County of Wayne v. City of Detroit

• Decision Date: 20 October 1868
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: The County of Wayne v. The City of Detroit

17 Mich. 390

The County of Wayne v. The City of Detroit

Supreme Court of Michigan

October 20, 1868

Heard October 14, 1868 [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material]

Error to Wayne circuit.

This was an action of assumpsit, brought by the county of Wayne to recover certain fines collected in the central police station court of the city of Detroit.

The cause was tried by the court without a jury on the following stipulation:

"It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between the plaintiff and defendant in the above entitled suit, by their respective attorneys, that on the trial of said cause, the following facts will be admitted without further proof, and stand in all respects as if regularly and conclusively proven thereon, to wit:

"First. That the plaintiff is a public corporation, under the corporate name of 'The county of Wayne,' and entitled to sue by its said corporate name.

"Second. That the defendant is a municipal corporation, capable of being sued by its corporate name, which is 'The city of Detroit.'

"Third. That the central police station court, so called, of said city of Detroit, is established and held under the provisions of an act entitled, 'An act to revise the charter of the city of Detroit, approved February 5, 1857,' approved March 12, 1861, and also under an ordinance of the city of Detroit, passed March 6, 1866, to which said ordinance reference is made for certainty.

"Fourth. That the said central police station court, so called, held its first session, and first went into operation on the 2d day of April, A. D. 1866.

"Fifth. That up to the commencement of this suit, said defendant, "The city of Detroit," has received from the said central police station court, so called, since the establishment thereof, and still retains the sum of $ 14,992 38/100, and that all of said money, so received and retained by said defendant, was received in payment of fines imposed by said court for offenses tried and determined therein.

"Sixth. That the said plaintiff has duly and legally demanded of said defendant the moneys so received by said defendant for said fines of said central police station court as aforesaid, as due the county of Wayne for the use of the several township libraries thereof, but that said defendant has refused to comply with said demand, and to pay over said moneys, or any part thereof to said plaintiff, and still does refuse to do so.

"Seventh. That the fines hereinbefore referred to were imposed upon parties complained of, and convicted of some violation of a city ordinance. In all cases the complaints made against the parties in said court, charged the offense to be contrary to the ordinances of the city, and mentioned the particular ordinance violated."

Judgment was rendered in favor of the defendant.

G. V. N. Lothrop, Geo. Hebden, prosecuting attorney, and D. B. & H. M. Duffield, for plaintiff in error:

1. The plaintiff claims these fines under article 13, section 12, of the constitution of this state.

That this includes cities as well as towns, has been virtually decided in the case or The People, etc., v. Treasurer of Wayne Co., 8 Mich. 292.

The only question in this case is, whether the term "penal laws," as used in the constitution, includes all those municipal ordinances which are passed for the protection of society and the punishment of offenses against society.

What, then, do the words "penal laws" mean as here used in the constitution?

It is not confined to any restricted class, but includes all.

This being a constitutional, not a statutory provision, these words are to be given their natural and fullest meaning: Sedgw. on Const. and Stat. Law, p. 488.

Plaintiff contends that any law deriving its authority from the supreme power of the state, either directly or indirectly, mediately or immediately, if it imposes a duty due to the public, and provides a punishment for the non-observance of that duty, is a penal law.

By whom that law is enacted, whether by the state directly or by a city through the authority delegated to it by the state, does not change its character or nature.

Whether it has primarily the supreme authority of the state to protect it, and whether it aims at the protection of the public, is the true and only test.

Any other is productive of a confusion of terms.

Compare the state law prohibiting an indecent exposure of the person with the ordinance on the same subject.

No distinction can be drawn between them. Each prohibits the act, and each provides a punishment for a disobedience of it.

Each is a rule of action, with a penalty if that rule is broken.

It is true that one is general and the other is local; but, although local, it is not confined to any particular class of persons. All who come within the boundaries of cities, no matter from what place, state or country, are amenable to it, and must obey it, or suffer the punishment for disobedience.

The language of the constitution is, "all fines assessed and collected in the several counties and townships."

Why are the words "and townships" used if it only includes legislative enactments?

Would not a fine for a breach of the state law, though it was collected in a township, be collected in the county in which that township was? and could it be collected in any county unless it was collected in some township in that county?

Suppose the provision read, "all fines assessed and collected in the city of Detroit and county of Wayne" for any breach of the penal laws. Would it not mean all laws that were strictly penal, whether they were in force only in the city of Detroit or throughout the entire country?

It is claimed that plaintiff's construction is unjust to the city; but it is not. The city has four-fifths of all the fines for breaches of state laws that are collected in the entire county. The rest of the county are entitled to and should receive onefifth of all fines for breaches collected in the city as well as the rest of the county.

But if, by prosecution under the city ordinances, they are taken from this library fund, the rest of the county can be deprived of all right to any share in the fines collected thereunder.

2. But plaintiff claims these fines for another reason.

No statute can take or direct any fund from the purpose to which the constitution has especially appropriated it: 6 Ind. 83.

The statute authorizing these fines to be paid into the city treasury does this.

The only offenses that can be tried in this central station court, are those against the ordinances prohibiting vagrancy, drunkenness, and disorderly conduct: City Ordinance, March 6, 1866.

Each of these offenses is a breach of the state law, and punishable as such: Sess. L. 1865, p. 147.

A conviction and sentence under the city ordinance would bar a prosecution under the state law: 3 Mo. 414; 1 Bishop on Cr. L., § 666; 29 Mo. 330.

If a conviction of an offense in this central station court for a violation of a city ordinance is a bar to a prosecution under the state laws for the same offense or act, clearly the fines assessed in that court must go to the school library fund. Otherwise, the legislature, by changing the mode of collection, have diverted the fines from the object to which they are appropriated by the constitution.

Gray & Moran, and T. Romeyn, for defendant in error:

The constitution, art. 4, § 38, gives full power to the legislature to confer upon townships and cities, and villages, legislative and administrative powers.

For the exercise of this power, see Revised Charter of Detroit, p. 168, § 298.

The money thus collected, and in the city treasury, is now claimed by the county for library purposes, under § 12, art. 13, constitution.

There are several questions connected with this inquiry, which are embraced in the following propositions:

1. The provisions of the constitution, art. 13, § 12, relative to fines collected in counties and townships, were not intended to embrace the city of Detroit.

The word "township," as used in the constitution, sometimes includes cities, and sometimes is used to denominate townships proper, to the exclusion of cities: 11 Mich. 65.

In this case the city of Detroit is not to be held to be within the constitutional provision, and the statutes founded on it, because:

a. Complete provisions for her school system had been founded and were in operation when the constitution was adopted. Laws of 1842, p. 112.

b. The former constitution did not specify townships. It referred only to fines assessed in counties for breaches of the general penal laws: Art. 10, § 4. This did not give to the township libraries the penalties for violation of township orders and by-laws: Rev. Stat. of 1838, p. 57; Laws of 1837, p. 121. See, also, Rev. Stat. of 1838, p. 104.

c. The present constitution specifies "all fines collected in the several counties and townships" This addition of the term "townships" to counties can not, by fair interpretation, be held to include the city of Detroit, for:

First. That city had its own system, and was provided with schools. There was no occasion to give a strained meaning to the term "township" to admit her to the benefit of the school system.

Second. There were special provisions for township libraries--C. L., § 2356--and there was a distinct provision for a library in the city: Laws of 1842, pp. 113, 114, 115.

Third. The townships may annex penalties to orders and by-laws: Comp. L., § 497. These may be sued for by the townships; and we may concede, for the purpose of this argument, that they should go to the library fund under the present constitution. These are distinct from the county fines as specified in 2 Comp. L., p. 1351.

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