County of Hudson v. Department of Corrections

• Decision Date: 10 December 1997
• Parties: The COUNTY OF HUDSON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, State of New Jersey, William H. Fauver, Commissioner Department of Law and Public Safety, Juvenile Justice Commission, State of New Jersey Deborah T. Poritz, Attorney General, Defendants-Appellants. The COUNTY OF CAMDEN, a body politic of the State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Peter G. VERNIERO, AttorneyGeneral of the State of New Jersey, in his Official Capacity as Administrator of the Juvenile Justice Commission of the State of New Jersey, and Chair of the Executive Board of the Juvenile Justice Commission; Paul Donnelly, Executive Director of the Juvenile Justice Commission of the State of New Jersey, in his Official Capacity; the Juvenile Justice Commission; and the State of New Jersey; William Fauver Commissioner of Department of Law and Public Safety and Department of Corrections, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 60

152 N.J. 60

703 A.2d 268

The COUNTY OF HUDSON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, State of New Jersey, William H.

Fauver, Commissioner Department of Law and Public Safety,

Juvenile Justice Commission, State of New Jersey Deborah T.

Poritz, Attorney General, Defendants-Appellants.

The COUNTY OF CAMDEN, a body politic of the State of New

Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Peter G. VERNIERO, AttorneyGeneral of the State of New

Jersey, in his Official Capacity as Administrator of the

Juvenile Justice Commission of the State of New Jersey, and

Chair of the Executive Board of the Juvenile Justice

Commission; Paul Donnelly, Executive

Director of the Juvenile Justice Commission of the State of

New Jersey, in his Official Capacity; the Juvenile Justice

Commission; and the State of New Jersey; William Fauver

Commissioner of Department of Law and Public Safety and

Department of Corrections, Defendants-Appellants.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued Oct. 6, 1997.

Decided Dec. 10, 1997.

Daisy B. Barreto, Deputy Attorney General, for defendants-appellants (Peter Verniero, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Joseph L. Yannotti, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Ms. Barreto and Donald M. Palombi, Deputy Attorneys General, on the briefs).

Robert G. Millenky, County Counsel, for plaintiff-respondent the County of Camden (Mr. Millenky, attorney; Mr. Millenky and Donna M. Whiteside, Assistant County Counsel, on the brief).

Michael A. Cifelli, Assistant County Counsel, cause for plaintiff-respondent the County of Hudson (Francis DeLeonardis, Hudson County Counsel, attorney).

Andrew M. Baron, Assistant County Counsel, submitted a letter in lieu of brief on behalf amicus curiae, the County of Union (Jeremiah D. O'Dwyer, Acting Union County Counsel, attorney).

PER CURIAM.

The issue in this case is whether the State must comply with a duly-enacted administrative regulation that requires the transfer of state-sentenced juveniles from county to state facilities within three days. Two counties challenged the State's refusal to transfer their juvenile delinquents within the three-day time period required by the regulation.

The circumstances giving rise to this litigation are that the juvenile detention centers in both Camden and Hudson Counties are overcrowded. Overcrowding has resulted in the intermingling of state-sentenced and non-sentenced youth in the detention centers. In response to that problem, both counties demanded that the State comply with the three-day regulation and transfer the state-sentenced juveniles to State facilities within that time. The State refused to comply with the regulation because its own two juvenile facilities were overcrowded. Instead, the State adopted a policy of transferring the juveniles "as expeditiously as possible, as circumstances permit, but not always in compliance with the three day requirement."

Both counties filed notices of appeal with the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division ruled that the regulation was valid and enforceable and ordered the State to transfer the juveniles within the three-day time period as required by the regulation. 300 N.J.Super. 389, 693 A.2d 146 (1997). The State petitioned for certification and filed an emergent application for a stay of the court's judgment. The Court granted the petition for certification and granted the motion for a stay except as to the two counties involved. 149 N.J. 406, 694 A.2d 192 (1997).

We affirm the judgment upholding the validity and enforceability of the transfer regulation. Except as to Hudson and Camden Counties, that judgment is stayed for a period of sixty days from the date of this decision to enable the State to take necessary measures to comply with the time period of the transfer regulation, unless that regulation is sooner modified and superseded by a valid amendatory regulation or other legally effective State action.

I

Foreshadowing the current litigation, in 1989 the Appellate Division held unlawful the State's practice of maintaining state-sentenced juveniles in county detention centers after final disposition. County of Monmouth v. Department of Corrections, 236 N.J.Super. 523, 566 A.2d 543 (App.Div.1989). The court determined that under the then-applicable statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43, -44 (since amended), the burden of housing state-sentenced juveniles was on the State rather than the counties. Accordingly, the court ordered the Department of Corrections (DOC) to effectuate its statutory duty to house state-sentenced juveniles by promulgating regulations to provide for the removal of those juveniles from the county detention centers. County of Monmouth, supra, 236 N.J.Super. at 528, 566 A.2d 543. Pursuant to that order, in 1991, the DOC issued the three-day removal regulation, N.J.A.C. 10:19-4.2(d). The regulation provides as follows:

A juvenile who receives a State sentence of incarceration shall be transported to the juvenile intake unit at the New Jersey Training School for Boys no later than three working days after the Department of Corrections receives notification, in the form of a signed commitment order and a presentence or predisposition report, from the county where the juvenile has been sentenced. The three working days shall be exclusive of the date on which the Department of Corrections receives the appropriate and necessary documentation.

[Ibid.]

That regulation forms the basis for the holding of the Appellate Division in this case that the State is required to transfer within three days state-sentenced juveniles from county facilities to State juvenile detention facilities. The Appellate Division determined that legislation that substantially revised the juvenile justice system, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-169 to -178, and created a new agency with complete authority over the housing of juveniles in the juvenile justice system did not, as argued by the State, repeal the three-day transfer regulation, and that regulation remained valid and fully enforceable. 300 N.J.Super. at 392-94, 693 A.2d 146. We affirm the judgment substantially for the reasons of the Appellate Division as expressed by Judge Shebell.

In 1995, the Legislature enacted N.J.S.A. 52:17B-169 to -178. That statute established the Juvenile Justice Commission (JJC) to oversee all juvenile justice matters. N.J.S.A. 52:17B-170a. The State argues that the 1995 legislation creating the JJC completely revamped the entire juvenile justice system and effectively displaced the three-day transfer regulation, N.J.A.C. 10:19-4.2(d), which, as noted, the DOC had promulgated in 1991.

Prior to the establishment of the JJC, three State agencies were responsible for the juvenile justice system: the DOC, the Department of Law and Public Safety, and the Department of Human Services. N.J.S.A. 52:17B-169d. With the creation of the JJC under N.J.S.A. 52:17B-170a, the State established a single agency "responsible for developing a Statewide plan for effective provision of juvenile justice services and sanctions at the State, county and local level...." N.J.S.A. 52:17B-169k. The Governor hailed the new legislation as "overhauling the entire system" and bringing about an "efficient, unified juvenile justice system...." Remarks of Governor Christine Todd Whitman-Juvenile Justice Bill Signing (Dec. 15, 1995).

The Legislature, in effect, transferred and consolidated the authority over the juvenile justice system previously exercised by the three separate executive departments. Under N.J.S.A. 52:17B-176, the Legislature placed in the JJC all of the powers and responsibilities the other three agencies had in respect of juveniles. The Legislature empowered the JJC to establish standards for the "care, treatment, government and discipline of juveniles" adjudicated delinquent, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-170e(6), to assume the custody and care of juveniles committed to it by law, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-170e(7), to formulate and adopt standards and rules for the efficient running of the commission and its facilities, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-170e(14), and to promulgate rules and regulations necessary to effectuate the purposes of the commission, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-170e(22).

Within the JJC's enabling legislation, the Legislature specifically provided for the continuation of any regulations promulgated by the other agencies. N.J.S.A. 52:17B-177b(3) provides as follows:

All rules and regulations promulgated by the Commissioner of Corrections or the Commissioner of Human Services pertaining to functions, powers, duties and authority transferred to the commission pursuant to [52:17B-176] shall be considered rules or regulations of the commission and, as such, shall remain in full force and effect until expiration or modification by the commission in accordance with law.

[Ibid. (emphasis added).]

The State argues that the JJC enabling legislation was intended to cover the entire subject matter of juvenile justice, including the detention and housing of all juveniles coming into the juvenile justice system and charged with and sentenced for delinquency. Consequently, the State contends, this comprehensive legislative scheme supersedes any prior enactments concerning juvenile justice. The State acknowledges the statutory delegation to the JJC of the power to amend any previously-enacted regulations, along with the delegation of all prior statutory and regulatory power. Nevertheless, it argues that the existing rules, even if unrepealed and unamended by the JJC, are ineffective and unenforceable.

There is, however, no indication that the Legislature intended to supersede and nullify any existing rules, including the transfer rule, in the absence of any regulatory action by the JJC serving to repeal or modify such rules. Rather, the opposite inference is irresistible. As noted, the statute expressly provides that, as related to the responsibility delegated to the JJC over the juvenile justice system, "[a]ll rules and regulations promulgated by the [agencies...