County of Solano v. Handlery

• Decision Date: 21 September 2007
• Docket Number: No. A114120.,A114120.
• Citation: County of Solano v. Handlery, 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 201, 155 Cal.App.4th 566 (Cal. App. 2007)
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: COUNTY OF SOLANO, Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Respondent, v. Paul HANDLERY, Individually and as Trustee, etc., Defendant, Cross-complainant and Appellant.

66 Cal.Rptr.3d 201

155 Cal.App.4th 566

COUNTY OF SOLANO, Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Respondent, v.Paul HANDLERY, Individually and as Trustee, etc., Defendant, Cross-complainant and Appellant.

No. A114120.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 3.

September 21, 2007.

Jonathan R. Bass, Susan K. Jamison, Rachel G. Cohen, Coblentz, Patch, Duffy & Bass, San Francisco, for Appellant.

Dennis Bunting, Fairfield, Azniv Darbinian, Kimberly Alexander Yarbor, Steven M. Ingram, County of Solano, for Respondent.

HORNER, J.^*

This appeal arises out of an action by respondentCounty of Solano(County) to quiet title to certain real property it received as a gift from appellantPaul Handlery's parents, Rose and Harry Handlery, in 1946(the property).Below, County sought a judicial determination that it owned the property free of certain restrictions on its use that were contained in the grant deed executed by Harry and Rose Handlery in 1946, and reiterated in a quit-claim deed executed by Harry and Rose Handlery in 1947.AppellantPaul Handlery(Handlery), in turn, filed a cross-complaint seeking a judicial declaration of the parties' respective rights and obligations with respect to the property.The trial court granted summary judgment on both the complaint and cross-complaint in County's favor.For reasons set forth below, we reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 1946 and 1947, Rose and Harry Handlery(collectively, Grantors) executed two deeds conveying to County certain real property located in the City of Vallejo, Solano County.Under the first deed, a grant deed executed in 1946, Grantors conveyed the property to County in consideration for $10 for use as "a County Fair or exposition and purposes incident thereto, which may include but not necessarily be limited to a public park, playground and/or recreational area."The 1946 grant deed expressly prohibited County from selling, assigning or transferring the property, and provided that, should the County breach any condition, restriction or covenant contained in the deed, the property was to "immediately revert to the Grantors herein, their heirs, successors, administrators and assigns, and no public use or interest therein shall be deemed to have been acquired so as to divert or render ineffective said reversion...."

The second deed, a quitclaim deed executed in 1947, contained restrictions on the property's use nearly identical to those contained in the 1946 grant deed, but omitted the language providing for a right of reversion to Grantors or their heirs, successors, administrators and assigns in the case of a breach of those restrictions.Specifically, the deed provided:

"(a) Said land shall be used only for a county fair or exposition for Solano County and purposes incident thereto, which may include public parks, playground and/or recreational areas, and for such other purposes for which county fair grounds may be used.

"(b)Said County of Solano may grant rights of way for sewer, power and other utility purposes.

"(c) Said land shall not be sold, assigned, or transferred by said County of Solano."

On June 13, 1947, County adopted a resolution accepting "the quitclaim deed of the [property] which said property is conveyed to said County as a gift for a County Fair site, and other uses, as in said quitclaim deed set forth."The resolution further consented to recordation of the 1947 quitclaim deed.

Harry Handlery died October 12, 1965, and Rose Handlery died October 6, 1970.

In June 2003, County wrote a letter to Handlery, Grantors' sole heir, requesting a meeting to discuss a "new vision" for the property.Then, following a phone request from Handlery for more information regarding this "new vision," County wrote a second letter in September 2003 explaining: "Our vision has as its primary focus the renovation and reconstruction of the existing fair facilities, and a continued commitment to keeping the fair in its current location."County also stated its belief that any reversionary interest Handlery's family may have held under the 1946 grant deed had expired, but that a cloud still existed on the property's title.County expressed hope the Handlery family would work cooperatively with it to clear the property's title by executing a grant or quitclaim deed, and also stated its intention to commemorate the Handlery family "in a very significant way in [the] new fair facilities."

In June 2004, County filed suit to quiet title to the property against Handlery in his capacity both as an individual and trustee of the Harry Handlery Irrevocable Trust, the Rose H. Handlery Irrevocable Trust dated December 27, 1968, and the Rose H. Handlery Revocable Trust dated January 20, 1970.Specifically, County sought a judicial determination that it is the sole owner in fee of the property and that Handlery has no interest in the property adverse to County.

In August 2004, Handlery filed a cross-complaint against County for declaratory relief, seeking a judicial declaration of the parties' rights and obligations with respect to the property.County then moved for summary judgment on its complaint to quiet title and for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication, on Handlery's cross-complaint for declaratory relief.

On February 28, 2006, following a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of County.¹The trial court first determined that the only interest reserved by Grantors in the 1946 grant deed—the right of reverter or, as such right is now referred to under California law, the power of termination—had extinguished, either by surrender upon recordation of the 1947 quitclaim deed or by expiration due to the passage of time pursuant to Civil Code sections 885.030and885.060, subdivisions (a) and (b).The trial court then determined the use restrictions contained in the 1946 grant deed and 1947 quitclaim deed were personal covenants that had become legally unenforceable once Grantors died and the power of termination extinguished.In so concluding the trial court rejected Handlery's argument that the use restrictions were enforceable as either equitable servitudes or obligations arising under charitable trust principles.²Finally, with respect to the cross-complaint for declaratory relief, the trial court determined Handlery had no standing to enforce the use restrictions because they were personal covenants enforceable only by the original parties.

Thus, the trial court ultimately concluded "County is entitled to have title quieted in fee simple absolute as to all adverse claims and interests, including unenforceable restrictions on use and alienation imposed, by the original grantors who are now deceased."This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Handlery contends the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of County.Specifically, Handlery disputes the trial court's finding that the use restrictions in the 1946 grant deed and 1947 quitclaim deed are legally unenforceable.

A trial court's summary judgment rulings are subject to de novo review.(Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400(2001)25 Cal.4th 763, 768-769, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 617, 23 P.3d 1143;Barton v. Elexsys Internat.(1998)62 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1187, 73 Cal. Rptr.2d 212.)"In performing [the] de novo review, we must view the evidence in a light favorable to ... the losing party[citation], liberally construing [his] evidentiary submissions while strictly scrutinizing [the prevailing party's] own showing, and resolving any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in [the losing party's] favor."(Saelzler, supra,25 Cal.4th at pp. 768-769, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 617,23 P.3d 1143.)

The law of summary judgment provides courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings to determine whether trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.(2001)25 Cal.4th 826, 843, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 24 P.3d 493.)"If summary judgment was properly granted on any ground, we must affirm regardless of whether the court's reasoning was correct."(Jackson v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc.(1993)16 Cal. App.4th 1830, 1836, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 913.)

A "motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)To be entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the moving party must show by admissible evidence that the "action has no merit or that there is no [available] defense."(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a).)

A plaintiff meets this initial burden of showing that no defense exists to a cause of action by proving each element of the cause of action entitling the plaintiff to judgment.(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).)Once the plaintiff has met this burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that either' a triable issue of one or more material facts or a defense exists as to that cause of action.(Ibid.)

A cross-defendant moving for summary judgment meets his or-her initial burden of showing an action has no merit by proving that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established or that there is a complete defense to the action.(Code Civ. Proc, § 437c, subd. (p)(2);Addy v. Bliss & Glennon(1996)44 Cal.App.4th 205, 213-214, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 642.)If the cross-defendant successfully makes this showing, the burden shifts to the cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of material fact or a defense exists as to that cause of action.(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)

Applying these rules to this case, we consider whether County met its burden on summary judgment to show Handlery had no defense with respect to the complaint to quiet title to the property, and that one or more elements of the cause of action could not be established with respect to the...