Courembis v. Weinstein

• Decision Date: 19 November 1952
• Docket Number: No. 1277.,1277.
• Citation: 93 A.2d 89
• Parties: COUREMBIS v. WEINSTEIN.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

93 A.2d 89

COUREMBIS v. WEINSTEIN.

No. 1277.

Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.

Argued October 27, 1952.

Decided November 19, 1952.

Ewing Laporte, Washington, D. C., for appellant.

Alvin E. Bernstein, Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Before CAYTON, Chief Judge, and( HOOD and QUINN, Associate Judges.

CAYTON, Chief Judge.

Two questions are presented for decision: (1) whether a jury's unauthorized inclusion of interest in its verdict rendered the entire verdict invalid, and (2) whether the trial court was required to grant a motion for new trial because the judge who tried the case had died before acting on the motion.

The suit was on a promissory note for "$500 with interest at five per cent per annum from date," which date was March 7, 1950. The defendant maker alleged that there had been a failure of consideration and a breach of conditional delivery. The jury returned a verdict "For the plaintiff," and when asked, "For how much?" the foreman answered, "For the full amount $500 and interest." The court received the verdict without objection, and entered judgment for the plaintiff "for $500 with interest at six per cent from 3-7-50."

Defendant filed a motion for new trial, contending that the judge had not charged the jury that their verdict might include interest, but had only instructed them that if they found for plaintiff their verdict "might be for the sum of $500." The trial was not reported stenographically and neither the judge nor counsel for plaintiff could recall the instruction given the jury as to what interest, if any, might be added. Nevertheless plaintiff offered to have interest stricken from the verdict. The judge then took the matter under advisement, and died before ruling on the motion.

The motion was reargued before another judge. Plaintiff conceded that no instruction had been asked and none given that interest might be added, and that no objection was made to the instructions. Plaintiff again expressly waived any claim to interest, and judgment was entered for plaintiff in the amount of $500 without interest or costs.

1. Did the jury's addition of interest invalidate the entire verdict?

We note that defendant made no objection whatsoever to the verdict when it was announced by the jury. Had he done so the judge could easily have clarified the situation (a) by ruling that it was proper for the jury to include interest in the verdict, or (b) by telling the jury that such an award was not within their province and returning them to their deliberations with specific instructions to omit interest from the verdict. But defendant did not then give the judge an opportunity to have the alleged error in the verdict corrected on the spot. He did not raise the paint unit; long after the verdict was received and the jury had been discharged, and he then presented the matter for the first time in his motion for new trial.

His argument is in essence that the verdict for $500 plus interest was in excess of the amount permitted under the court's instructions, and that he was therefore entitled to have the entire verdict set aside. His argument is based on those cases which hold that where the trial court specifically sets an amount as proper, the jury is bound by that instruction. The reason for this is of course the well-established rule that a jury must follow the law as given by the court. In Stetson v. Stindt, 3 Cir., 279 F. 209, 23 A.L.R. 302, on which defendant relies and which is typical of such cases, the jury were instructed that if they found for plaintiff, their verdict should be for the balance claimed on a note which with interest amounted to $56,990.70. The jury, in disregard of the instruction rendered a verdict for $27,439.42. The appellate court held this verdict to be "directly violative of the charge of the court," and in ordering a new trial said: "It is not sufficient to say that the defendant cannot complain because he was not injured. He was injured by being deprived of the right of a litigant to have the jury determine his liability under the law as laid down by the court. That liability might be for more than the jury found; yet it might be for nothing. What his liability is, the jury refused to say; but said something else, which, under the law and on the facts, was simply untrue."

We think a different principle applies to this case. The law recognizes that if a jury goes beyond the judge's instructions, as distinguished from a failure to decide the issues submitted to it, that fact alone will not necessarily render the verdict invalid or prevent the court from entering a valid judgment thereon. The court may disregard, as surplusage, that which is outside the issues submitted to them and enter that part of the verdict which conforms to the instructions, provided it is not otherwise improper. "If a verdict, in addition to answering the issues involved contains immaterial findings or findings on matters not in issue, such portions of the verdict should be disregarded * * *." Fleming v. Collins, 190 Ga. 210, 9 S.E. 2d 157, 159.¹ Here, except for the words "and interest" we have a verdict awarding plaintiff $500, and this is no more than the jury were authorized to find.

Exactly in point is Bredel v. Parker-Russell Min. & Mfg. Co., Mo.App., 21 S.W.2d 932. The jury were instructed that if they found certain facts their verdict should be in favor of plaintiff for $2,000. A verdict was returned for $2,000 "with interest thereon at six per cent. per annum etc." The trial court treated as surplusage that portion of the verdict providing for interest and rendered judgment for only $2,000. On appeal it was held that there was no error of which defendant might complain. So too in Doty v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 223 Mo.App. 360, 16 S.W.2d 712, a jury returned a verdict for $500 "and 10%" but did not indicate what the 10% was for. That much of the verdict was held to be mere...