County of Calhoun Et Al v. American Emigrant Company
| Decision Date | 01 October 1876 |
| Citation | 93 U.S. 124,23 L.Ed. 826 |
| Parties | COUNTY OF CALHOUN ET AL. v. AMERICAN EMIGRANT COMPANY |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Iowa.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Submitted on the record by Mr. James Grant for the appellants, and on printed arguments by Mr. C. C. Nourse for the appellee.
Power is vested in the Circuit Court to enjoin the collection of a municipal tax, where it appears that the assessors acted without authority of law, and in violation of a special contract between the municipality imposing the tax and the tax-payer.
Swamp-lands were owned by the county of Calhoun, and the record shows that the proper authorities of the county contracted to sell the same to the American Emigrant Company, the county stipulating that they would not assess any taxes against the lands until after the time the lands should be conveyed to the company.
Pursuant to that contract, the supervisors of the county made a deed of the lands to the Emigrant Company; but they recited in the instrument that the deed was deposited with the clerk of their board as an escrow, and that it was not to be delivered to the grantees until they should execute a mortgage back to the county, conditioned to secure the full performance of the contract. Such a mortgage was never executed; but the evidence shows that the deed, by some means or agency not explained, was filed for record, and that it was duly recorded. Controversy ensued, and the county instituted a suit to set aside the contract and the deed. Pending the suit, the parties made a settlement; and, as a part of the terms of the same, the county, in consideration of certain moneys paid by the other party, consented to a decree, declaring the title to the swamp-lands, and swamp-land interests of the county, to be in the Emigrant Company.
Sufficient also appears to show, that the Emigrant Company complied with all the terms of the settlement, and that the Circuit Court, where the suit was pending, entered a decree, by consent of the parties, dismissing the bill of complaint, and decreed that the decree of dismissal should for ever operate as a bar and estoppel upon the county to set up any right or title to the lands in controversy. Prior to that decree, which bears date the 20th of May, 1872, the lands described in the contract had not been assessed for the two preceding years, as is averred in the bill of complaint and admitted in the answer.
Public property is not subject to taxation by the law of the State, and consistency forbade the county to assess the lands pending the controversy, as the deed had never been sanctioned or approved by the county or their proper officers. Instead of that, it appears that the authorities of the county uniformly maintained that the possession of the deed for registry was surreptitious and wrongful, and that the title to the lands was still in the county. They accordingly withheld the lands from taxation during those years; and the complainants charge that the treasurer, subsequent to the settlement and decree, caused the lands described in the two schedules set forth in the record to be listed and entered in the tax duplicates, and pretended to extend a computation of taxes, interest, penalties, and costs thereon, according to the rates of levy of the two preceding years, amounting to the sum set forth in the record, whereas the complainants aver that the title was decreed to them at the time of the settlement, with the full understanding that no taxes was payable on the lands for those two years, and that the acts of the treasurer in listing the lands and assessing the taxes were without authority of law, and they pray that the pretended assessment and levy of the taxes may be decreed to be illegal, null, and void, and that the county treasurer and his agents and successors may be for ever enjoined from selling the lands, or in any manner enforcing the collection of said pretended taxes.
Process was duly issued and served, and the proper authorities of the county appeared and filed an answer, setting up the following defences: 1. That the complainants are the legal owners of the lands described in the contract, by virtue of the deed from the county. 2. That the county had no right to exempt the lands from taxes. 3. That the agreement was unauthorized and in violation of the laws of the State, and is null and void.
Certain admissions of the respondents are also contained in the answer, which it is important to notice: 1. That the deed was deposited as an escrow until a mortgage back should be executed; but the respondents aver that it was the fault of the complainants that it was not executed, and they insist that the complainants cannot claim any benefit from their own neglect. 2. That the settlement and decree were made as alleged; but the respondents aver that the settlement ratified the deed, and gave complainants a legal title relating back to the date of the execution of the same. 3. That the officers of the county did not assess taxes on the lands pending the suit; but the respondents aver that the failure of the officers to do so did not waive the right of the county to assess the lands and collect the taxes. 4. That the title to the lands in the other schedule is in the United States; but the respondents aver, that if that be so, then no sale of the same for taxes will be of any validity.
Proofs having been duly taken and the parties fully heard, the court entered a decree in favor of the complainants, and the respondents appealed to this court.
Enough appears in the pleadings in this case to show that the deed from the county to the complainants was never delivered to the grantees until the settlement and decree; and it is settled law, of universal application, that a deed takes effect only from the time of delivery, even though it may have been fully executed at a much earlier period. Hopkins v. Leek, 12 Wend. 105; Hardenberg v. Schoonmaker, 2 Johns. 23.
Beyond doubt, the deed of the lands was delivered to the clerk of the respondents as...
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