Courtaulds Fibers, Inc. v. Long
| Decision Date | 15 September 2000 |
| Citation | 779 So.2d 198 |
| Parties | COURTAULDS FIBERS, INC. v. Horace L. LONG, Jr., et al. Horace L. Long, Jr., et al. v. Courtaulds Fibers, Inc. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Wesley Pipes, Cooper C. Thurber, and William E. Shreve, Jr., of Lyons, Pipes & Cook, P.C., Mobile; and C.C. Torbert, Jr., of Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C., Montgomery, for appellant/cross appellee Courtaulds Fibers, Inc.
Christopher E. Peters, Charles S. Willoughby, J. Keith Givens, and J. Farrest Taylor of Cherry, Givens, Peters & Lockett, P.C., Mobile, for appellees/cross appellants Horace L. Long, Jr., et al.
Joseph P.H. Babington of Helmsing, Sims & Leach, P.C., Mobile; Rhonda Pitts Chambers of Rives & Peterson, P.C., Birmingham; and Charles A. Stewart III of Sirote & Permutt, P.C., Montgomery, for amicus curiae Alabama Defense Lawyers Association.
Horace L. Long, Jr., and Margaret Long sued Courtaulds Fibers, Inc., alleging that it had released carbon disulfide (CS2) into the air, soil, and water during its manufacturing process and seeking damages based on harm they claimed to have incurred as a result of Courtaulds's actions. The Longs alleged nuisance, trespass, negligence, wantonness, and emission of an abnormally dangerous instrumentality. They sought to represent a class, and they sought both compensatory and punitive damages. Courtaulds moved for a judgment as a matter of law ("JML") on all claims, at the close of the plaintiffs' case. The trial court entered a JML as to the claims alleging wantonness and emission of an abnormally dangerous instrumentality; as to the class action claims; and as to the claim seeking punitive damages. It denied the motion as to the remaining claims. Courtaulds again moved for a judgment as a matter of law on the three remaining claims at the close of all the evidence. The court denied Courtaulds's motion and submitted the nuisance, trespass, and negligence claims to a jury; the jury returned a general verdict awarding the plaintiffs $1 million. The court entered a judgment on the jury's verdict. Courtaulds appealed. The plaintiffs cross-appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in entering the JML on their claim for punitive damages. On the appeal, we reverse and remand; we dismiss the cross-appeal.
In or about 1952, Courtaulds began manufacturing rayon fabric at its Axis, Alabama, plant. In the manufacture of this fabric, Courtaulds uses CS2, which has been designated by the Federal Government as a hazardous material. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1). Some amount of CS2 is released into the environment during Courtaulds's production of rayon. In the 1960s, Mr. Long came into possession of a tract of land in Creola, Alabama, that is located approximately three to four miles from Courtaulds's Axis plant. In 1985, he began to keep horses on a portion of this land; in 1988 he married and he and Mrs. Long moved into a house he had built on the property. Mr. Long contended at trial that he noticed the smell of CS2 before 1987, and that beginning in that year the smell became a problem for him. Specifically, he complains that it caused a burning sensation in his nose and throat and prevented him from enjoying the use of his property.
In 1991, the Longs noticed that the horses they kept on the property were beginning to lose weight and to have difficulty breathing. They had the horses examined by a number of veterinarians. Two of these horses died, and the Longs presented expert testimony at trial indicating that they had died as a result of exposure to a toxic substance. One veterinarian, Dr. Frederick W. Oehme, testified that he believed the CS2 caused the illness and death of the horses.
In addition to the testimony concerning the damage or loss they claimed to have sustained as a result of the illnesses contracted by their horses, the Longs also offered testimony indicating that the value of the land had decreased by approximately $3 million because of the known presence of CS2.
Courtaulds presents five issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying its motion for a JML on the Longs' nuisance claim; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying its motion for a JML on the Longs' trespass claim; (3) whether the trial court erred in denying its motion in limine to exclude testimony from the Longs' veterinary toxicologist expert; (4) whether the trial court erred in denying its motion for a JML on the Longs' claim of damages for mental anguish; and (5) whether the trial court erred in denying its motion for a new trial. In their cross-appeal, the Longs contend the trial court erred in entering a JML on their claim for punitive damages.
In its motion for a JML made at the close of all the evidence, Courtaulds challenged, with specificity, the sufficiency of the evidence to support the nuisance claim. In Aspinwall v. Gowens, 405 So.2d 134, 138 (Ala.1981), this Court held:
However, if the defendant makes the specific objection, then this Court will not assume that the verdict was returned on a valid claim or count and will reverse for a new trial on the valid claims or counts. AALAR, Ltd., Inc. v. Francis, 716 So.2d 1141, 1149 (Ala.1998).
Courtaulds's motion for a JML made at the close of the plaintiffs' case and its motion for a JML made at the close of all the evidence both contain the following paragraph:
The Longs contend that the evidence indicating that the defendant had failed to use "carbon-bed-absorption" recovery technology was substantial evidence indicating that the defendant had negligently or improperly operated its plant. However, the record contains no evidence indicating that the defendant violated its permit from the Alabama Department of Environmental Management ("ADEM"). In addition, during the period 1993-97, the defendant installed improved rayon-spinning machines; the installation of these machines increased the rate of CS2 recovery and substantially reduced emissions.
The Longs also argue that carbon bed absorption is the industry practice in the United States, and, therefore, that Courtaulds acted negligently by not following that practice. Even if a jury can consider industry practice as evidence of a duty, the breach of which would constitute negligence, the record contains no evidence indicating that carbon bed absorption is the industry practice. The record does contain evidence indicating that the defendant's indirect parent company, Courtaulds PLC, used carbon bed absorption in its plants in Europe. Certainly, this fact alone—and that is all that is before us in regard to this argument—does not constitute substantial evidence indicating that the defendant was negligent in failing to retrofit its Axis plant with carbon-bedabsorption technology. The plaintiffs presented no expert testimony on this issue, and they presented no testimony indicating the defendant breached any standard or acted unreasonably by not installing carbon-bed-absorption technology in the Axis plant.
We will not assume negligence; we will not assume improper operation. Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-127(a), provides:
"No ... manufacturing or other industrial plant or establishment ... shall be or become a nuisance, private or public, by any changed conditions in and about the locality thereof after the same has been in operation for more than one year when such plant, facility, or establishment, its appurtenances or the operation thereof was not a nuisance at the time the operation thereof began [no evidence in the record indicates the defendant's plant was a nuisance in 1952]; provided, that the provisions of this subsection shall not apply whenever a nuisance results from the negligent or improper operation of any such plant...."
Given the provisions of this statute, to support the verdict in this case the plaintiffs had to present substantial evidence of "negligent or improper operation of [Courtaulds's] plant." The record contains no substantial evidence indicating "negligent or improper operation." Thus, § 6-5-127(a) bars the plaintiffs' nuisance claim. The trial court erred in denying Courtaulds's motion for a JML on that claim.
Furthermore, because in its JML motion Courtaulds specified the particular reasons the plaintiffs could not recover on the negligence and nuisance claims, we cannot assume that the jury's general verdict was returned on a valid claim or count in the complaint. Therefore, we must reverse for a new trial on the valid remaining claims. AALAR, 716 So.2d at 1149.
As shown above, the nuisance and negligence claims were not supported by substantial evidence, but we conclude that the plaintiffs did present sufficient evidence for the court to submit the trespass claim to the jury. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause for a new trial on only the trespass claim.
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