Cournyer v. Follett
| Decision Date | 03 December 1962 |
| Docket Number | No. 9172,9172 |
| Citation | 85 Idaho 119,376 P.2d 707 |
| Parties | Rex COURNYER, and Mary L. Cournyer, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. George FOLLETT, Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Frank V. Barton, Lewiston, for appellants.
Clements & Clements, Lewiston, for respondent.
This action is to recover damages alleged to have been caused by a collision between a pickup truck driven by plaintiff, Mary L. Cournyer, and a sedan automobile driven by defendant, George Follett. The collision occurred at the intersection of Fifth and 'F' streets in Lewiston, Idaho, on October 14, 1958. The plaintiffs, Mary L. Cournyer and her husband Rex Cournyer, contend the defendant was negligent in the operation of this vehicle and that this negligence was the proximate cause of the collision. The defendant contends the plaintiff, Mary Cournyer, was negligent in that she improperly stopped while turning right at the intersection and that this negligence contributed to and proximately caused the collision.
The parties stipulated the date of the collision; the make and ownership of the vehicles; that the plaintiff Mary L. Cournyer, was driving the truck west on 'F' street, and approaching the intersection of 'F' street and Fifth street and that she planned to enter onto Fifth street and proceed north; that the defendant was driving his automobile west on 'F' street behind the vehicle being driven by the plaintiff; and that a collision occurred at the aforesaid intersection when the front of the defendant's vehicle struck the left rear fender and bumper of the vehicle being driven by the plaintiff, Mary L. Cournyer.
The only real conflict in the testimony concerning events surrounding the collision involve the position of the vehicles at the time of the collision and the actions of the two drivers immediately preceding the collision. Plaintiffs contend that Mary Cournyer drove west on 'F' street where she halted, and while so stopped, was struck by defendant's vehicle. The defendant, however, contends that he was following the vehicle being driven by Mary Cournyer; that when she stopped at the intersection, the defendant stopped between six and eight feet behind the plaintiffs' pickup; that when Mary Cournyer then proceeded to make a right turn onto Fifth street, the defendant drove forward to the stop sign where the pickup had stopped, he then started to enter the intersection; that at this point the pickup abruptly stopped in front of the defendant and was struck by the defendant's car. Thus the conflict between the parties centers around the claim of the plaintiffs that the negligence of the defendant in driving into plaintiffs' vehicle while it was stopped at the intersection was the sole proximate cause of the collision, whereas the defendant contends Mary Cournyer had driven her vehicle into the intersection and started to make a right turn and stopped abruptly and that by so stopping the plaintiff committed an act of negligence which contributed to and was a proximate cause of the collision.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the case was submitted to the jury. The jury was instructed as to the law regarding negligence and contributory negligence. The trial court refused Plaintiffs' Requested Instruction No. 12, which dealt with the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant and judgment was entered thereon.
Plaintiffs filed a motion for a new trial on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to justify the verdict and judgment. The plaintiffs now appeal from the order denying the new trial and the judgment, contending that the trial court erred in (1) refusing to give Plaintiffs' Requested Instruction No. 12 regarding the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance, (2) refusing to grant plaintiffs' motion for a new trial, in that there was insufficient evidence to justify the verdict, and (3) entering the judgment on the verdict, on the ground that the...
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Hudson v. Cobbs
...is no substantial evidence to support the doctrine. Graham v. Milsap, supra [77 Idaho 179, 290 P.2d 744 (1955) ]; Cournyer v. Follett, 85 Idaho 119, 376 P.2d 707 (1962); Hale v. Gunter, 82 Idaho 534, 356 P.2d 223 (1960); Ralph v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 82 Idaho 240, 351 P.2d 464 (1......
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Kuhn v. Dell
...of care commensurate with the present situation of the parties.' [Citation].' Additionally this Court in Cournyer v. Follett, 85 Idaho 119, 122, 376 P.2d 707, 708, 709 (1962), "That doctrine implies thought, appreciation, mental direction and lapse of sufficient time effectually so to act a......
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Schwandt v. Bates
...them. There is an abundance of rulings by this Court to support the conclusion we have reached in the premises. In Cournyer v. Follett, 85 Idaho 119, 376 P.2d 707 (1962), the following 'Plaintiffs contention that the trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury on the doctrine of ......
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Walton v. Potlatch Corp.
...is no substantial evidence to support the doctrine. Graham v. Milsap [77 Idaho 179, 290 P.2d 744 (1955) ], supra; Cournyer v. Follett, 85 Idaho 119, 376 P.2d 707 (1962); Hale v. Gunter, 82 Idaho 534, 356 P.2d 223 (1960); Ralph v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 82 Idaho 240, 351 P.2d 464 (1......