Courtney v. Charles Dowd Box Co.

• Citation: 341 Mass. 337,169 N.E.2d 885
• Parties: . v. CHARLES DOWD BOX CO., Inc. Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester
• Decision Date: 07 November 1960
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

Page 885

169 N.E.2d 885

341 Mass. 337

John F. COURTNEY et al. v. CHARLES DOWD BOX CO., Inc.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.

Argued Sept. 27, 1960.

Decided Nov. 7, 1960.

Warren H. Pyle, Boston, for plaintiffs.

James A. Crotty, George H. Mason, Worcester, and John P. Dunn, for defendant.

Before WILKINS, C. J., and SPALDING, WILLIAMS, WHITTEMORE and CUTTER, JJ.

WILKINS, Chief Justice.

The plaintiffs, who are members of the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, and its Local 5158, both individually and on behalf of all the members, bring this bill in equity to enforce a collective bargaining agreement with the defendant. The defendant filed a demurrer to the bill and a 'motion to dismiss' for want of jurisdiction, and appealed from interlocutory decrees overruling the demurrer and denying the motion to dismiss. The case was referred to a master. The defendant raisies questions relating to the master, the hearings before him, and his reports. The final decree declared the agreement to be valid, and ordered the payment of specific amounts to members of the class for whom the suit was brought. The defendant appealed.

1. The defendant urges that 'this action is within the purview of § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 ¹ (commonly referred to as the Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. (1952) § 185 [29 U.S.C.A. § 185], and that Congress in enacting said § 301 evidenced an intention to occupy the field of litigation involving violations of collective bargaining agreements when interestate commerce would be affected thereby.' We do not accept the contention that State courts are without jurisdiction. The statute does not so declare. The conferring of jurisdiction in actions at law upon the appropriate District Courts of the United States is not, in and of itself, a deprivation of an existing jurisdiction both at law and in equity in State courts. The case principally relied upon by the defendant, Textile Wkrs. Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972, does not so state. In the absence of a clear holding by the Supreme Court of the United States that Federal jurisdiction has been made exclusive, we shall not make what would be tantamount to an abdication of the hitherto undoubted jurisdiction of our own courts. Our decision in Karcz v. Luther Mfg. Co., 338 Mass. 313, 317, 155 N.E.2d 441, has gone far to adumbrate the position now taken, namely that there is concurrent jurisdiction in Federal and State courts over suits for enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement. Other State court decisions are in accord. McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal.2d 45, 57-60, 315 P.2d 322, certiorari denied sub nom. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters v. McCarroll, 355 U.S. 932, 78 S.Ct. 413, 2 L.Ed.2d 415; Coleman Co., Inc. v. International Union, United Auto., Aircraft & Agricultural Implement Wkrs. of America (UAW-CIO), 181 Kan. 969, 973-974, 317 P.2d 831; Steinberg v. Mendel Rosenzweig Fine Furs, Inc., 9 Misc.2d 611, 167 N.Y.S.2d 685; Anchor Motor Freight N. Y. Corp. v. Local Union No. 445 of Intl. Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, 12 Misc.2d 757, 171 N.Y.S.2d 506, 509; General Elec. Co. v. International Union United Auto., Aircraft & Agricultural Implement Wkrs. of America, 93 Ohio App. 139, 153-156, 108 N.E.2d 211, appeal dismissed 158 Ohio St. 555, 110 N.E.2d 424; Springer v. Powder Power Tool Corp., Or. ² . General Bldg. Contractors' Ass'n v. Local Union No. 542, 370 Pa. 73, 79-80, 87 A.2d 250, 32 A.L.R.2d 822; Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local Union No. 1291, 382 Pa. 326, 332-333, 115 A.2d 419, 733.

The defendant's 'motion to dismiss' for want of jurisdiction was rightly denied. No other ground of demurrer has been argued. The demurrer was rightly overruled.

2. On October 3, 1957, the case was referred to a master under the usual rule to 'hear the parties, find the facts and report his findings to the court, together with such questions of law, arising in the course of his duty, as any party may request.' Rule 86 of the Superior Court (1954).

The master's report was filed on December 27, 1957. On January 22, 1958, the plaintiffs filed a motion that the court 'enter a decree in accordance with the findings, rulings and decision of the master's reports [sic] filed in the above matter.' On May 15, 1958, this was allowed by indorsement on the motion, and on May 22 an interlocutory decree was entered also allowing the motion. From this decree the defendant appealed. On June 19 the plaintiffs' motion 'for assessment of damages' was allowed in an interlocutory decree, which also referred the suit to the same master 'for the assessment of damages only.' From this decree the defendant also appealed. On January 22, 1960, a 'master's supplemental report' was filed. A motion to confirm the supplemental report was allowed on February 18, 1960. The final decree was entered on February 23, and the defendant appealed.

The allowance of the motion for a decree in accordance with the report was irregular. The report first should have been expressly confirmed. 'The findings of the master are entitled to no weight whatever until established by confirmation.' Peteros v. Peteros, 328 Mass. 416, 421, 104 N.E.2d 149, 152, and cases cited. The defendant argues that the allowance of the motion was an implied confirmation of the report, and we agree. It does not follow, however, as the defendant also contends, that the judge was without power to recommit the report to the master for the finding of further facts, to wit, as to damages. The expression of the motion in the terms of the assessment of damages was, at most, a formal defect which did not destory the substance of the judge's action in allowing it. In Cutter v. Arlington Casket Co., 255 Mass. 52, 57, 151 N.E. 167, 168, it was said, 'Upon the coming in of a master's report the court in its discretion may overrule the exceptions thereto, confirm that report and recommit the case to the master for further report without request of parties, if the nature of the matter under consideration requires further investigation and finding of further facts not inconsistent with the confirmed report; for example, the statement of an account between persons found by the report to be partners or to stand in a fiduciary relation to each other.' The case at bar presents a similar situation. A like practice was followed in Flynn v. Curtis & Pope Lumber Co., 245 Mass. 291, 293, 139 N.E. 533. In the case at bar the judge's action was in the interest of avoiding delay in the termination of the controversy, and is to be looked upon with favor. See Eastern Bridge & Structural Co. v. Worcester Auditorium Co., 216 Mass. 426, 431, 103 N.E. 913.

3. The defendant arguest that the master exceeded...