County of Fairfax v. Century Concrete Services, Inc.

• Decision Date: 31 October 1997
• Docket Number: No. 961854,961854
• Parties: COUNTY OF FAIRFAX, et al. v. CENTURY CONCRETE SERVICES, INC. Record
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Page 648

492 S.E.2d 648

254 Va. 423

COUNTY OF FAIRFAX, et al. v. CENTURY CONCRETE SERVICES, INC.

Record No. 961854.

Supreme Court of Virginia.

Oct. 31, 1997.

Dennis R. Bates, Senior Assistant Attorney (David P. Bobzien, County Attorney; Robert L. Howell, Deputy county Attorney, on briefs), for appellant.

Brian J. Vella (Randall C. Allen; Christina M. Pirrello; Smith, Pachter, McWhorter & D'Ambrosio, on brief), Vienna, for appellee.

Present: CARRICO, C.J., COMPTON, LACY, HASSELL, KEENAN and KINSER, JJ., and WHITING, Senior Justice.

HASSELL, Justice.

In this appeal, we consider whether Code § 15.1-549 prohibits a county from paying interest on a judgment.

Fairfax County executed a contract with Century Concrete Services, Inc. Pursuant to the terms of the contract, Century agreed to perform certain construction work on a landfill basin. A dispute arose between Century and the County. Century filed a motion for judgment against the County and was awarded a judgment in the amount of $60,340.00 plus prejudgment and judgment interest. The County appeals that portion of the judgment which awarded interest.

The County argues that the trial court erred by entering an order which requires the County to pay interest. The County asserts that Code § 15.1-549 prohibits the County from paying interest on a judgment. Century responds that Code § 15.1-549 does not bar the award of interest. We agree with the County.

Code § 15.1-547 authorizes a county's board of supervisors to issue and approve warrants to pay all valid claims that may be asserted against a county. Code § 15.1-549, which imposes certain limitations upon the issuance of warrants, states in relevant part:

"No board of supervisors shall order any warrant issued for any purpose other than the payment of a claim received, audited and approved as required by § 15.1-547.

....

No interest shall be paid on any county warrant.

Any clerk, deputy clerk or member of any board of supervisors who shall violate or become a party to the violation of any of the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and in addition thereto shall be guilty of malfeasance in office."

In Lynchburg v. Amherst County, 115 Va. 600, 80 S.E. 117 (1913), we considered whether a city was entitled to a jury instruction which would have permitted a jury to make an award of prejudgment interest against a county. We stated:

"As a rule, the common law did not imply a promise to pay interest, and interest could not be recovered, save where it was expressly contracted for.... While the courts in this State, aided by the legislature, have established a different doctrine as between natural persons and private corporations, viz., that it is but natural justice that he who has the use of another's money should pay interest on it ... yet, so far as we know, it has never been held by this court that a claim asserted against the State or a county bears interest where there is no provision in the statute or authorized agreement creating the liability for the payment of interest. Not only is there no statute or precedent for the payment of interest on claims like those asserted in this case, but clause 2, section 834 of Pollard's Code [the precursor to Code § 15.1-549], which provides for the examination, settlement and allowance of all accounts chargeable against the county and for the issuance of warrants therefor when settled and allowed, expressly declares that no interest shall be paid by any county on any county warrant. If the board of supervisors had allowed the claims of the city, or any of them, and issued a warrant therefor, and the county afterwards refused to pay the claim and litigated its liability, as it had the right to do ... and judgment had been rendered against it for the amount of the warrant so issued, by the plain terms of the statute, it would not have been chargeable with interest. This being so, it is difficult to see upon what ground the county would be liable for interest on the same claims when disallowed by the board of supervisors."

Id. at 608-09, 80 S.E. at 120.

The rationale that we invoked in Lynchburg v. Amherst County is equally pertinent here. The County pays its construction claims by ordering the issuance of warrants, payable on demand, which may be converted to negotiable checks. See Code § 15.1-547. That portion of the trial court's judgment awarding interest against the County is erroneous because Code § 15.1-549, which is similar to the statute that we considered in Lynchburg v. Amherst County, specifically states that "[n]o interest shall be paid on any county warrant." And, consistent with our reasoning in Lynchburg v. Amherst County, in the absence of a specific statutory authorization, we will not permit a judgment creditor to obtain an award of interest against a county because to do so would enable that judgment creditor to circumvent the express prohibition against an award of...