Beaver v. Armstrong, 44 Pa. 63; v. First Division of the St. Paul. & Pacific R. R. Co., 25 Minn. 314; Lexington v. Union Nat. Bank, 75 Miss. 1, 22 So. 291; Tru......
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